



Final Report: Part II

Social inequalities among young people and their responses through social innovation in ten European cities

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Introduction

Part II of the Final Report brings together the first and second phases of research which informed the action research, on which the later stages of CITISPYCE were based. The first phase (Chapter 3) comprised a base-line comparative study of inequalities affecting young people in ten major cities across Europe. Using key secondary statistical data, it identified a number of drivers of social inequality at a macro level. The second phase was divided into two fieldwork studies in the same ten cities. Two neighbourhoods characterised as ‘deprived’¹ were identified in each city and used as the primary fieldwork sites. The first stage of fieldwork (Chapter 4) looked at the meso-level of society and examined the contribution of neighbourhoods and public services on social inequalities of young people using quantitative and qualitative methods. The second (Chapter 5) focused on the micro-level and the lived experiences of inequalities based on individual encounters with young people.

Whilst we recognise that dividing social investigation into these separate levels is problematic, the analytical distinction between them was set as a heuristic to guide successive phases of the research and allowed us to apply different approaches, procedures and methods. This allowed us to obtain a more rounded picture of the reality from different perspectives. The aim was to encourage reflexivity in our reports and to uncover the interplay of factors between these three levels to help understand how social inequalities are (re)produced and how they may be counteracted. We have, therefore, incorporated the original comparative reports from the two phases in their entirety into this Final report so that the relationship between their findings and conclusions can be clearly seen. References in the following chapters may refer to WP2, WP3, WP4 which are the Work Packages that form the contents of Chapters 3, 4 and 5 respectively.

¹ See Chapter 4

Chapter 3: Causes of Inequality affecting young people in 10 European cities

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1. Introduction

Citispyce means “Combating Inequalities through Innovative Social Practices of and for Young People in Cities across Europe”. The objectives of the project are set in the framework of the Social Innovation Europe Initiative and follow on from the establishment of the European Platform against Poverty, the Social Innovation Pilot within the European Social Fund, the PROGRESS programme and the focus on young people and employment through Youth on the Move and New Skills for New Jobs. They come together around the key question: In the rapidly redrawn landscape of deprivation and inequalities across Europe, how might policymakers (at local, national and EU levels) be assisted in their objectives to tackle inequalities through learning from innovative strategies developed for and by young people and particularly those from marginalised groups in major European cities, including an elaboration of the resources and technologies at the heart of these social innovations?

In order to achieve that, we first of all need to know about the inequalities that are supposed to be combated through innovative social practices of and for young people in cities across Europe. Accordingly, this report aims to fulfil that need and in that way present a basis for the further work in the Citispyce project. The report deals with the inequalities, but not by restricting itself to the symptoms. It aims to go beyond the symptoms and identify the causes. Such analyses will show that the symptoms may be the same in two cities, for example in terms of youth unemployment, but the causes different. As agreed in the project, social practices to combat inequalities have to be directed at the causes to become successful and innovative. The symptoms of inequality are of course important, but mainly as point of departures for further analyses of the causes.

The report builds on 10 reports, dealing with the cities in their national contexts, written by national teams in the Citispyce project (see References). In order to make the descriptions of symptoms in these 10 reports similar, 14 indicators were selected (see Annex). All of them are

well known, established and defined within the EU. They are used in the work within the *EU Youth Strategy* (European Commission, 2009), the framework for European cooperation in the youth field (2010-2018). Two recent publications, *EU Youth Report* (European Commission, 2012) and a report by Eurofound (2012), contain values for all the indicators, specified for the national levels. The 10 national teams were asked to try to find the corresponding values at the city level. If they were not successful, it would perhaps be possible to determine whether values were higher or lower. These values or estimates have then served as a basis for the analyses of the causes (see Annex).

Regarding the causes of inequalities, this report runs counter to the wisdom that has characterized a lot of economics and politics during the last decades (see Section 6). The report suggests that a capitalist economy has to be regulated. Thus, totally deregulated capitalist economies do not exist and when deregulations are carried out, one can expect that the fundamentally contradictory content of the capitalist economy gets out in the open, so to speak, engendering instability and conflict (Jessop, 2013). These structural contradictions (basically deriving from the exchange- and use-value aspects of the commodity), for example the one between labour-power as a use-value and capital as an exchange value, are one of the reasons to why a capitalist economy has to be regulated. The other reason is that a capitalist economy cannot reproduce itself. For example, children have to be born, raised and educated in order for labour-power to be available. People have to make decisions about buying the commodities produced and thus needs have to be engendered. Historically, it took a while for people to become mass consumers. Among other things, people need to feel sufficiently secure about their future. The welfare state has had as one of its purposes to make them feel that.

This means that the economy cannot be studied separately. It has to be understood in its “inclusive sense” (Jessop, 2002: 5) and in this report, this will have two implications. Firstly, it means that the relationships between growth and welfare will be highlighted. It turns out that there are crucial differences between the countries regarding this relationship, which then may explain the differences in the causes of inequality. That will be conceptualized as regimes of capital accumulation. Secondly, it means that extra-economic mechanisms and structural forms contributing to the regulation of the economy have to be brought into the picture. One such structural form is the wage relation, another one is the state and we will focus on the specific configurations of state, market, family and social economy known as welfare regimes. These regimes will be regarded as structural forms, decisive for the regulation of the capitalist economy.

This view expressed above belongs to the perspective called regulation theory (Aglietta, 1987). The implications of it will be clarified in Section 4. Another guiding theory of this report

concerns causes. They are not always what they seem to be; and what seems to be is not always the cause. Furthermore, often nothing seems to be the cause; although a cause certainly exists but it does not seem so, as we may not be able point it out. For that reason, we have to ask ourselves what can have a potential to be a cause.

Such a line of inquiry has its basis in the scientific paradigm called critical realism (Jessop, 2005) which distinguishes between the real, the actual and the empirical. Something must have the causal force to make people unemployed before they become it. Critical realism identifies such a causal force at the level of the real. Whether people do become unemployed (the actualisation of it), however, depends on various circumstances interacting at the level of the actual. Finally, that should be distinguished from how we perceive it, which is a matter of the empirical and may be indicated by, for example the unemployment rate.

The distinction between the real and the actual explains how the same causal forces can operate in different contexts but get different outcomes due to the differences in actualisation. In one of the articles resulting from the EU project Social Polis,² Pratschke and Morlicchio (2012: 1895) express the same thought when they refer to it as generative mechanisms that “combine to produce differing outcomes in a context-dependent way”. This means that we cannot take the indicators for granted and that is what the distinction between the actual and the empirical implies. The indicators may be well defined and technically superb but do not speak for themselves. It is we who have to speak for them by interpreting them critically. As stated above, the indicators should only be regarded as point of departures.

The critical realist view of causes enables us also to understand that what is a symptom, effect or solution can also become a cause and problem. For example, unemployment of young people may be regarded as an effect but it also causes a lot of problems; another example is the welfare state, which seems to solve problems as it regulates the economy and makes it run more smoothly. The welfare state also causes its own problems, however, regarding, for example, the conditions for getting benefits or access to public housing. Thus, what seems to be solutions can also be, or turn into, problems. This was underlined by the Hamburg team in a contribution to the WP2 Strategy report:

Nationality and age open and close doors to services, and the reason for this is no other than the very make-up of the welfare system itself that draws clear boundaries around citizenship (citizen vs alien) or age (child vs adult). Secondly, the institutions of inclusion may in practice provoke

² Available at: <http://www.socialpolis.eu/> (accessed 9 October 2013)

exclusion through mechanisms of institutional discrimination, just think about the last riots in France which were clearly directed against discriminatory state practices in schools etc., or think about the conditionalities built into the workfare approach of employment policies - not handing out benefits to people because they fail to apply for jobs means in reality that they will face deeper hardship than before rather than anything else.

The objective of this report is to compare the 10 reports on the cities in their national contexts. The cities can probably be compared in many different ways, but here the comparisons have been made with the purpose of serving the forthcoming work packages. Since the view of this report is that in order to combat inequalities, social practices have to be directed at the causes to be regarded as innovative, the analyses finishes with a chapter where some conclusions are drawn about what these causes may be. But first of all, the 10 cities are presented on the basis of how they are presented in the 10 reports (Section 2).

Thereafter (Section 3), the focus turns to the symptoms of inequality and one of the 14 indicators will be highlighted, the NEET. That means the young people not in employment, education or training. There are several reasons why we have chosen to highlight the NEET indicator. Firstly, it is a major indicator because it covers not only one symptom of inequality but at least three (employment, education and training) and also often other symptoms related to that, like for example discrimination. Secondly, the NEET indicator is particularly useful as a way of leading into a more theoretical discussion, including problematising concepts such as social exclusion and aiming at improving the understanding of young people's situation and what it depends on. At the local level, however, the NEET indicator has not been available with the same definition in all the 10 cities. That shows the difficulties of finding indicators which may be used for comparisons.

Then, in Section 4 we turn to the causes of inequality, starting with the ones associated with the growth models. In Section 5 the exploration of causes continues with the welfare regimes. Section 6 highlights two major and general trends from a European perspective. Both these trends have been engendered by the political project called neo-liberalism. It has on the one hand caused a divergence between and within European societies. On the other hand, it has made them converge in the sense of being increasingly imprinted by neo-liberalism. Finally, based on the analyses and as a kind of conclusions, Section 7 outlines seven prospects for social innovations.

It is important to note that this report represents a critical interpretation of the 10 reports and information provided in other ways. The report does not simply convey the content in the 10 reports. It is the view of the author that such a procedure would not have been scientifically

justified. It is also the author who is responsible for the selection of theories and literature by which the critical interpretations and analyses have been made. All the teams have, however, been given the opportunity to read and comment on a previous version of this report. All these comments have been considered by the author to the best of his ability. The responsibility for the final result, however, with its remaining shortages, lies with the author.

2. Ten European cities

The 10 European cities are very different. All the cities, however, can be regarded as capitals, although only two in the national sense and the others regionally. Some of the cities are very old, in particular Athens, one of the oldest cities in the world. Others were previously very prosperous industrial cities which have gone through a hard time of industrial decline. Some of them have managed to change their identity, like Malmö. In contrast, Birmingham seems to have got stuck in between the old and the new, while Rotterdam remains as the working class stronghold, the city where you earn the money you spend in Amsterdam, according to a popular saying (Spies and Tan, 2013: 3).

Some cities have been very much affected by the crisis, like Athens, while in Hamburg things have never been better. Also Brno looks optimistically towards the future. In two of the cities, Krakow and Rotterdam, there do not seem to be any serious problems at all, according to the reports. In especially one city, history means a lot and that is Barcelona, the city that gains strength from its history and sees itself as champion in the contemporary struggles against the central power in Spain. That probably provides something for young people to identify with, making life a little more meaningful, and that is also a reason for mentioning it. The cities differ in terms of the meaning and identities they offer young people. Inequality is certainly about jobs, housing, education and politics, but also about meaning which will be made clear later in this report.

Another city with a rich historical and cultural heritage is Venice. It does not, however, provide the same opportunities as Barcelona for young people to gain strength from this heritage. According to the Venice report (Campomori et al., 2013: 19), the history of trades and cosmopolitanism, but also the working class tradition and the strong presence of migrants have made Venice an open city, acceptant towards strangers. This feature is anchored in the Old Town of Venice which during the last decades, however, has been invaded by tourists. In this emergent “touristic monoculture”, many young people cannot afford to live any longer and have been forced to move. The Venice report (Campomori et al., 2013: 21) describes the city as

“heartbroken by the disruption of social ties that have suddenly taken shape in the last thirty years, polarized between an ‘Old Town-museum’ (‘Old-Town-Disneyland’) and a ‘mainland-dormitory’, as a melancholic because of the progressive emptying of young population that appears unstoppable and because of the lack of generational turnover caused by the projection of the new generations to other contexts and by their lack of attachment to the city and to its history”.

In terms of population, the cities range from 270.000 (Venice) to almost 2 million people (Hamburg and Barcelona). That is not particularly significant, however, as all the cities are included in wider metropolitan regions with much bigger populations of between half a million (Brno) and 5 million people (Barcelona) or even 7 million of the Randstad in The Netherlands. Thus, as centres of metropolitan regions they all offer a wide range of opportunities for young people. The difference in opportunities between cities has nothing to do with size. It is not because some of the cities are small that there is a lack of opportunities.

More interesting is the change of populations in the cities. Athens stands out as the city which has lost a substantial part of its population. In fact, the registered population of Greece has diminished significantly from 10.206.539 in 2001 to 9.903.268 in 2011 (Avatangelou et al., 2013: 3). Malmö constitutes the opposite pole, being one of the fastest growing cities in Europe. The other eight cities have either increased a little (Barcelona, Birmingham, Brno, Hamburg and Sofia) or remained around the same size (Krakow, Rotterdam and Venice). According to the Athens report, the decrease of population in Greece and in Athens depends on, amongst other things, low fertility rates, but also large-scale emigration and that makes it even worse because, as the Athens report (Avatangelou et al., 2013: 3) mentions, “the majority of emigrants are well educated young people who move towards other European countries in search of employment and better living conditions”.

Particularly worrying is that Greece has lost as much as a fifth of its young population (age 15-29) during the last decade, falling to below 18% of the entire population. That makes Greece a middle range country in relation to the share of young people. Among the ten cities, Krakow and Rotterdam have the highest share of young people, amounting to 22% of the population, followed by Brno with 20%.

Athens is not only the city with the highest emigration. It probably also has the highest immigration, although a lot of it is undocumented. In 2010, according to FRONTEX, 9 out of 10 immigrants who illegally entered Europe did that via Greece (Avatangelou et al., 2013: 4). This could be well explained by the fact that a large number of immigrants do not have Greece as their final destination, but rather use it as a transit point in order to reach other European countries (Kitsantonis, 2007). Due to the fact that other member states do not want to receive

them, they remain in Greece and end up living in specific areas of Athens, many of them working in the informal sector and in that way contributing to the growth of that sector.

Barcelona has also experienced a rapid increase of immigrants, but of a different character. Previously, Spain has been characterized by emigration. It changed at the end of the 1990s when large numbers of foreigners started entering Spain, mainly because they could get a job there. From 2001 to 2012, the ratio of foreign nationals living in the city has risen significantly, from 6,3% to 17,4% of the population. As Latin American immigrants represent the largest continental group, constituting 41% of the immigrant population, many immigrants obviously speak the Spanish language. Regarding the rest, Europeans amount to 30%, which also creates favourable conditions for a social integration. In addition, large numbers of undocumented immigrants live in Barcelona, corresponding to roughly 17% of the immigrant population according to estimates (Barcelona report). The proportion of immigrants has increased particularly rapidly, from approximately 3.9% in the year 2000 to 29.9% twelve years later of the youth population (15-24) of Barcelona.


A city which has a much longer experience of immigration is Birmingham. Currently, 22% of the city's residents were born outside the UK. Due to the status of English as a world language and because many immigrants in the UK have their background in English-speaking countries, speaking the language of the majority does not imply the challenge that it does in, for example, Malmö where almost none of the immigrants, except for the Danes, understand Swedish on their arrival. Among the ten cities, Malmö seems to have the highest share of people born abroad, namely 30%, although the figures are difficult to compare. Hamburg as well as Rotterdam (21%) have high proportion of people born in other countries. In contrast, less than 1% of the population in Krakow was born abroad. Also Brno and Sofia have very low proportions of people born abroad. In these cities, however, another ethnic division prevails, one between the majority and the Roma community.

All these differences between the cities immediately raise a question about comparability. How is it possible to compare the cities when they are so different? They are not, however, supposed to be compared in general. The comparisons should focus on the symptoms and causes of inequality affecting young people. For that reason, we have selected 14 indicators of such symptoms as points of departure for further examinations of the causes. As explained in the introduction, one of these indicators has turned out to be particularly useful. That is the NEET indicator, indicating what all the cities have in common, although to different extent, "the not included".

3. NEETs – the not included

A major indicator of inequality is the so-called NEET (young people not in employment, education or training). The EU Youth Report (2013: 211) points out the NEETs as the “group of young people mainly at risk of poverty and social exclusion”. According to the Youth Report (2013: 211), in 2011, 12.9 % of young people in the EU-27 were classified as NEETs. Among the countries in our project, Bulgaria had the highest share of NEETs with 22,6% (age 15-24). The share of NEETs was high also in Greece, Spain and Italy, but particularly low in the Netherlands (European Commission, 2012b).

Diagram 1. Young people (15-24) not in employment, education or training (NEET), 2011



As the Malmö report (Grander, 2013: 6) states, in Malmö “those born abroad are overrepresented in the NEET category”. That means that in addition to not being in employment, education or training many of them are probably affected by discrimination. Furthermore, many of them probably live in specific areas of the city, thus with concentration of NEETs and where others in a similar situation, the “almost-NEETs”, live.

As mentioned in the quote above from the EU Youth Report, the NEETs are associated with social exclusion. According to the Youth Report (2013: 199), “social exclusion brings about a vicious circle of unemployment or low-quality employment and poor living conditions with limited access to education and training, health care and social and community networks and activities. In short, it adversely affects all aspects of young people’s lives”. Social exclusion can,

however, be a controversial term as it may be used to stigmatize and thus aggravate the problems rather than solving them. For that reason, if we are to use it, we should very carefully define it and specify the purpose of using it.

The EU has since 2004 defined social exclusion as (European Commission, 2012b: 144) “a process whereby certain individuals are pushed to the edge of society and prevented from participating fully by virtue of their poverty, or lack of basic competencies and lifelong learning opportunities, or as a result of discrimination. This distances them from job, income and education and training opportunities, as well as social and community networks and activities. They have little access to power and decision-making bodies and thus often feel powerless and unable to take control over the decisions that affect their day to day lives.”

One of the major problems with the concept concerns if it refers to a process or a state (situation). The EU report *Employment and Social development in Europe 2012* expresses both these meanings, without paying attention to the very important difference between them. On the one hand, social exclusion is referred to as a process, as in the definition above, but then there is said to be “consensus that it can also mean being deprived of other aspects of life in a rich European society, such as access to paid employment, quality education, health and health care, housing, public benefits, and social contacts.” (European Commission, 2012b: 145) Being in a state of deprivation, however, is something else than the process of depriving.

As clarified in for example Collins English Dictionary, the term exclusion has two different meanings, the one referring to a process and the other to a state. While in English, the one and the same term carries both meanings, different terms are used in for example Swedish. The term used by the Swedish government, “utanförskap”, corresponds to only one of the meanings carried by the English term social exclusion. In Swedish, the term is used as a noun, referring to a state.

That is not how many scientists define it (for example Byrne, 2005; Madanipour et. al., 2003: 22). It is seen as an on-going process and Byrne (2005: 2) stresses the benefits of such a definition: “When we talk and write about ‘social exclusion’ we are talking about changes in the whole of society that have consequences for some of the people in that society.” Byrne asks us to pay attention to the inherent dynamics of the term because it points out something that happens in time. The term is also clearly systemic, Byrne claims, as it is about the nature of social systems and also has an implication for agency: “ ‘Exclusion’ is something that is done by some people to other people”.

In British politics, however, a definition of social exclusion as a state prevails, according to Fairclough (2000: 54), as “in the language of New Labour social exclusion is an outcome rather

than a process – it is a condition people are in rather than something that is done to them.” It is used to present people and places as excluded but without the slightest trace of someone causing it, other than themselves. Fairclough (2000: 65) concludes that New Labour has replaced the quest for equality with the desire for more inclusion.

The objective of equality in left politics has been based on the claim that capitalist societies by their nature create inequalities and conflicting interests. The objective of social inclusion by contrast makes no such claim – by focusing on those who are excluded from society and ways of including them, it shifts away from inequalities and conflicts of interest among those who are included and presupposes that there is nothing inherently wrong with contemporary society as long as it is made more inclusive through government policies.

This is the definition that the Swedish alliance government has imported by translating social exclusion to “utanförskap”. Levitas traces the roots of this view in the sociology of Emile Durkheim. Its main characteristic consists of taking the existing social order for granted. Society is seen as obvious and natural. The individual must adapt to it. Disorder depends on individuals who have not adapted and therefore should be blamed. Levitas (2005: 188) sees it as a “neo-Durkheimian hegemony”, which removes the critique of capitalism from the political agenda.

But will a process-definition of social exclusion be sufficient to bring the full potential of that critique back? The answer here is no, because the process-definition also tends to take society for granted, although not necessarily the contemporary one. It conjures up the vision of a society that does not exclude and where social exclusion becomes the exception. It makes us believe that we are all basically included, but in modern and functionally differentiated societies we are not.

According to Marx (1996), following the French physiocrats and Adam Smith, capitalism requires a separation of work from the ownership of its material conditions. There must be people who volunteer to work for others because they do not own anything and therefore cannot work for themselves. They have to be outside, so to speak, before they can come inside. They must be out of work to be compelled to take one. Marx calls it “primitive accumulation” and what he conceptualises as capitalism’s point of departure can be understood as a state of social exclusion.

Harvey (2010: 48) updates the concept of primitive accumulation by renaming it as “accumulation by dispossession”. By that he wants to highlight that primitive accumulation does not only belong to the earlier stages of capitalism. It continues to happen and indeed, puts an imprint on contemporary society, by the use of illegal means, “such as violence, criminality, fraud and

predatory practices of the sort that have been uncovered in recent times in the subprime mortgage market”. But also legal means are deployed, including “privatisation of what were once considered common property resources (like water and education), the use of the power of eminent domains to seize assets, widespread practices of takeovers, mergers and the like that result in ‘asset stripping’, and renegeing on, say, pension and health care obligations through bankruptcy proceedings”.

Dispossession means excluding, thus reaffirming the definition of the term as a verb. But all these processes of social exclusion tend to reproduce a fundamental precondition of capitalism, namely the state of social exclusion. This argument seems consistent with the view held by Luhmann who distinguishes between pre-modern and modern societies (Braeckman, 2006). In pre-modern societies, Luhmann claims, the individual is basically included due to family bonds. Being inside and included is linked to the individual as a person, thus, one is either completely included or excluded. Moreover, one is included in only one sub-system, as in pre-modern society households constitute the sub-systems. Each such sub-system can be characterised as multifunctional, i.e. it serves many functions.

Modern societies are instead functionally differentiated. The various sub-systems perform different functions. The same individual is now participating as a voter, consumer, student and/or music fan, but in different sub-systems. No one is, for example, neither just a voter nor a consumer. We are both voters and consumers, but in different sub-systems and thus with different conditions for being included. In order for the individual to appear and feel as a whole individual, she/he must reconcile what in reality is systemically separated. Beck (1998: 220) describes it as a separation between subsystems which runs right through the individual and which the individual has to integrate in her/his life history. In modern society, the individual is basically excluded.

Therefore, social exclusion should neither solely be defined as a process (verb) nor as a state (noun), but as both. It is a matter of both excluding people and the state they are in. Accordingly, both the causes that exclude people and the conditions that hinder people from getting included have to be analysed. It might be argued that using the term social exclusion in its form as a state, “utanförskap” in Swedish, contributes to stigmatisation. That is certainly a risk but the term also helps recognising a particular situation. For what should the result of dispossession be called when it also means being excluded from any influence in society? We may call it a state of social exclusion (Braeckman, 2006: 74); and it is this state of social exclusion which some of the reports describe.

Using the term social exclusion both as a noun and as a verb paves the way for a fundamental critique of contemporary society. Moreover, it makes it possible to recognize the excluded on their own conditions. Being excluded does not necessarily equate with being useless or worthless. More specifically, it means that you do not fulfil the conditions for being included or perhaps do not want to fulfil them. The European Commission (European Commission, 2012b: 144) actually hints at such a definition when they claim that “situations of poverty and social exclusion are relative in time and space”. Relative to what? Such a line of inquiry is very seldom pursued, probably because it opens up the scope for a critique of contemporary society. Perhaps the main problem is not a matter of the excluded young people lacking competencies, but that society fails to recognize and make use of it. We will return to this last point in Section 6.


Using the term social exclusion both as a noun and as a verb enables two sets of questions regarding the inequality affecting young people. Firstly, what are the conditions that hinder young people from getting included, that the young people affected by inequalities and in particular the NEETs do not fulfil? Secondly, why and how does society cause the inequalities that affect young people and even exclude some of them? These are the questions that will be guiding for the subsequent chapters.

4. Growth models

The global crisis that started as a banking crisis in 2008 has put its imprint on all the countries across Europe. The youth unemployment rate (15-24) increased from 2007-2012 in all the countries involved in Citispyce, except for Germany where it decreased from 11,9% to 8,1%.³ In contrast, the youth unemployment rate has increased by 2,9 times in Spain, from 18,3% to 53,2%, and by 2,4 times in Greece, from 23,0% to 55,3%. This also shows the differences in point of departure. Greece had the highest youth unemployment before the crisis set in. The youth unemployment rate was high also in Poland, 21,6%.

¹⁵ Available at:

http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php?title=File:Youth_unemployment_rate_ratio_2012.png&filetimestamp=20130710115744 (accessed 3 October 2013)

Diagram 2. Youth unemployment rate (15-24), 2003-2012


This has led to an increase in long-term unemployment, but not in all the countries and not to the same extent (European Commission, 2012a: 168). It has increased in Greece, Spain and somewhat also in the Netherlands, but not in the Czech Republic nor in Poland. Among the employed, the share of those with temporary employments has increased overall in Europe, but not in all the countries and to very different extents. Also the share of part-time work has increased, but again to different degrees and from various points of departure.

To conclude, young people across Europe have been affected by the crisis but to various extents and in different ways. The comparisons on the basis of symptom indicators will not take us further than that. Thus, we will not be able to make assessments of the situation for young people in cities on one single scale. The situation may be worse in one sense and better in another. For example, the situation looks perhaps good in Poland where a remarkably high share of the 25-29 have jobs, but as a remarkable share of these jobs are temporary, that probably causes a lot of uncertainty; and how do we grade that uncertainty in relation to the uncertainty caused in other ways?

Really, what do we know about what the indicators indicate? Indeed, they all have their limitations and shortcomings. One of the most used indicators of inequality in the labour market is the unemployment rate. It measures unemployed people in a particular age group as a percentage of the total labour force (both employed and unemployed). It covers only, however, the active population and thus excludes those classified neither as employed nor as unemployed, for example students. To be classified as unemployed you need actively to seek employment.

For that reason, the unemployment ratio seems to be a more accurate indicator as it covers the proportion of people registered as unemployed over the total population in the same group⁴. Among the countries in our project, Spain has the highest unemployment ratio, 19%. None of the other countries comes near that high level. Germany, The Netherlands and The Czech Republic have the lowest unemployment ratios, between 4-7%.

Diagram 3. Youth unemployment rate and ratio (15-24), 2012



Getting a job is not, however, necessarily the solution. Also, conditions and quality matter. For example, the job may be temporary, of which Poland (Chrabąszcz et al., 2013: 6) has the highest share. 66% of the jobs there are temporary, compared with only 8% in Bulgaria (Eurofound, 2012: 16). On the other hand, Bulgaria has the lowest employment rate among young people, which means that the share in relation to all those taking advantage of the permanent jobs is not particular high.

One may wonder what the rest do. In Bulgaria, only 27% of the young people aged 15-24 are either employed or registered as unemployed (European Commission, 2012b: 406). In Italy, it is the same. What do the rest do? Study? Some of them certainly do but far from all of them. Thus, in all probability the unemployed consist of many more than the registered ones. That means that youth unemployment is considerably higher than what the figures indicate.

Thus, we may take for granted that young people are affected by inequalities in all the countries but in different ways. We do not really know, however, to what extent, due to the inaccuracy of statistics. But even with more accurate statistics we would not have been much

⁴ Available at:

http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php?title=File:Youth_unemployment_rate_ratio_2012.png&filetime=20130710115744 (accessed 3 October 2013)

wiser. For example, Sweden and the UK have the same unemployment ratio, which may then look as if they have the same problem. They do not. Behind these figures lie very different causes. In order to understand that we need to know about the different economic structures across Europe.

In *Industrial relations 2008* the European Commission suggests a classification. They start by highlighting some commonalities which the western member states of the European Union share and which distinguishes the EU from other regions in the world. In post-war western Europe, the industrial relations arrangements and their achievement in contributing to growth and publicly secured social protection have rested on four institutional pillars (European Commission, 2008: 19); “strong or reasonably established and publicly guaranteed trade unions; a degree of solidarity wage setting based on coordination at the sectoral level or above; a fairly generalized arrangement of information, consultation, and perhaps co-determination at the firm level based on the rights of workers and unions to be involved; and routine participation in tripartite policy arrangements.”

From the perspective of regulation theory (see Introduction), these four pillars are associated with the so-called Fordist mode of regulation. This was linked to the fordist regime of capital accumulation, which consisted of a virtuous circle of mass production and mass consumption. A fordist growth model existed when this regime of accumulation was coherently combined with its associated mode of regulation. Fordism, however, was developed unevenly across Europe. In Britain, Fordism has been described as flawed, while an export-oriented flexi-fordism developed in Germany (Jessop and Sum, 2006: 128-133). The countries in southern Europe did not develop Fordist growth models due to their large agrarian sectors and late industrial development. Yet, they were affected by the general crisis of the Fordist growth model during the 1970s. When new growth models eventually appeared, it turned out that the differences between the European economies had increased.

In *Industrial relations 2008*, and more recently in *Industrial relations 2012* (European Commission, 2013: 47), the European Commission tries to classify these differences. On the basis of several typologies, the report identifies five models of industrial relations, associated with different geographical areas. The Nordic model is characterised by being inclusive and coordinated as well as having a high union density and collective bargaining coverage. The Central European model is also coordinated, but dualistic and it has a middle-range union density, although a quite high bargaining coverage. The Western model is uncoordinated and market-oriented as well as characterized by a low union density and also low coverage of collective bargaining. In the Southern model, described as state-centred and dualistic, union density is extremely low but bargaining coverage rather high. The Eastern model has

both an extremely low union density and a low bargaining coverage. Citispyce contains representatives for all these five models.

From the perspective of regulation theory, these five categories concern the structural form called the wage relation. As such, however, categorisation is useful. In order to make the categories even more useful, these five different forms of wage relations will be linked to different regimes of accumulation. As Becker and Jäger (2011: 4) maintain “to understand the crisis of the EU and the Eurozone and the responses to the crisis it is necessary to analyse the content of structural forms, their interaction and territoriality together with the regimes of accumulation.” Together these five different forms of wage relations and their structurally coupled regimes of accumulation constitute five models of growth. Each one of them will be dealt with in turn and the reports will be used to clarify how they have been actualised. The aim is to highlight the model-specific causes of inequality, the ones that makes it difficult for young people to get included as well as the ones that exclude them.

4.1. Dependent financialisation in the south

Countries in the south of Europe have pursued an import oriented regime of capital accumulation, depending on borrowed money and indicated by current account deficits in Spain and Greece at least since the mid-1990s. The increasing indebtedness has been driven by consumption but also by rising prices on real estate (Lapavistas et al., 2012: 19). The main reason for increasing debt has been the loss of competitiveness. That has forced peripheral countries to focus on boosting domestic demand, above all, through investment in real estate and consumption (Lapavistas et al., 2012: 92).

This regime of accumulation has been called dependent financialisation (Becker and Weissenbacher (2012). With the support of Fine (2011), we may define the concept of financialisation by referring to the phenomenal expansion of financial assets and financial activity relative to the rest of the economy over the last thirty years. Financialisation has comprised “the proliferation of different types of assets, not least through the expansion of securitisation, derivatives, exchange rate speculation and corresponding futures markets for currencies as well as for many commodities”. Moreover, this proliferation has occurred at the expense of the real economy. Financialisation “has been perceived to be dependent upon consumer-led booms based on credit in which the housing market in particular has been the basis for a central speculative asset”. It has also penetrated generally into “ever more areas

of economic and social life such as pensions, education, health, and provision of economic and social infrastructure.”

In addition to the definition suggested by Fine, financialisation has to be treated in conjunction with the finance-dominated regime of accumulation. This differs from the fordist regime of accumulation, where productive capital dominated and the wage was regarded as a source of demand. Therefore, increases in real wages were in the interest of both capital and labour. In the finance-dominated regime of accumulation the wage is regarded as a cost and has to be kept as low as possible. Hence, the wage share has declined in all OECD countries, according to Stockhammer (2013: 1) on average from 73,4% in 1980 to 64% in 2007, constituting “a major historical change as wage shares had been stable or increasing in the post-war era”. The results of Stockhammer’s study indicate that financialisation has been the main cause of the decline in the wage share.

In Spain, the continuous economic growth for 14 years, from 1994 to 2008, and the veritable economic boom in the last decade of this period, built on loans. As Lapavistas et al. (2012: 93) shows, “aggregate Spanish debt has risen dramatically as a proportion of GDP since the late 1990s. The bulk of growth has been in private debt, driven mostly by rising debt of the financial sector”. In contrast, Spanish public debt has actually declined in relative terms since the late 90s. Money was mainly invested in construction and its subordinated industrial production, not for example in export oriented production or an increased productivity (Lapavistas et al., 2012: 27). That made the growth model vulnerable to changes in borrowing conditions. Accordingly and as the Barcelona report highlights, sectors closely related to the previous economic growth were affected more severely by the crisis.

In Greece, the public sector debt has been a far more significant part of aggregate debt than in Spain and Portugal. This has been a feature of the Greek economy since the 1980s, the initial growth of public debt being an outcome of the expansion of public expenses and mismanagement (Lapavistas et al., 2012: 95). For instance, the Athens report describes that although the National Health System, founded in 1982, was originally a breakthrough concept at the time, gradually, great administrative loopholes, mismanagement and lack of monitoring, resulted in poor public health services, worsening during the time of the crisis (Avatangelou et al., 2013: 11). The Greek welfare state in general is currently described as dysfunctional and inefficient. Obviously, despite the great expectations of certain legal provisions, operation mechanisms remained ineffective and the welfare state did not manage to support the development of a competitive economy deserving its place in the international division of labour.

In Italy, the general government gross debt as a percentage of GDP has exceeded 100% every year since at least the mid-1990s. Dependent financialisation has not, however, engendered the same dynamic as in Spain and Greece. Italy has suffered from slow growth since the late 1990s. As Tridico (2013: 18) concludes, “Italy used to be a richer country, with an average GDP above the EU15 (the richest club), and today it is far below this average level”. According to the detailed analysis made by Tridico, this depends on the past reforms of the labour market, in particular the labour flexibility introduced in the last 15 years.

The development of the welfare state in Greece can be interpreted as an attempt to catch up regarding modes of regulation instituted in other countries during the heydays of Fordism. Another such attempt was made to establish the kind of wage relation associated with Fordism when pressures by the Unions led to the establishment of some ‘protective’ laws restricting the use of fixed-term contracts. Accordingly, in 2007 Greece’s rate of fixed-term contracts was below the EU27 average, the Athens report tells us, but “nevertheless, after the eruption of the crisis, temporary employment came dynamically to the forefront and permanent employment declined, within the general measures taken for the enhancement of “flexible work”.” (Avatangelou et al., 2013: 8)

The restrictions on fixed-term contracts in Greece did perhaps alleviate the effects of the division between insiders and outsiders, characterising the southern form of wage relation. In contrast, on the labour market of Spain a tendency to rely on temporary work contracts, especially for young people, has been the norm. As the Barcelona report (Roiha et al., 2013: 6) states, “a key reason why temporary contracts do not lead to permanent employment in the Spanish context is the large difference between dismissal costs for temporary and permanent contracts, making companies reluctant to convert fixed-term contracts into open-ended ones. ... This means that many young people are trapped in precarious employment or unemployment, with unfavourable effects for their long-term employability and large costs for society as a whole.”

The dualistic division and the concomitant existence of a market for low skills seemed to have made it legitimate for a substantial share of young people not to educate themselves. As the Barcelona report mentions, a high share of youth (15-24) in Spain have attained at most lower secondary education, but yet “until 2007, the unemployment rate of low-skilled workers was not much higher than that of skilled workers, indicating a great deal of low-skilled jobs in the construction and hospitality sectors in the past” (Roiha et al., 2013: 7). The first to lose their jobs during the crisis, however, were these low-skilled youths and “they are also likely to be in a disadvantageous position in terms of accessing new jobs when the economy recovers, considering the growing demand of high and intermediate levels of skills”.

In general, young people have been particularly vulnerable due to the southern form of wage relation with its dualistic labour market dividing workers in insiders and outsiders. They do not seem to have had any legitimate representatives at the labour market. Union density is extremely low in the southern form of wage relation. As the Athens report (Avatangelou et al., 2013: 19) maintains, “participation of young people in labour unions is minimum in Greece, mainly due to the neglect and lack of good practices for attracting youth.” The Greek trade unions have failed to offer a fresh view to young people and tend to have restricted themselves to safeguard the insiders.

To this another characteristic of the Southern growth model can be added, and that is its weak learning opportunities. Lundvall and Lorenz (2012: 237) make a distinction between four different forms of work organisation; discretionary learning (DL), lean production, taylorist organisation and traditional organisation. The forms of work organisation differ with regard to problem solving and learning on the job as well as the degree of freedom that the worker has to organise his or her work. Discretionary learning is the form where employees are engaged in work activities involving problem solving and learning. The concept refers to “work settings where a lot of responsibility is allocated to the employee who is expected to solve problems on his or her own” (2012: 238). That matters, Lundvall and Lorenz claim (2012: 237), because “... the key to economic success for a national or regional economy is its capacity to renew competencies in order to be able to move into activities that are less exposed to global competition.” It is simply less efficient to operate in a hierarchical organisation when the environment changes rapidly. The Southern growth model, however, consists to a high degree of hierarchical organisations. In 2000, only around 20% of the employees in Spain and Greece worked in organisations characterised by discretionary learning and since then it has further decreased.⁵ In Italy, the corresponding figures has been higher (30% in the year 2000), but yet far below the shares in the Netherlands (64%), Sweden (53%) and Germany (44%) (Lundvall and Lorenz: 2012: 249).

Yet, in Spain and Greece the growth model seemed to be successful. In 2003, Greece had the highest growth rate among the countries in the European Union, 5,9%, compared to -0,4% in Germany. As the Athens report (Avatangelou et al., 2013: 2) states, “an unexpected growth throughout the 1990s, also continued into the new millennium, involving a major improvement in employability, welfare and citizens’ living standards and providing immense

⁵ According to a lecture given by Bengt-Åke Lundvall at the international Helix conference in Linköping, 12 June 2013, where he referred to recent research available at: http://www.ike.aau.dk/digitalAssets/71/71537_holmlorenzemaee2013.pdf (accessed 4 October 2013).

opportunities to young people at the time.” Yet, just a few years later, everything had been turned upside down and the growth model had proved to be unsustainable. The crisis has led to the collapse of this growth model, the one characterized as dependent financialisation.

4.2. Export-orientation in the centre

The Central European model consists of an export-oriented regime of accumulation, regarding both goods and capital, where productive capital dominates. In contrast to the countries with dependent financialisation, Germany has had a surplus in its account balance since 2001, rising until 2007. This surplus has not depended on superior productivity growth, which has been weaker than for example Greece (Lapavistas et al., 2012: 26), but on a favourable situation in the Eurozone as well as an internal pressure on pay and conditions. Growth in Germany has in fact been mediocre. In addition, investment has been flat, consumption stagnant, savings rising and household debt falling. The question arises about what has engendered growth. As Lapavistas et al. (2012: 21) underlines, “the only source of dynamism has been exports” and two thirds of German trade is with the Eurozone (2012: 30). As the leading country of this growth model, Germany has become very rich.

One of the most important industrial centres in Germany, and indeed of this growth model is Hamburg. It shows all the benefits of this growth model. As the Hamburg report (Gehrke et al., 2013: 7) states, “never before has the number of people in employment been as high”. In fact, Hamburg is one of the richest cities in Europe, ranking four of the 271 NUTS-2 regions with regard to GDP comparison per capita. The Hamburg report gives the impression of a city with a lot of space for discretionary learning: *The City of Hamburg has a prosperous and innovative scene that spans across the arts and creative industries, including services and production related to new technologies and software development, media and journalism, advertising and design. Beside the typical hot spots in which young urban professionals have already established centres for multimedia and all types of creative and independent arts and technology (Schanzenviertel/St. Pauli/ Ottensen), many new creative cells are spread all over the city. (Gehrke et al., 2013: 4)*

The report also highlights, however, the costs of this model because “at the same time, precarious jobs (short term or part time contracts - with less protection than in previous decades when permanent contracts were the norm) are increasingly common, even for middle classes, causing uncertainty and unease” (Gehrke et al., 2013: 8). The Hamburg report mentions subcontracted temporary employment, “which increased by 95% during 2000-2011 up to now 3.4% of all formal employment contracts (the national average is 2.9%). Half of these contracts

are for less than three months and typically, the wages are much lower compared to average wages in regular employment contracts” (Gehrke et al., 2013: 9). Since 2000, the low wage sector has increased by 38% and in 2010, it comprised 19% of all employees working with an income of less than 1890 Euro per month. People in general have benefited from the regime of capital accumulation but a substantial share of the population has not been favoured by its form of wage relation. As Becker and Jäger (2011: 6) emphasise, the low wage sector is as important in Germany as in the USA. According to Eurostat data, the proportion of low-wage earners among all employees is among the highest in Europe, 22,2%, slightly higher than in the UK (22,1%).⁶

Rotterdam with its harbour is certainly a very important node in this growth model. As the Rotterdam report (Spies and Tan, 2013: 7) maintains, “from the 19th century onward the harbour and the economic activity that comes with it, has been the most important source of employment in the region”. A lot of the low-skilled work, associated with the harbour and traditionally dominating the labour market, has however disappeared. The Rotterdam report tells us how the labour market has changed, also in terms of the wage relation. Flexibility is increasing and fewer people have a permanent job. Nevertheless, the Dutch economy seems to have positioned itself successfully in the international division of labour, indicated for example by a surplus in the current account balance for decades and by low levels of unemployment. Netherlands has one of the highest percentages of employees working in organisations characterised by discretionary learning, 64% in 2000, although it has decreased since then. Obviously, that makes the Dutch economy competitive and allows it to provide job opportunities for young people.

4.3. Dependent export-orientation in the east

The Czech Republic, Poland and Bulgaria have in common the legacies of the severe recessions and de-industrialisation that occurred in the early 1990s as a result of the transformation to capitalism. It took until the late 1990s until the growth models became more neatly defined. Becker and Weissenbacher (2012: 5) characterise the growth model of the Czech Republic and Poland as a combination of export-oriented industrialisation and dependent financialisation. “These growth models corresponded to the accumulation strategies of West European companies – the outsourcing of production by German manufacturing companies and the export of money capital.”

⁶ Available at: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php?title=File:Figure2_Proportion_of_low-wage_earners_%25_2006_and_2010.png&filetimestamp=20130201090333 (accessed 6 October 2013)

The key sectors, export industry and banking, became dominated by Western European companies. In that way, the Czech Republic and Poland were closely linked to the German export industry and productive system. As the Brno report (Sirovatka and Valkova, 2013) reaffirms, “the economy of the country is very much tied to the performance of manufacturing industries, the exporters in particular, strongly influenced by the development of the economy in Germany”. Due to this dependence the growth model has proved to be highly vulnerable, Becker and Weissenbacher (2012: 9) concludes, “but it has at least a productive base – though usually a very narrow and extraverted one”. The expansion of domestic demand has relied significantly on increasing household debt.

Regarding the industrial relations, union density is below 20% in both the Czech Republic and Poland, while bargaining coverage is higher in both countries, around 40%, but yet much lower than the average of the EU-27 (European Commission, 2013: 23). Active labour market policies are rather underdeveloped, in the Czech Republic amounting to 0,3% of GDP and in Poland 0,7% (2010). As the Brno report (Sirovatka and Valkova, 2013: 7) puts it, “the Czech Republic prefers rather to have an increasingly flexible labour market and force the unemployed to take any job available than to invest into job creation and employability”.

In contrast, financialisation was the main motor of the growth regime in Bulgaria, Becker and Weissenbacher (2012) maintain, relying on huge capital inflows. During 2001-2007, Bulgaria attracted considerable amounts of Foreign Direct Investment. This led to the emergence of an unsustainable current account deficit. The pre-crisis growth model proved compatible with increased labour force participation, a significant jump in employment levels and much lower unemployment. The Sofia report explains what happened:

The limited construction of new housing in combination with the increased demand pushed the housing prices progressively upwards. With the stabilisation of the economic situation in Bulgaria and a clear course towards EU membership, the Bulgarian property market became interesting for foreigners. In addition, numerous Bulgarians who emigrated during the 1990s started investing in property in the country, giving a push to a construction boom from 2000 to 2008, during which property prices increased dramatically. (Hajdinjak and Kosseva, 2013: 17)

That made the Bulgarian economy vulnerable in a way similar to the countries with dependent financialisation. Hence, the global financial crisis led to a considerable decline in the economy. Both private consumption and foreign investment declined rapidly in 2009 and 2010. Although a very modest growth resumed in 2010, both private consumption and investment remained quite low even by 2012, when they began to recover in most EU countries. Today, the most important obstacles for foreign investment and economic growth remain low productivity

and competitiveness on the European and global markets, which are a consequence of inadequate R&D funding and a lack of a clearly defined development policy.

Bulgarian households are under heavy burden of low incomes, high unemployment, the declining property prices and the fear that the jobs market will deteriorate further. Severe constraints on access to credit, concerns about liquidity in banks with strong linkages to EU-15 countries and very high real interest rates are also major factors inhibiting investment. Wage levels remain the lowest in the EU and the low-wage sector comprises 22% of all employees.⁷As a result of low average wages, Bulgaria enjoys substantially lower unit labour costs, which means that Bulgaria has to rely on industries with low added value – a factor preventing a catch-up with the more advanced countries of the EU. For example, the majority of Bulgarian exports are products with very low skill content (clothing, footwear, iron and steel, machinery and equipment).⁸

4.4. Superior financialisation in the west

The Birmingham report (Robinson et al., 2013: 8) mentions how the crisis revealed several systemic vulnerabilities of a previously outwardly successful economy, “a house price bubble, an over-extended banking system, an over-indebted household sector”. These are the symptoms of an extreme financialisation which has its background in the political project of the Thatcher governments in the 1980s to make Britain, and London in particular, the principal site for international financial institutions. Since then, the UK has had a deficit in its annual current account balance. Thatcherism in the 1980s set the UK on a path which also included the weakening of the unions and led to high levels of unemployment, in Birmingham rising to over 20%.

Many of those out of work were low-skilled manual workers with minimal or no qualifications and had no tradition of self-employment. They were ill-equipped to access new opportunities which required higher levels of literacy and numeracy. They were in no small part victims of the structural shift in economic policy espoused by the Thatcher government in the 1980's. This was the case across the country, where the emergent neo-liberal economic settlement significantly altered the cultural as well as economic bedrock of Britain. (Robinson et al., 2013: 4)

⁷ Available at: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php?title=File:Figure2_Proportion_of_low-wage_earners_%25_2006_and_2010.png&filetimestamp=20130201090333 (accessed 6 October 2013)

⁸ Important additional information has been provided by one of the authors of the Sofia report, Marko Hajdinjak.

Currently, Britain has a low union density and one of the lowest bargaining coverage rates in Europe (Ind rel 2012: 22). Another legacy of the Thatcher governments in the 1980s is the emphasis on flexibilizing wages, hours and working conditions, instead of reskilling workers (Jessop, 2006: 135). The UK displays the lowest level of spending on active labour market policies in the whole of the EU (European Commission, 2012b: 96). Thus, the victims of the structural shift, mentioned in the quote above, have not got much support to cope with the new flexible conditions and instead become permanently socially excluded, sometimes for generations.

Youth unemployment in the UK was quite low before the crisis and lower than the average of the EU-27. It has been argued that the deregulated labour market makes it easier for young people to get a job. It certainly makes it easier to lose jobs as well. The inequalities have been transformed into the labour market and many young people work on precarious conditions. An example mentioned in the Birmingham report (Robinson et al., 2013: 7) is the so-called zero contract, “whereby people agree to be available for work as and when required but they have no guaranteed hours or time of work”.

According to Lundvall and Lorenz (2012: 250), the UK belongs to the countries with the lowest frequencies of discretionary learning. They relate that to income inequality and claim that “the countries with the highest degree of income inequality (the UK and Portugal) are amongst those that are most unequal in terms of access to discretionary learning and that those countries (Denmark and the Netherlands) that have the most equal income distribution also offer the most egalitarian access to jobs with discretionary learning.” This means that young people who get a job in the UK are more likely than in other countries to also get a low income and less likely to learn something useful for a future career.

4.5. Export-orientation and financialisation in the north

The growth model in Sweden is characterized by export-orientation, just like the German one, and Sweden has had a surplus in its current account balance every year since 1994. In contrast to the German growth model, however, households in Sweden have become heavily involved in financialisation through both assets (pensions and insurance) and liabilities (mortgage and unsecured debt). Financialisation in Sweden has become, what Becker and Jäger (2011) call, mass-based. A part of the pension system has been privatised via the implantation of capital based schemes. Housing prices have increased almost constantly since the late 1990s and households are heavily indebted. The government, therefore, announced at the end of August 2013 the establishment of a “stability council”.

The unions are, however, still quite strong and the collective agreements do still cover a considerable part of the labour market. This has contributed to strengthening competitiveness, but not as in the German case through reduced wages and the preservation of a low-wage sector. According to Eurostat data, Sweden has the smallest low-wage sector in Europe.⁹ The proportion of low-wage earners is only 2,5% of all employees, compared to 17% in the EU-27. Instead, work has been made more efficient. This has been the old-fashioned principle in operation since before the Second World War and defended by the parties at the labour market.¹⁰ This is reflected in a high share of jobs which Lundvall & Lorenz (2012) characterise as discretionary learning, but it has at the same time raised barriers around the labour market and made it more difficult for young people to get a job. The demands for a formal education have been sharpened. Due to this growth model, not many low qualified jobs remain at the labour market.

This increases the risks of unemployment for those who do not fulfil the demands. To avoid this, well developed labour market measures have been a part of the growth model since its early days. In 2010, Sweden spent 1,11% of its GDP on active labour market measures, which is lower than in 2006 but yet among the highest in Europe.¹¹ These measures have, however, not been fully sufficient to meet the increasing unemployment. That was a major reason to why the social democrats lost in the general election 2006.

The response of the succeeding right-wing coalition that has remained in power since then was a solution which can be interpreted as German. The government wanted to increase the divisions, in particular between those with and without a job, in the hope of thereby strengthening the motivation of the unemployed to seek a job. This has been done through in particular the so called 'jobbskatteavdraget' (work-tax deduction), explained by the Malmö report (Grander, 2013: 11) as "a tax deduction for all employed people. This priority is part of the current government's strategy of motivating people to work, the so called "work first principle", which implies that rather than providing social benefits, the government should strive to reduce unemployment so people can work and support themselves. The deduction has increased the disposable income for all people having a job, while it has not affected the economy of unemployed, sick or people not able to work for other reasons. Parts of the tax deduction have been financed by increases in the fees for the unemployment insurance funds, which has led to a political debate."

⁹ Available at: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php?title=File:Figure2_Proportion_of_low-wage_earners_%25_2006_and_2010.png&filetimestamp=20130201090333 (accessed 6 October 2013)

¹⁰ For a recent and interesting paper on the Swedish growth model, see Erixon (2013).

¹¹ Available at: <http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=LMPEXP#> (accessed 6 October 2013)

The critics have stated that the government more or less deliberately is about to introduce a low wage market while making the labour market less inclusive and more dualistic. That may happen as Sweden just as Germany lacks a legislated minimum wage. The parties at the labour market have agreed to make the collective agreements determinant of the lowest levels. That works to a greater extent than in Germany, but if the unions are further weakened and the coverage of the collective agreements continues to decrease, Sweden may end up in a German situation.

5. Welfare regimes

Managing risks has traditionally been a responsibility for families. In some European societies, such a responsibility remains primarily with the family. In other societies, the welfare state has replaced the family as mainly responsible for managing risks. Furthermore, some societies rely primarily on market solutions. Finally, welfare is also delivered by voluntary and non-profit work, often called the 'third sector' or the social economy. Market solutions, the welfare state, the family and the third sector/social economy constitute four main sources of managing social risks.

The different divisions of responsibility among sources for managing social risks have been the basis for the theory about welfare regimes, launched 1990 by the Danish social scientist Gösta Esping-Andersen, in the book *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (1990). There he made the distinction between liberal, conservative and social democratic welfare regimes. This typology was partly derived from quantitative criteria concerning the decommodification of labour-power in eighteen OECD countries. By decommodification he meant (1990: 3), inspired by Karl Polanyi, the degree to which social rights "permit people to make their living standards independent of pure market forces".

The theory has been elaborated and restated by many social scientists as well as Esping-Andersen himself. Subsequently, it has become necessary to incorporate the social economy, recognised by Esping-Andersen 1998 in *Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies*, although only in a note and not with any significant theoretical impact. Below, we will refer to this fourth main source as the social economy. Other types have also been identified, for example one prevailing in southern Europe.

The theory of welfare regimes has been criticised by, for example, Jessop (2002: 68) who highlights the restriction of Esping-Anderson's original typology to only the decommodification of men's waged labour. The equally important relation of the state to women's waged and unwaged labour was not considered. Nor was other dimensions of the state's

involvement in social reproduction examined, such as housing, health or education, although Esping-Anderson has extended into these areas in later work. Jessop wants to retain the concept of welfare regime but broaden its definition, emphasising “how welfare regimes are structurally coupled with modes of economic growth (including their insertion into the international division of labour) and more encompassing modes of regulation”. As such, welfare regimes belong to the “normal” and do not exist only to manage risks. That paves the way for including for example housing in the analysis.

Cameron et al. (2011: 10) refers to such attempts. It has turned out that the “concept of decommodification in housing is complicated by the very wide range of policy interventions which are made to modify market outcomes in housing”. As an alternative analysis they highlight the distinction between unitary and dualist housing systems.

Unitary housing systems treat public and private sectors in a co-ordinated and flexible way to encourage affordable housing provision across tenures. Dualist systems typically privilege home ownership and operate systems of subsidy and access to social housing which emphasise its separation and stigmatisation as housing for the poor. (Cameron et al., 2011: 11)

The authors suggest, however, a combination between the unitary/dualist model with welfare regime classification since these two approaches are not mutually exclusive. A third source of inspiration will be added which concerns social housing, making a distinction between universal, general and residual approaches (Europolitics, 2011). The reason for including this distinction is because this report concerns inequality. In particular, we will focus on how welfare regimes manage the form of inequality highlighted here, the one associated with the relationship between social exclusion and social inclusion.

5.1. The conservatives and their “misérables” in the centre

The term social exclusion stems from France in the mid-1970s (Amin et al., 2002: 17). At that time it referred to the growing number of people who for various reasons were not covered by the social insurances of the welfare system. The title of Victor Hugo's classic from 1862, *Les Misérables*, accords well with those designated in the original definition of the concept of social exclusion. The definition was broad, but it did not include the unemployed, which Amin et al. (2002: 17) highlight:

Interestingly, given the subsequent history of the term, this list encompasses a wide range of individual conditions and problems and social ills and pathologies but does not explicitly refer to the unemployed or any other group whose exclusion might be attributed primarily to economic deprivation.

Amin et al. (2002) explain the lack of the unemployed in the definition as time-bound. The concept emerged at the end of the long period in Europe characterised by full employment. Mass unemployment did not yet exist, neither deregulated labour markets nor low-wage sectors.

An additional explanation has been put forward by Atkinson and Davoudi (2000: 429). The fact that the original definition did not include the unemployed depends on the welfare model developed in France (see also Levitas, 2005: 21). This welfare model has been tailored for well-paid industrial workers with lifetime employment capable of paying to the social security funds and thereby safeguard both their own and their entire family's situation. The model also includes a concern for solidarity with the disadvantaged in society, however, from a conservative basis. Not only working men constitute the pillars of the model, but also their home-working wives. Although in the formal sense unemployed, the home-working wives are not counted as excluded.

This model has been called a conservative or Central European welfare regime. In this regime, economic security is built on a mix of insurance and family. It relies primarily on the breadwinner, usually male. Welfare rights are attached to status, based on social insurances rather than taxes and directed at the family. The principle is that unemployment compensation has to be earned, either through payments to insurance or housework. Compensation levels can, therefore, vary widely. The regime also rewards long-term employees and well-paid men with home-working wives. Single people, especially women and young people have it much more difficult. Germany is usually described as the prototype of the conservative, “Bismarckian“ regime and the Hamburg report highlights its principle of subsidiarity:

An important principle that stems from the Christian background of the German welfare model is subsidiarity: the state should only come in as a last resort, family and civil society should be the first to turn to in times of need. This principle is reflected in the governance and provision of social services and in the power of the big non-governmental welfare associations. (Gehrke et al., 2013: 11)

In a conservative regime, the housing systems usually have a unitary character. As previously mentioned, this means that public and private sectors are treated in a co-ordinated way to encourage affordable housing provision across tenures. In Germany and, thus, Hamburg, various policy instruments exist to provide affordable housing, including housing benefits to low income and unemployed households, and subsidies to housing providers who offer apartments at a low price (Gehrke et al., 2013: 16). Social housing constitutes an important part of the system, however not with a universal access. Access is determined by income ceilings and priority criteria. According to the Hamburg report, “nearly half of the households in Hamburg (46%) would be eligible for social housing due to their low income”. (Gehrke et al., 2013: 18)

The Dutch welfare regime has been classified as conservative. As the Rotterdam report (Spies and Tan, 2013: 5) explains, however, “over the last 20 years the Dutch welfare state, however, has been in transition, partly guided by elements from Anglo-Saxon welfare state models, partly guided by populist sentiments, and partly through windows of opportunity arising from among others changing political constellations”. As part of this transition, the obligation to work has been increased, and “almost all municipalities in The Netherlands have adopted a form of ‘work first’ policy, partly substituting the right to a benefit with the right to a (subsidised or created) job. This is especially true for young people.” Furthermore, benefits and access to social support have been limited, more pressure has been put on people to become self-reliant, services have been privatised, and rights and responsibilities have been individualised, instead of being attached to the household.

Similar changes have been carried out in Germany, starting in the early 2000s when “the German Government, then led by social-democratic chancellor Gerhard Schröder, introduced far-reaching labour market reforms, driven by the principles of activation and workfare. These reforms also set a new focus for the field of youth work. Institutions for child and youth work are now asked to build coalitions with the jobcentres for an integrated support of young people on their way to the labour market. In this context, measures for active labour market policies, i.e. the stimulation of (social) maturity for starting vocational education and training (VET), became a first priority.” (Gehrke et al., 2013: 6)

5.2. The liberals and their obstacles to economic growth in the west

In Britain, another welfare regime came to dominate, called liberal or Anglo-Saxon, characterised by a low level of de commodification. This regime implies a reliance on market solutions. The state provides a minimal support, usually means-tested and therefore also predominantly selective, as opposed to general. The same compensation is paid to all, regardless of previous income. Risks are considered social only in a narrow sense and preferably individualised. The family do not play any substantial part in the management of risks.

The UK is usually regarded as the most clear-cut representative of a liberal welfare regime in Europe. UK also exemplifies the significance of the social economy in a liberal welfare regime. Amin et al. (2002) define social economy as “non-profit activities designed to combat social exclusion”. Indeed, that is a very British definition, which Amin et al. (2002) admits, at least implicitly, by presenting a typology of four models. Amin et al make distinctions between the Rhineland, the Nordic, the Mediterranean and the Anglo-Saxon models. A particular emphasis upon tackling social exclusion is a typical feature of the Anglo-Saxon model.

The orientation of the state in a liberal welfare regime is residual which means that it limits its involvements in social reproduction to the most urgent needs. Such a residualisation of housing started with the Thatcher government and the Birmingham report (Robinson et al., 2013: 16) tells the story.

The lack of affordable social housing in Birmingham – as in other cities in the UK – can be traced back to the ‘right to buy’ policy of the 1980s which encouraged tenants to purchase their Council homes. This depleted the stock of social housing and neither local authorities nor government have been able to replenish the supply. Local authorities have also found it hard to fund repairs to many of the remaining stock.

It has to be added, that the notion of social housing has its origin in this “right to buy” policy. Social housing did not really exist before that. Indeed, the liberal welfare regime emerged in the 1980s when Margaret Thatcher was prime minister. In 1997, Labour won the election but that did not lead to any fundamental changes (Wood, 2010). The Labour government carried on the policies of deregulation and reduced state intervention. The British attitude to the concept of social exclusion was however modified. As Jessop (2003) highlights, the attitude of the previous Conservative governments had been marked by indifference and denial. Unemployment and social exclusion were considered the price that had to be paid in order to control inflation.

Immediately after its accession to power, the Labour government set up a special unit dealing with issues of social exclusion, called the Social Exclusion Unit. Thereby, the problem was put on the agenda, but according to Jessop (2003: 16) on the basis of an essentially neo-liberal ideology. Social exclusion was seen as an obstacle to growth and appeared on that ground as a problem.

Thus, in contrast to the Thatcherite view that economic growth would solve any residual problems of social exclusion, New Labour sees social exclusion and the existence of an underclass as obstacles to economic growth.

Central to this approach was the introduction of the Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD). As the Birmingham report (Robinson et al., 2013:13) presents it, “the IMD provides a single overview indicator of how all-English areas compare on levels of deprivation measure a broad concept of ‘multiple deprivation’, made up of several distinct dimensions, or domains, of deprivation”. It is utilised in policy-making to compare areas and also trends over time. As the Birmingham report puts it, “with the introduction of multiple indices of deprivation income redistribution (through welfare benefits) was given a back seat in the government’s welfare agenda ...”

The British sociologist Ruth Levitas makes a distinction between three different definitions of social exclusion (Levitas, 2005). The definition that emerged in France in the 1970s, which she calls MUD (moral underclass discourse), associates social exclusion with deviant behaviour and lower morale. The definition pursued by the Labour government since its election victory in 1997 focused on unemployment and Levitas calls it SID. She means by that a “social integrationist discourse”. Here it will be called a “system integrationist discourse”, drawing on the important distinction between social and system integration, represented by for example David Lockwood (1992: 400). That corresponds to the use of the concept in the Hamburg report as “integration in functional subsystems (educational, labour market, health, housing etc.)”. So SID – yes – but as an abbreviation for a system integrationist discourse. Furthermore, Levitas identifies a third definition, called RED (redistributionist discourse), which associates social exclusion primarily with poverty, and as Levitas (2005: 27) summarises it “to oversimplify, in RED they have no money, in SID they have no work, in MUD they have no morals”.

The British Labour Party used to be a representative of the definition which Levitas calls RED, but in the 1980s and 1990s, the Labour agenda was gradually remoulded. In the liberal welfare regime problems tend to be individualised. The problem is not society, but the people who find themselves in a state of social exclusion. They have to get included, if not otherwise so by the use of coercion (Levitas, 2005:

141). The rich have not been exposed for the same pressure and intrusive scrutiny:

There is no discussion of how to persuade them to pay existing or higher taxes, how to dissuade them from buying their way out of common institutions, or how to induce them to reduce car and air travel and thus contribution to global warming (Levitas, 2005: 228).

No matter what kind of work, it simply has to be paid. Although paid work in different ways may impede inclusion, for example for people working long hours, little attention is paid to that (Levitas, 2005: 169). Society is not regarded as a big problem. The problem is those who are identified as being outside, in a state of social exclusion.

5.3. The social democratic hesitancy in the north

In countries like France and Britain, the concept of social exclusion has for quite a long time played an important role in both policy and research. In Sweden, the concept has led a more obscure life. That depends on the welfare regime characterising Swedish society. It is neither conservative nor liberal. It is, therefore, not easy to take over either the French or the English meaning of the term.

In Sweden, a welfare regime called social democratic or Nordic has dominated. In this regime, the state is primarily responsible for providing economic security and welfare. Unemployment benefits are linked to previous income, not means-tested and welfare provision could therefore be characterised as general. Financing is secured by taxes, not insurance. The Nordic regime can, therefore, be said to have the citizen as a base, not the family as in the conservative regime or the individual as in the liberal one. Every citizen gets the same assistance in relative terms, regardless of class, status or earlier achievements. Risks are socialised in a comprehensive sense. The family has lost much of its earlier significance, due to policies of de-familialisation.

Yet, families are relied upon when young people fail in school or get unemployed. Such a responsibility, however, runs counter to the logic of the social democratic welfare regime as it usually keeps both parents fully engaged in employment, lacking the time to care for the family. In contrast, many immigrant parents do not lack that time due to unemployment. Long-term unemployment, however, tends to undermine the authority of parents. Furthermore, the active approach to employment management, also a characteristic of the social democratic regime, puts a pressure on parents to take part in various labour market measures, one after the other, without regard to the parental support needed by their children. Hence, families are forced to deal with societal problems which they have not got the capacity to solve. The resulting tensions, rows and decreasing trust, weakens the family institution even further.

The social economy is a deep-seated part of the social democratic regime. Although the term social economy has not been used very long, the phenomenon has a background in the popular movements. Basically, the social democratic model of social economy has not been designed to combat social exclusion, although the significance of it in tackling social exclusion has grown in recent years. Instead, it rests on the idea of organised self-help. As such, the social economy in various areas shares the responsibility for welfare provisions and delivery with the welfare state. For example, in Sweden unemployment funds run by the trade unions provide unemployment benefit, not the state.

Public housing constitutes an important part of housing in Sweden, in Malmö amounting to 15% of all dwellings and owned by the public housing company MKB, owned in its turn by the city of Malmö. Sweden has however by definition no social housing since the apartments in the public housing are available for everyone, not only for people with low income or other special needs. Furthermore, rents have been regulated by norms set by these public housing companies for the rent in general which private housing companies have had to comply with. The public housing companies have been a significant part of the welfare regime with their apartments

available for the general public. Due to its openness to the entire population, the approach to social housing in Sweden has also been called Universalist (Europolitics, 2011).

The social democratic welfare regime has made it difficult for the concept of social exclusion to take hold. The existence of social exclusion is contrary to its fundamental principles. A general welfare based on citizenship makes it quite unthinkable. Any “miserables”, as in the conservative sense, are not supposed to exist. And those who get into trouble should not have to be treated as obstacles to growth. Therefore, there was a lack of a typical Swedish breeding ground for the concept when the right-wing alliance launched it in the election campaign 2006. To be sure, the alliance put words on a reality that was too little talked about, to some extent the unthinkable given the principles of a social democratic regime. But the concept used by the alliance has rather to be seen as an Anglo-Saxon import. It is the liberal meaning of the term that has been used, i.e. what Levitas calls SID.

After the change of regime in 2006, the new right-wing alliance government highlighted “a reduction of social exclusion” as its main task. The concept has however not been properly defined but used in different ways. That prompted criticism from the National Audit Office that in an examination focused on the lack of a clear definition. In the Swedish election campaign in 2010, almost nothing was said about social exclusion. The government has even been reluctant to use the term as social exclusion had increased by some calculation methods, and decreased according to others. Yet the concept has continued to play a key role. Its importance seems to be so flexible and that is precisely why it is such a powerful concept, as Levitas (2005: 178) claims. It draws the attention away from the injustices and disparities among the included, while “...the poverty and disadvantage of the so-called excluded are discursively placed outside society.” (Levitas, 2005: 7)

Although the government has found it difficult to use the term social exclusion, it has however pursued a policy which can be interpreted as liberal. An example is the ‘jobbskatteavdraget’, explained in Section 3.5. The critics of this work-tax deduction include the influential economist and governmental advisor Lars Calmfors who claims that the tax deduction is worsening the divides. Indeed, the divides have worsened, mentioned by a recent report from OECD (2013) which shows that Sweden has the fastest growing inequality in the OECD countries.

5.4. The reliance on the family **in the south**

A fourth type of welfare regime prevails in southern Europe. As it relies on the family primarily, it could be called the familial welfare regime. Welfare is provided by inter-generational care

within the family, supported by a low retirement age. Concomitantly, the familial welfare state is less generous than the conservative with regard to unemployment benefit. As the Barcelona report (Roiha et al., 2013: 9) explains regarding the characteristics that states in southern Europe share, “they have smaller and less developed welfare programmes; a segmented social insurance model, building on the concept of an insider/outsider labour market; weak safety nets and a strong reliance on families for care and support”.

Familism is explained by the Venice report (Campomori et al., 2013: 18) as “based on the idea that family can and has to work as social security cushion for its members and, therefore, that it can carry out a number of functions like child, elderly and disabled people care, guarantee an income in case of unemployment or other events that produce an absence of income. The state gives very few services and some money transfer in order that families can eventually find caregivers on the market”. The Venice report highlights the inequalities this causes among immigrants, which often not have a wide family support.

The familial welfare state has directed a considerable amount of its resources to generous pension schemes, also in terms of early retirement, favouring a passive approach to employment management, just like the liberal and conservative states. As Mary Daly (2001: 91) has stated, “government and social partners have preferred passive transfer payments over active labour market policies, have maintained high wage rates, and reduced labour supply by relying on early retirement.” Old age risks has been favoured at the expense of other risks, particularly in Italy where more than 60% of social benefits has been spent on old age and survivors every year since decades, compared to the average of around 46% in the EU-25 (European Commission, 2010: 280).

In a previous chapter we concluded that the Greek welfare state may have been a dream for those who worked there, but not in terms of the services it has provided. The Athens report describes an imbalance and inequality in terms of the provision of social services, benefits, pensions and healthcare related to the different number of insurance funds that existed until recently, involving different rules, conditions and criteria. A figure that looks striking is the decrease in the proportion of population aged 15-24 years from 14.3% in 2001 to 10.2% in 2012. Thus, the proportion of young people in this age group has gone down by 29%, moreover during the period when the growth model has flourished. The Athens report mentions low fertility rates as one of the causes, but behind the low fertility rates lies probably the problems of the familial welfare regime. The welfare states of the familial regime have not been designed to support female employment. The family is still expected to care for welfare, and as the labour market protects the privileges of males, women find it hard to combine employment and parenthood.

Thus, young people have perhaps not dared to give birth to children because the familial welfare regime has not been replaced by a regime with a welfare state that provides the support and security needed to develop a competitive economy, for example decent unemployment benefits and child care.

In Italy, devolution has further weakened the welfare state and instead exacerbated the already existing differences among the regions. In this way, Italy has spearheaded the emergence of what Andreotti et al. (2012: 1926) propose to conceptualise as Local Welfare Systems (LWS). By that they do not refer to any fixed and stable structures, but to “dynamic processes in which the specific local socioeconomic and cultural conditions give rise to: different arrangements of formal and informal actors, public or not, involved in designing and implementing welfare policies; and different profiles of people in need”. Such Local Welfare Systems have emerged in the absence of a framework of rules to guarantee homogeneous access to services across the country. According to the Venice report (Campomori et al., 2013: 9), the welfare system in the Veneto region is centred on cash transfers to families while the systems in, for example, Piedmont or Tuscany are more oriented towards the provision of services.

In the familial welfare regime, young people’s housing is the responsibility of the family. Accordingly, in Greece, Spain and Italy, but also in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Poland, young people do not leave the parental household until they are on average around 30 years of age. This is probably also a reason why young people are considered young to such a high age, 35 in Greece as well as in Spain. As the Athens report (Avatangelou et al., 2013: 14) maintains, it depends on traditional cultural patterns, “placing family bonds at the high scale of life principles”. As the Barcelona report (Roiha et al., 2013: 13) puts it, the important role of families is “somewhat shaped by religious habits, and the perception of co-residence of parents and youth during the latter’s transition into adulthood as part of family life in the Spanish context”. Therefore, housing in Spain has been treated as an economic rather than a social policy because it is perceived as part of family wealth. According to CECODHAS Housing Europe, social housing is very tiny, as in Spain, or non-existent, as currently in Greece.

The small rental sector, lack of social housing and scarce opportunities for affordable housing makes it also difficult for young people to leave the parental household. In addition, as emphasised by the Venice report, young people find it difficult to obtain credits and loans to purchase a house. As touched upon in chapter 1, this has forced young people in Venice to move from the Old Town to the Mainland, creating what the Venice report refers to as an “exodus” (Campomori et al., 2013: 20).

In the south of Europe, the combination of the familial welfare regime and the growth model of dependent financialisation has left space for a quite comprehensive informal sector. The Athens report (Avatangelou et al., 2013: 9) regards it as a characteristic feature, “the extensive informal work flourishing within the context of the ‘grey economy’, which was especially intensified since the 1990s with the mass flow of undocumented immigration. The informal labour regime that tends to be widespread in Greece, is flourishing in Athens particularly, in all types of work, especially in blue-collar work.” The Athens report refers to the establishment of ‘grey economy networks’, “creating especially precarious working conditions for a significant number of young people.” Also the Venice report (Campomori et al., 2013: 18) underlines the significance of the informal economy, “which Italian governments have tacitly accepted for many years, despite workers in marginal and black economy do not benefit of the social insurances and their job is extremely precarious”.

The crisis has exposed all the weaknesses of the familial welfare regime and its backbone, the family itself, as “more young persons (15-24) nowadays are seeking employment in order to help their families to cope with everyday difficulties; a practice that tended to operate in the opposite way in Greece before the crisis, when most youngsters were financially supported by their parents until the end of their studies.” (Avatangelou et al., 2013: 8) The already weak structures and operations of the welfare state have deteriorated further by austerity measures carried out because of the crisis. The Athens report gives the impression of a welfare state about to vanish.

Unable to find a job for long periods, in combination with the almost unbearable taxation and increased prices in products and goods, those youngsters de facto cannot sustain a private household. Thus, more of them are delaying their transition from family home to independent living, which in turn creates further feelings of inability and depression for many of them. On top of that, the apparently weakened and dysfunctional national welfare system, not only fails to support young adults’ independent living, but also fails to protect them against the risk of poverty or exclusion in cases of very low or no income. A large number of young people are constantly complaining about the social welfare state in Greece, which intensifies their insecurity. (Avatangelou et al., 2013: 20)

In Barcelona, the crisis has resulted in many evictions. As the housing market in Spain is based to a great extent on ownership and due to easy access to loans, many families bought property before the crisis, but “now, a great number have lost their jobs, making it difficult or impossible to keep up with mortgage payments; hence, many families have become homeless” (Roiha et al., 2013: 12). The Spanish government has reacted by changing

legislation towards easing the pressure for those in debt; “however, these measures are likely to be ‘too little too late’ for too many families, focusing only on the debt issue and not on housing as a basic human right”.

5.5. The constant transitions in the east

The Bulgarian report (Hajdinjak and Kosseva, 2013: 12) draws a background which also applies to the other new member states:

Under the communist regime, medical and social care were “owned” and controlled by the state. As such, they were provided to all citizens at no cost, since they were fully covered by the state budget. In general, the communist-era social and health care is still considered as very good, mostly on account of its universal accessibility and highly educated medical personnel.

The political changes in 1989, however, led to a profound transformation. In a study of the Eastern European countries, Zsuzsa Ferge (2001: 131) concluded that “most of them seem to share just one feature: the absence of a project for a welfare system ...” During the 1990s, the Eastern European countries were pushed by international organisations like the IMF and the World Bank to pursue neo-liberal policies, including the withdrawal of the state, deregulation and privatisation. Existing universal benefits “including price subsidies, the health service, and family benefits were curtailed across the region. They were either simply withdrawn or transformed into public or private insurance, or into means-tested benefits.” (2001: 140)

In Bulgaria, the current welfare systems are managed by the state at the national level and financed mainly by compulsory contributions by the employers, the employees and the self-employed. The contributions are insufficient due to the exceptionally low level of incomes in Bulgaria, however, and accordingly the systems suffer from a chronic underfunding. That has worsened the quality of the service. Instead, “private medical practice has boomed in the past decade and high quality health care is easily available to those who can afford it”. Moreover, an increasing number of people are not entitled to welfare benefits and services. Because of unemployment, they cannot afford to pay the compulsory contributions due to the poverty in which many of them live or they do not qualify to get the benefits. That shows clearly how the welfare state, with the words of Esping-Andersen (1990: 165), is “an active force in the ordering of social relations”, contributing to causing the problems it is supposed to solve.

This is probably part of the explanation to why Bulgaria “has the second highest levels (after Romania) of poverty and social exclusion for children and young people (but also for the total population) – between 40 and 45%” (Hajdinjak and Kosseva, 2013: 15). Furthermore, Bulgaria

has the highest severe material deprivation rate in the EU. The Bulgarian report refers to the formation of an extensive youth underclass, in which unemployment is not an exception but a norm. “A logical presumption is that if abandoned by institutions and the society, such young and jobless underclass represents a social time bomb, which might explode in a very near future.”

Due to their transitional character, the new member states have been difficult to classify, which the Krakow report reaffirms. The Brno report (Sirovatka and Valkova, 2013: 10) describes this transitional character of the Czech welfare state:

It started as a conservative Bismarckian model inherited from the pre-war period (Cerami, 2006; Inglot 2008). Later it was modified by the communists who implemented more uniform elements as well as workplace-related measures. After 1989, the post-communist governments again modified it by imposing rather modest standards in social insurance, in combination with selective and targeted measures in the final result generous enough to effectively alleviate poverty. Since 1990s the Czech welfare state has gradually moved in a more liberal, residual direction through the decaying of benefit levels and by a series of partial reforms (Saxonberg and Sirovátka, 2009), labelled as a trajectory towards a “low social expenditure” welfare state (cf. Armingeon, 2006).

As the Brno report (Sirovatka and Valkova, 2013: 15) states, “access to housing is one of the key preconditions for the effective inclusion into society”. Housing in the Czech Republic, Poland and Bulgaria, however, does not seem to offer such an effective inclusion for young people. In the Czech Republic, a large proportion owns a dwelling. The share of tenants has fallen and a higher share of them rent at market price which reflects the process of rent deregulation. According to CECODHAS Housing Europe, no official common definition of social housing exists in the Czech Republic.¹² To the extent that social housing does exist, it “comprises an integral part of the transition model of housing. It is intended among others for young people who cannot afford to pay for standard municipal housing or rent on the open housing market”, according to the Brno report (Sirovatka and Valkova, 2013: 18).

Similarly in Poland, CECODHAS Housing Europe finds it “difficult to define what constitutes ‘social housing’”. Furthermore, access is based on income and aimed at those without access to any other dwelling. Also in Bulgaria, social housing consists of dwellings “let to particularly needy people, and represents about 3% of the total housing stock in the

¹² Available at: <http://www.housingeurope.eu/publication/social-housing-country-profiles> (accessed 7 October 2013)

country”. Hence, in all the three countries, housing can be described as residual and dualist, making it hard for young people to leave the parental home. Consequently, the average age of leaving is high, around 30 years.

6. The simultaneous convergence and divergence in Europe

Since the early 1980s, finance has grown in weight relative to production and economies have been increasingly financialised. Large corporations have become much more engaged in the financial markets, based on speculation (“fictitious capital”) and rents (Arrighi, 2010: 230; Becker et al., 2010: 228). Banks have been transformed. Another crucial characteristic of the last decades is that profits have increased their share of total production value at the expense of wages and taxes (Harvey 2010: 12; Callinicos 2010:55). That has made the collective welfare increasingly difficult to finance and paved the way for the emergence of private alternatives, for example regarding education. A major redistribution of wealth has taken place, confirmed by a recent report from the OECD, *Divided we stand - why inequality keeps rising* (OECD 2011).

As Lapavistas et al. (2012: 1) put it “households have become heavily involved in the financial system through assets (pensions and insurance) and liabilities (mortgage and unsecured debt).” Thus, people’s welfare has increasingly come to be based on speculation and loans. It has for example become important to make a career in the housing market. As long as house prices rise, anyone can make a profit by moving. Many have mortgaged their homes to fund additional consumption in the knowledge that prices, after all, are expected to rise. This works, but only as long as prices rise and that does not last forever, as shown most clearly in southern Europe. In recent decades several large housing bubbles have burst with large fluctuations as a result and usually to the benefit of financial capital. Indeed, since 1973 there have been hundreds of financial crises around the world, compared to very few between 1945-73 (Harvey 2010: 8).

Politically, this development has been guided by neo-liberalism, defined by Jessop (2012) as “a political project that is justified on philosophical grounds and seeks to extend competitive market forces, consolidate a market-friendly constitution, and promote individual freedom”. Jessop defines four main types of neoliberal regimes that developed in the ‘neoliberal epoch’ beginning in the 1970s. All of them emerged in reaction to the crisis of post-war settlements. The most radical was the neoliberal system transformations in the states that emerged from the former Soviet Bloc, among them Poland, Czech Republic and Bulgaria. Next follows the neoliberal regime shifts of which Thatcherism is the prime expression. The third form comprises restructuring processes that were primarily imposed from the outside (southern Europe),

while the more pragmatic neoliberal policy adjustments constitute the fourth type. Germany, The Netherlands and Sweden belong to this last group. In general, neoliberal globalization has “reduced the frictions associated with national “power containers” or analogous borders, strengthened the logic of profit-oriented, market-mediated competition within the world economy, and reinforced the influence of world market dynamics in world society more generally”.

All the reports display effects of the neo-liberal project, most obviously in the reports on Birmingham and the cities in Eastern as well as Southern Europe. Furthermore, it appears in the far-reaching labour market reforms in Germany, driven by the principles of activation and workfare. It has put a decisive imprint on the transition of the Dutch welfare state and as the Rotterdam report (Spies and Tan, 2013: 7) states, “it seems plausible to assume that privatisation, decentralisation and an increased emphasis on a person’s own responsibility, are changing the welfare state as we know it”. Neo-liberalism shows itself clearly in the austerity measures pursued with the intention to “solve” the crisis, for example “the excessive use of fixed-term contracts towards young people, is also accompanied by the extension of the maximum duration of their renewal (until they become permanent contracts); i.e. now the three continuous renewals can convert the fixed-term contract to permanent, not after 24 months as it was happening until recently, but after 36 months.” (Avatangelou et al., 2013: 8). In the sense of being increasingly imprinted by neoliberalism, the European societies now converge.

The political project of neo-liberalism has made the European economies in general more financialised. In the European Union, neo-liberalism has put its imprint on European policies since at least the establishment of the Single European Act in 1986. The Euro has been crucial in the neo-liberal project, urging the member states to strengthen competitiveness by increasing flexibility as well as promoting temporary and part-time work. As Lapavistas et al. (2012: 23) put it “all Eurozone countries have joined the race to impose labour market flexibility and compress labour costs, but from very different starting points and with different mechanisms.” EU policy has by the adoption of the Stability and Growth Pact enforced a race to the bottom across the Eurozone. That race has been won by Germany. Because of that race, countries across Europe now diverge. This is the divergence that now increases rapidly simultaneously as the countries converge in being imprinted by neoliberalism.

Lapavistas et al. (2012) highlights two main reasons to why Germany has won the race. Firstly, peripheral countries entered the Eurozone at high exchange rates which gave German exporters a competitive advantage. In that way, the competitiveness of peripheral countries was reduced at a stroke when joining the Eurozone. Secondly, Germany has been much more successful than the

peripheral countries in squeezing its own workers and in that way increase its competitiveness. Lapavistas et al. (2012: 30) describe the euro as a “‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ policy for Germany, on condition that it beggars its own workers first.” German capital has also since the early 1990s taken full advantage of cheaper labour in Eastern Europe.

How has the EU tried to counteract the causes of these growing divergences? Indeed, there are reasons to be critical because the austerity measures have made the divergences worse. The President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, highlighted in his 2012 State of the Union speech that “it is precisely those European countries with the most effective social protection systems and with the most developed social partnerships that are among the most successful and competitive economies in the world.” (EU Communication, 2013: 1) It is easy to agree but how does the development of effective social protection systems and social partnerships accord with austerity measures? And how will such a development be possible when the competitive countries build their successes on a ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ policy, on condition that they beggar their own workers first?

The EC has addressed the increasing divergences, in particular by issuing a Communication on social investment for growth and cohesion in February 2013, the so-called ‘Social Investment Package’. It called on Member States to prioritise social investment and to modernise welfare states. But what is meant by social investment, the key concept in the Communication that is supposed to get people a sense of something new? Social investment is said to be one of three functions that welfare systems fulfils, the other two being social protection and stabilisation of the economy.

Social investment involves strengthening people’s current and future capacities. In other words, as well as having immediate effects, social policies also have lasting impacts by offering economic and social returns over time, notably in terms of employment prospects or labour incomes. In particular, social investment helps to ‘prepare’ people to confront life’s risks, rather than simply ‘repairing’ the consequences. (European Commission, 2013b: 3)

Such a preparatory function rather than simply ‘repairing’ the consequences should certainly be regarded as an important aspect of social investment. What the Communication does not mention, however, is that social investment as a perspective involves much more. In fact, the social investment perspective was launched during the 1990s as a critique of neo-liberalism (Morel et al., 2012). From the perspective of neo-liberalism, social policy has been seen as a cost and inequality a natural part of a market, even necessary to justify the economic actors. Markets have to be deregulated to avoid high unemployment and low growth and people need to be encouraged

to apply for a job, regardless of quality; activation, as it has been called. Security has been less important.

During the second half of the 90s, critiques of neo-liberalism rallied around the new perspective that was developed, called the social investment perspective (Jenson, 2012: 66). “Central to the social investment perspective”, Morel et al. (2012: 354) writes in an anthology called *Towards a social investment welfare state?*, “is the attempt to reconcile social and economic goals.” This is not only desirable in order to reduce inequality but necessary to become competitive. Thus, a social investment perspective does not restrict itself to social policy but demands more equality and discretionary learning at the labour market as well, because as de la Porte and Jacobsson (2012: 143) write in the anthology mentioned above “pressure on the unemployed to accept unskilled and unrewarding jobs may be detrimental to productivity in the long run.” The relationship between growth and welfare, efficiency and equity, has to be renewed.

The social investment perspective had an impact within the European Commission during the 1990's second half. It came to characterize the European Employment Strategy and underpinned the Lisbon Strategy in 2000. The original Lisbon Strategy from 2000 expressed a desire to reconcile economic and social objectives, in line with the social investment perspective (Lundvall & Lorenz, 2012: 337). The revision of the Lisbon Strategy in 2005, however, meant a radical break, and according to Robertson (2008: 90) “... a significant shift away from a social market/’fortress Europe’ as the means to create a knowledge-based economy toward a newer vision; a more open, globally-oriented, freer market Europe.” As Robertson describes it, neoliberalism took revenge in the revision. Thus, when the EC uses the notion of social investment in the Communication from February 2013, there are reasons for a critical interpretation. Does the use of the notion signal the adoption and perhaps even development of the social investment perspective or is the term reinterpreted in another discourse, perhaps even a neo-liberal one? It might be the latter. After the crisis had broken out in 2008, it became quite fashionable to blame and criticise neoliberalism for it. In recent years, however, it seems as if neo-liberalism has survived and even gained momentum, which the austerity policies show. According to a report from Oxfam published on 12 September 2013, “austerity policies could put between 15 and 25 million more Europeans at risk of poverty by 2025”.¹³ Neither has austerity cut debt ratios, as it was supposed to, nor has it triggered inclusive economic growth. Instead, unemployment in many European countries is soaring. As the report underlines, women and

¹³ Available at: <http://www.oxfam.org/en/eu/pressroom/pressrelease/2013-09-12/25-million-more-europeans-risk-poverty-2025-if-austerity-drags-on> (accessed 7 October 2013)

young people are being hit hardest, and “Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the UK – countries that are most aggressively pursuing austerity measures - will soon rank amongst the most unequal in the world if their leaders don’t change course”.

A crucial stake in the success of the neo-liberal project has been its conceptualisation of social exclusion. Neoliberalism expresses itself by treating social exclusion as a state, not as a process, drawing the attention away from the injustices and disparities among the included. Instead, it discursively places the poverty and disadvantage of the so-called excluded outside society, blaming the victims. Exclusion is done to them by themselves. Social exclusion in the neo-liberal sense does not implicate changes in the whole of society that have consequences for some of the people in that society. Indeed, there is nothing inherently wrong with contemporary society, according to neo-liberalism, as long as it is made more inclusive through government policies. The problem is not society but the people in a state of exclusion from it. Thus, they have to get included, by using carrots and/or sticks, in particularly the latter. In that way, any critique of capitalism is efficiently removed from the political agenda.

A major area which has become increasingly imprinted by neo-liberalism across Europe is education. An expression of that is what the Athens report (Avatangelou et al., 2013: 18) refers to as ‘shadow education’ consisting of additional private lessons in private educational centres or at home which has emerged in several countries due to the deterioration of the educational system. In Birmingham and the UK, the democratically elected local politicians and local authorities seem to lose more and more of their responsibility in favour of central government, private initiatives and market forces. As the Birmingham report (Robinson et al., 2013: 19) maintains, “local authorities used to have a major role as providers of schools but this role is now reducing as a significant number of secondary schools are converting to become academies or free schools, which are independent of Local Authorities (LAs)”. The academies have been set up to replace poor performing schools in deprived areas. In general, private means are funding the start-up costs while the central government provide for the running costs. Free schools are also funded directly by central government. They may be set up by groups of parents, teachers, charities, businesses, universities, trusts, religious or voluntary groups.

In Sweden, a system of independent schools was inaugurated in 1992. These schools were supposed to be run by headmasters, teachers or parents who wanted to realise their own good ideas. Currently, 10% of the pupils in elementary education attend independent schools and at upper secondary level, the rate is 20%. A large part of it, however, is run by multinational

venture capital companies based in international tax havens. The Malmö report (Grander, 2013: 15) tells the recent story:

There are no restrictions on the profits or dividends to the owners of the school. An independent school is like any business. This means that a school can make a profit, which is paid directly to the owners. There is no obligation to re-invest the profits in the school. This kind of profit outtakes are prohibited in most other EU states. The system also makes it possible for an independent school to go bankrupt. Recently, one of the largest Swedish independent school providers, JB, owned by a Danish private-equity firm, went bankrupt. 14,500 pupils now wait to be placed in other schools. The teachers are losing their jobs.

This section will be finished by some questions on the basis of the *EU Youth Strategy*, the framework for European cooperation in the youth field (2010-2018). At the end of its first three-year cycle, in the autumn of 2012, *EU Youth Report* (European Commission, 2012a: 8) was published with the dual objective “to evaluate the progress and to serve as a basis for establishing a set of priorities for the coming work cycle”. The content of that report may be treated as an expression of current thinking and approaches. In particular, we have paid attention to what it does not contain. On the basis of the analyses in this report, it seems appropriate to pose the questions below, also in line with a social investment perspective. Unfortunately, the answers cannot be found in the *EU Youth Report*. That signals that a lot of work remains to be done, not only by giving answers to the questions but also in order to develop, establish and spread another perspective on the situation of young people in the European Union.

What does the *EU Youth Report* say about the financialisation of societies, often affecting young people who easily get indebted without having had a chance to understand how and why? What does it say about the growing divergences in Europe which increasingly unequal opportunities for young people? Why does it so one-sidedly stress the need to promote the employability of the young people and not the need to improve the quality of work at the labour market? Why does access to the labour market for young people have to be improved by making changes that weaken the rights of those that work there? How does the EU want to change the labour market to the extent that it becomes more interesting, stimulating, rewarding and developing to work there? Why does the EU put a one-sided emphasis on individual live- style factors (smoking, alcohol, nutrition, obesity and drug-use) in the promotion of health and well-being among young people when so much research, including the WHO-commission on the social determinants of health and the work of Michael Marmot in general, highlight the structural causes of health inequity? Why does the EU “stress the need to fight poverty from an early age in

order to break the inter-generational cycle of poverty", instead of fighting the causes of poverty? Why does the EU highlight the need for a "focus on flexicurity" when the security aspect is being allowed to deteriorate across Europe?

7. Prospects for social innovations

The report has highlighted various structural determinations and causes of inequality. It has to be emphasised that all these structures do not actualise themselves. They always have to be actualised by people on the basis of their interpretations, understandings, interests etc; and there will always be scope for individuals and actors of various kinds, including politicians, to make a change. Ideas, desires and even dreams may have the potential to be actualised, but whether and to what extent they do get actualised depends on among else their coherence, but also the context that they are getting actualised in, regarding for example support. And when they do get actualised, they are co-constitutive of social relations by assigning them with a certain meaning.

This report has highlighted one such meaning-making with a profound implication for the inequality affecting young people and that is the neoliberal conceptualisation of social exclusion. Such a conceptualisation belongs to what can be called a problem-oriented approach. That means to take the problems for granted without paying attention to their underlying causes. This approach restricts itself to what seems to be and draws attention away from the injustices among the included. It blames the victims because they seem to be the problem. A problem-oriented approach is NOT premised on critical realism.

The report has claimed the existence of social exclusion and that we should talk about it, but both as a process and as a state. As a state, some of the reports contain descriptions of what it means. As a process, it occurs on conditions determined by society. In order to clarify these conditions, Levitas' distinction between the three definitions of social exclusion can be used, but seen as three different aspects or criteria. Social exclusion may depend on that you do not have, do and/or feel what is required. If you do not have you belong to the have-nots and that is the aspect emphasised by RED. Similarly, SID is concerned with the ones who could be called the do-nots while MUD deals with the feel-nots, i.e. those who do not express the "right" moral. At least one more aspect needs to be added, however, concerning those who do not want to be included and which can therefore be called the want-nots. They cannot be identified on the basis of a process definition solely. Exclusion has not been done to them by others but by themselves. A process definition does not recognise what the excluded want, have, do and/or feel. It presents the excluded only on the basis of what they do not want, have, do and/or feel. This makes these

people appear as almost helpless. It becomes, therefore, our responsibility, those of us who happen to be included, to help them in again, or perhaps even force them to it. The process definition can thus quite easily be linked to patriarchal solutions. Therefore, defining social exclusion as a process has to be supplemented by defining it as a state (situation). Then, we do not need to assume what these people lack. Instead, it makes us attentive to what they actually want, have, do and/or feel. They want, have, do and feel perhaps not what is required to be included. But they probably want, have, do and feel something else. And it may well be the potential for a positive societal development, if only society became liable to it.

This is the potential that Citispyce hopes to contribute to actualising. That requires another approach than the problem-oriented, one which can be called potential-oriented. Such an approach pays attention to the potential (the real) whether it gets actualised or not. The concept of potential is used here in the Aristotelian sense, explained by Britannica as “existing in possibility: capable of development into actuality”, covering both the positive and the negative. Indeed, Aristotle can be regarded as a predecessor of critical realism. Thus, some potential that does get actualised contributes to causing the inequality affecting young people. It has been the main objective of this report to highlight such causes. On the basis of the analyses in the report, we will end by drawing some conclusions which highlights the needs for change and prospects for social innovation.

Firstly, this report has presented another understanding of Europe than the usual one. It is an understanding which underlines the dependence between the countries, to the advantage of some and to the disadvantage of others. Patterns of inequity are growing, certainly within cities but also between countries. Social innovations that aim to change causes need to take this into consideration. Indeed, the development and dissemination of such an understanding should be regarded as an important category of social innovations.

Secondly, such an understanding clarifies the needs of solutions that do not restrict themselves to individual neighbourhoods or even cities. There is a need for young people to get to know each other across Europe and address the causes of inequality collectively. The problems may express themselves in a particular neighbourhood or city but they depend to a high extent on a fundamentally flawed integration of Europe. Therefore, the solutions have to be European. Thus, initiatives that show how young people can work jointly to combat the inequalities on a European scale should certainly be regarded as social innovations.

Thirdly, the report has used a range of indicators, displaying several symptoms of inequality. Comparisons on the basis of these indicators show that young people are affected in different ways, across Europe. These differences become even more pronounced when the underlying causes are considered. The same symptom may have different causes. If all these symptoms of inequality have something in general, it is uncertainty. Young people in general across Europe are exposed to a growing uncertainty. Thus, social innovations that counteract this uncertainty should be given a high priority. As the Malmö report states, building social relations with mutual trust is a key for change.

Fourthly, the report has shown how financialisation has penetrated almost every aspect of European societies, also to the detriment of the productive sector and productive potential. There is a strong need of developing the productive sector and even to re-industrialize parts of Europe (Becker, Frieder Otto Wolf). What social innovations developed by and with young people can contribute to spread the work organization of discretionary learning? How can financialisation be revealed, dealt with in a competent way and even counteracted? Social innovations that respond to such questions should be more than welcome.

Fifthly, as Novy (2011: 249) has underlined, the welfare state has proved to be one of the most important social innovations of the 20th century. As quoted in the previous section, it was praised by the then President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, himself. The practice too often contradicts the rhetoric, however, and the welfare state is being dismantled across Europe. For example, why has the European Commission put pressure on Sweden to abandon its Universalist housing system when it plays such an important role in one of these “most effective social protection systems” that President Barroso praises? The Netherlands has already abandoned its universalist housing system due to a similar pressure from the EC. There is an urgent need of social innovations that contribute to maintain the successful aspects of the welfare state and shows how to improve it, instead of substituting it.

Sixthly, besides the uncertainty mentioned above, another general characteristic among young people across Europe is the lack of rights. The *EU Youth Strategy* addresses this and the second of its two overall objectives is to “promote the active citizenship, social inclusion and solidarity of all young people”. This is too often promoted, however, at arenas and in contexts where it does not mean much. In contrast, there is an urgent need of social innovations that show how young people can gain an influence where it means something, for example in the class room regarding the approach to knowledge and what to learn. How could trade unions become more open to the needs of young people and collective agreements be developed in order to secure the rights of young people?

Seventhly, we should welcome warmly social innovations that show how to take advantage of, support and actualise young people's positive potential. The Athens report (Avatangelou et al., 2013: 21) finds it important to emphasise, "that youth, have not yet resigned, but rather fight for their rights and all kinds of inequalities they are experiencing, through their calls for democracy and end of austerity measures on the streets and through various solidarity actions." The Barcelona report (Roiha et al., 2013: 22) expresses a similar belief in young people, underlining that "one of the traits that characterise many young people in the city is their active stand against injustice". The Malmö report (Grandner, 2013: 21) urges us not to forget that "young people have a lot of competences, potential and often show creativity in dealing with their own situation".

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Annex

As a first step in this workpackage, the *WP2: Strategy report* was written (Stigendal, 2013), outlining the rationale of the workpackage and how it was supposed to be carried out. Five contextual areas were identified. The first one was the economy and labour market (1). The second one was welfare regimes which we divided into access to social income, social and health services (2), housing (3), education and training (4). Finally, we agreed to focus on power, democracy, citizenship and civil participation (5). In each one of these five areas, indicators of inequality were selected. Most of the indicators was selected from the so-called dashboard of EU youth indicators, released by the EU Commission in spring 2011. They are also used in the latest *EU Youth Report* (European Commission, 2012a). Besides the EU youth indicators, some additional indicators were selected from a recently published report by the Eurofound (2012).

These were the 14 indicators and they were divided between these areas as follows:

The economy and labour market

1. Long-term youth unemployment rate (European Commission, 2012a: 276): “Share of unemployed youth 15-24 without a job for the last 12 months or more among all unemployed in this age group.” Also defined at the Eurostat web page: “The long term unemployment rate is the share of unemployed persons since 12 months or more in the total number of active persons in the labour market. Active persons are those who are either employed or unemployed.”¹⁴
2. Youth unemployment ratio: Share of unemployed among the total population (employed, unemployed and inactive), aged 15-24. (European Commission, 2012a: 276)
3. Youth employment rates, EU Member States, 2007 and 2011. (Eurofound, 2012: 11)
4. Young people in temporary employment, EU Member States, 2007 and 2011. (Eurofound, 2012:16)
5. Young people in temporary employment because they could not find a permanent job, by country, 2007 and 2011. (Eurofound, 2012: 17)

Access to social income, social and health services

¹⁴ Available at: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_SDDS/en/une_esms.htm (accessed 10 of April 2013)

6. At-risk-of- poverty or exclusion rate for young people (18-24) compared to total population: The share of young people (18-24) who are at risk of poverty and/or severely materially deprived and/or living in a household with very low work intensity compared to total population. (European Commission, 2012a: 277)
7. At-risk-of poverty rate for young people (18-24) compared to total population: The share of young people (18-24) living in families with an equivalised disposable income below 60 % of the national median equivalised disposable income (after social transfers) compared to total population. (European Commission, 2012a: 277)
8. Severe material deprivation rate for young people (18-24) compared to total population: Percentage of the population that cannot afford at least three of the following nine items: 1) to pay their rent, mortgage or utility bills; 2) to keep their home adequately warm; 3) to face unexpected expenses; 4) to eat meat or proteins regularly; 5) to go on holiday; or cannot afford to buy a: 6) TV 7) Refrigerator, 8) Car, 9) Telephone; compared to total population. (European Commission, 2012a: 277)

Housing

9. Mean age of young people leaving the parental household. (European Commission, 2012a: 199)

Education and training

10. Early leavers from education and training: Percentage of the population aged 18-24 with at most lower secondary education and who is no longer in education or training. (European Commission, 2012a: 275)
11. Young people (20-24) having completed at least upper secondary education: Percentage of young people aged 20-24 having completed at least upper secondary education (ISCED level 3c). (European Commission, 2012a: 275)
12. Young people not in employment, education or training (NEET). (European Commission, 2012a: 278)

Power, democracy, citizenship and civil participation

13. Young people's participation in political organisations/party or community/environmentally-oriented organisations: Self-reported participation in activities of a political organisation or political party or a local organisation aimed at improving their local community and/or local environment in the last 12 months. Age 15-30. (European Commission, 2012a: 278)

14. Participation of young people in political elections at local, regional, national or EU level: Percentage of young people aged 18-30 who declare that they participated in political elections at either local, regional, national or EU level in the last three years. (European Commission, 2012a: 278)

It may of course be extremely difficult to make such comparisons, but the idea was to use the indicators as our common language. Using the same definition, we would know what we were talking about. As the values presented for each member state are based on the same definition, we can take their comparability for granted. That does not necessarily mean that these indicators are used by all the member states in their national contexts and perhaps other indicators are used at the city level. As long as everybody tried to maintain a relationship to the 14 indicators used at the EU-level and treat them as our common language, the prospects for comparisons was expected to be acceptable. Furthermore, that would make it likely that the teams would identify causes to the same symptoms, making the causes comparable.

For example, “youth unemployment rate” was to be used with the same meaning as defined in the EU Youth indicators and if otherwise, that should be explained. It was perfectly legitimate to use other definitions but then the difference should be explained with regard to the EU Youth indicator, for example concerning age span. Then, we would know what we were talking about.

How did it work? Quite well. But of course, if we had got a few more months and every team the opportunity to work their reports through after reading this report it would certainly have worked even better. The ten reports have, however, also had the function to test the indicators. How do these 14 indicators function in order to get to know more about the inequality affecting young people? Did they all function well? No, they did not. Values for several of the indicators were not possible to get hold of at the city level and where such values exist, it does not always build on the same definition or it may perhaps apply to the region and not the city. The indicators will not be reviewed here, however, because it would take too much space and time. Above else, our study has shown the difficulties making comparisons on the basis of the same indicators.

Chapter 4: Local matters? Neighbourhoods and social infrastructure as spaces of reproducing, producing, mitigating or counteracting social inequalities in 10 European cities

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1. Introduction

This report (Work package 3) presented the findings of the first stage of fieldwork in the EU funded CITISPYCE research project in a comparative way. In ten cities, studies were carried out in order to describe and analyse in a comprehensive way policies and infrastructure at neighbourhood level working against social inequalities, with a particular focus on young people. For each city, two neighbourhoods were selected as case studies; availability, outreach, accessibility and quality of local social infrastructure, services and projects were assessed, underlying values, normative-cognitive frameworks and governance arrangements were deciphered. Particular emphasis was put on the relation and division of labour between state, non-governmental welfare organizations and small-scale bottom up initiatives at the local level.

This research exercise is to be seen in the wider context of the CITISPYCE project. It follows on from a baseline study (Stigendal 2013) that identified drivers of social inequality at a macro level. The baseline study (Chapter 3) looked at the scale level of cities, EU Member States and beyond and, deploying a critical realist perspective, discussed how varied forms of regulating capitalist economies produce and reproduce social inequalities. Two broad trends that were brought to the fore and presented in their respective regional shapes, are neoliberalisation and financialisation, and their acceleration and accentuation after the 2008 economic and financial crisis, resulting in unprecedented and dramatic levels of working poor, youth unemployment and, as Stigendal highlights, social uncertainty. With the local case studies (Work Package 3), the CITISPYCE project turned to the meso-level of sociality before a next set of studies which explore micro level experience based on individual encounters of young people (Work Package 4). Slicing up social investigation into these three levels is problematic, as they are heavily intertwined. The analytical

distinction between these three levels has been set as a heuristic to guide successive phases of the research (and to allow for appropriate and distinct research methods to be applied in each phase), but they will have to be seen in their interplay. Social inequalities, so we assume, are produced and reproduced across these levels and not bound to one or another. Indeed, part of the CITISPYCE project rationale is to uncover the interplay of factors between these three levels to help understand how social inequalities are (re)produced and how they may be counteracted. This also brings into dialogue a range of different actors at those three levels, including policy makers, practitioners, third sector/voluntary organisations, young people and networks incorporating all of these.

In this wider research framework, the meso-level is operationalized as neighbourhoods and public services. The research is expected to show if (and how) neighbourhoods and public services contribute to social inequalities. In other words: Do they matter? Does it make a difference to the life chances and social inclusion of a young person, in which neighbourhood of a European city he or she lives and which public services are provided there? We presume that, yes, place and services do matter and that there is a power (in some instances more limited than in others) in the locality that (potentially) mediates and shapes such manifestations. Badly equipped and isolated neighbourhoods can amplify experiences of inequality as can discriminatory service delivery. Well-equipped and accessible neighbourhoods on the other hand can be important resources to cope with deprivation and even escape poverty, empowering services can be a decisive factor of social inclusion. The role of neighbourhoods in both, producing and tackling inequalities, is well described by Alan Murie (2005). He refers particularly to articulations of social exclusion, which we regard as one of various expressions of inequalities (see also Stigendal 2013)¹⁵:

“The dynamics of social exclusion both affect neighbourhoods and are affected by them, and the understanding of deprivation and exclusion is sterile without reference to neighbourhood and place as key elements in the production and experience of exclusion. Such reference includes aspects of the local welfare state and rebalances accounts that neglect the welfare state altogether or are selective about what they include. Some neighborhoods are better placed to access jobs and training; some have a greater diversity of public, voluntary and community services – more acceptable to a mixed faith and diverse population. Others are less diverse. The perceptions and realities of opportunity, security, and safety relate to all of these and are important aspects of the experience of exclusion” (Murie 2005: 165).

¹⁵ A conceptual debate about the relation between these concepts is still to be deepened in the course of this project. Bernt/Colini's categorization of peripheralisation, marginalization and exclusion as three forms of “urban inequalities” could be an actual inspiration (Bernt/Colini 2013).

Two EU wide trends feed our presumption of the significance of the neighbourhood level at which we explore manifestations of inequalities as well as services to tackle these. Firstly, residential segregation and social polarisation have been on the rise in European cities since the late 20th century so that where one lives is more and more decisive about his or her health, safety, educational achievements and career prospects. Secondly, in a still ongoing process of rescaling state spaces, the urban neighbourhood as a geographic entity has become an important site of social intervention, a “key spatial and institutional force field for post-Keynesian regulatory experiments” (Brenner 2004: 272).

Research method

To get to grips with neighbourhoods empirically, two aspects of analysis were combined in the field work: a) the local social structure, i.e. the composition of the population and the more recent social history, and b) the social infrastructure, i.e. the public services in place that address social inequalities experienced by young people living in the respective area or visiting it in their everyday life.

The fieldwork was carried out on the basis of a research strategy paper that had been developed by the project consortium and identified a number of analytical categories and research dimensions that were to be addressed in each report. In line with the overall focus and target group of the CITISPYCE project (young people of ethnic minorities or with a migration history in deprived urban areas), the selection criteria were: a) a socio-economic situation that is less favourable than city-wide average, b) an age structure that ensures that the neighbourhood is inhabited by young people (under 25), and c) a population composition that characterises the area as ethnically diverse. Within each city, two areas were to be selected that would show these characteristics of social structure and deprivation, but differ in their social structure and social history as well as in the opportunity structures and social infrastructure that are available for young persons. Given the profound differences between the participating cities and their institutional make-up, significant room for discretion was allowed and each partner was asked to find a plausible rationale for the selection. Area sizes were to be within a range of 5,000 and 50,000 inhabitants (for details, see WP 3 strategy paper).

Methodically, the fieldwork was based on a mix of social research methods, including document analysis, site visits and about 15 expert interviews per area. Documents that were analysed include recent and past administrative reports and plans, policy papers, research reports. The site visits included an account of the appearance and condition of local infrastructure, service facilities and

public space. Experts that were interviewed were local policy-makers, service providers, local associations, businesses, researchers, inhabitants and in some cases also service users. They focused on the socio-spatial characteristics of the neighbourhood, characteristics of local social infrastructure, the relation of social infrastructure to inequalities, and incidences of social innovation in the area. A total of 146 interviews were carried out.

Before we turn to the findings of the case studies, we'll briefly introduce some conceptual underpinnings of these two research objects - neighbourhoods and social infrastructure -, and discuss their relevance for the socialisation of young people.

1.1 Neighbourhoods as a research focus (attributes, effects, scales)

Neighbourhoods are, at a first glance, geographic entities, parts of a wider city, a set of adjacent streets and buildings. But there is much more to a neighbourhood than its physical features. Numerous attempts of urban studies tried to get hold of what it is that makes up a neighbourhood and distinguishes it from other areas. Amongst the earliest accounts, is a reflection by Robert A. Woods, who, in 1914, saw a neighbourhood as a core institution in the evolution of animals and mankind, even more powerful than the family¹⁶. And even in the modern and differentiated society, so he observed, the proximity of neighbours, their interaction in everyday life, makes the neighbourhood a strategic and powerful site of socialization:

“It is surely one of the most remarkable of all social facts that, coming down from untold ages, there should be this instinctive understanding that the man who establishes his home beside yours, by that very act begins to qualify as an ally of yours and begins to have a claim upon your sense of comradeship. Surely this deeply ingrained human instinct is capable of vast and even revolutionary results. Among the unexplored and almost undiscovered assets upon which we must depend for the multiplication of wealth and well-being in the future, may it not be that here in the apparently commonplace routine of our average neighborhoods is the pitch blende out of which, by the magic of the applied social science that is to come, a new radium of economic and moral productive resource will be elicited?” (Woods 1914: 581).

¹⁶ “the neighborhood is a still more ancient and fundamentally causative institution than the family. It seems likely that the neighborhood, in the shape of gregarious association among the animals, was the necessary matrix in which reciprocities of the family could find suggestion and protection, (...) a family of families (...), the neighborhood relation has a function in the maintenance and progress of our vast and infinitely complicated society today which is not wholly beneath comparison with the function which it exercised in the creative evolution of that society” (Woods 1914: 576).

Figure 1 Neighbourhood maps of Barcelona (Raval), Brno (Cejl) and Hamburg (Essener Straße)

Source: Citispyce WP3 Reports Jubany et al.2014, Sirovatka et al. 2014, Gehrke et al. 2014.

Inspired by such accounts, a group of sociologists in Chicago, who are often referred to as the founders of the Chicago School of Sociology, saw an urban neighbourhood as “a locality with sentiments, traditions, and a history of its own” (Park 1925/1984: 6), even a “moral region” (Park 1925/1984: 43). Turning to their internal social organization, they argued that neighbourhoods, as “cities within cities” (Park 1925/1984: 10), should be studied “not merely for their own sake, but for what they can reveal to us of human behavior and human nature generally” (Park 1925/1984: 9). In this human ecologist tradition, Schwirian (1983) suggested neighbourhoods to be made up of “people, place, interaction system, shared identification, and public symbols” (Schwirian 1983: 84). As instructive as they are, these concepts are somewhat flawed by assumptions about the impact that living in proximity has on the individual behaviour of its inhabitants. To avoid such a bias and related shortcomings, Galster (2001) proposed a more neutral definition, stating:

“Neighbourhood is the bundle of spatially based attributes associated with clusters of residences, sometimes in conjunction with other land uses” (Galster 2001: 2112).

The attributes that he proposed are, in brief, the spatially based characteristics of buildings, infrastructure, demography, class status of the resident population, taxing regime, public services, environment, proximity, political culture, social interaction and sentiments (ibid). These attributes are, that is a crucial disposition, “mutually causal over time” (ibid: 2116)¹⁷. Similarly, Murie (2005) speaks of “a two-way interaction in which residents shape the neighbourhood and the character of

¹⁷ Galster goes on to illustrate the various roles and relations quite pictorially: “the consumers of neighbourhood can be considered the producers of neighbourhood as well. Households consume a neighbourhood by choosing to occupy it, thereby producing an attribute of that location related to that household’s demographic characteristics, status, civil behaviours, participation in local voluntary associations and social networks, and so forth. Property owners consume a neighbourhood by buying land and/or buildings in it; they subsequently produce the neighbourhood’s attributes through their decisions regarding property construction, upkeep, rehabilitation or abandonment. Business people consume a neighbourhood by operating firms there, thereby producing attributes related to structure types, land use, pollution and accessibility. Local governments consume neighbourhood by extracting property tax revenue and, in turn, produce attributes associated with public services and infrastructure” (Galster 2001: 2116).

the neighbourhood affects household decisions to stay, move to, and move on (...)” (Murie 2005: 165)¹⁸.

Amongst these attributes are factors that can produce social exclusion or facilitate inclusion, opportunities and resources that are valuable to cope with poverty and help overcome situations of deprivation and distress: “Opportunities and despair, it’s all in there” (Atkinson/Kintrea 2004: 437). A neighbourhoods can, for instance, be experienced as a cul-de-sac, when residents feel trapped in it, or as a safe haven, as a transit area which is inhabited in a particular stage in one’s biography only, or else. These functions will differ amongst residents and over time. Safe havens can quickly turn into cul-de-sacs, when some attributes are no longer appropriate for a new life situation. The size of an apartment is a particularly important element here, but also the quality and availability of services, jobs, and, not least, the neighbours. How these functions are played out for newcomers to a city was recently described well in journalist Doug Saunders’ study of “arrival cities” (Saunders 2011).

The – positive or negative - effects that a neighbourhood has on one’s life chances, so-called “neighbourhood effects” (Sampson/Morenoff/Hannon-Rowley 2002) or “area effects” (Atkinson/Kintrea 2004) are difficult to explore empirically (and there is a lively debate amongst urban researchers about their existence), yet they are a powerful currency in urban policy and have been the starting point for area-based policies in North-Western European countries and at EU level since the late 1980s.

An instructive study to explore area effects was carried out by Rowland Atkinson and Keith Kintrea in the two Scottish cities Edinburgh and Glasgow. They see “three main mechanisms at work” in areas “where social worlds consist of people who are almost universally deprived”: “Social and physical isolation”; “local norms and expectations”, and socially and geographically restricted social networks” (ibid: 441ff). Consequently, in their study, they were interested in “the role of local geographically based and socially produced cultures in sustaining and reproducing positions of affluence and deprivation” (ibid: 441) and structured their analysis along three lines: Does isolation lead to a “distinct form of social capital”? Do socialization processes in a predominantly poor neighbourhood lead to “a depression of expectations and ambitions”? Are poor people caught in the trap of “geographically restricted social networks” so that they lack information and exchange which may be important to “escape their current situation” (ibid: 441). They found a “differential image of social reality and opportunities of residents” with positive and negative area effects in predominantly poor areas and in more diverse areas. Table 1 sums up their findings.

¹⁸ Similar findings have been presented by Wacquant/Wilson 1993.

The spatial scale of what is perceived as a neighbourhood, however, is variable, from just outside an apartment upwards. Building on Suttles (1972), Kearns and Parkinson (2001) suggest three scales which hold specific functions: a) the home and its immediate surrounding, places to be reached in a short footwalk (“home area”), b) the wider “locality” at the size, for instance, of a housing estate, and c) the even wider urban district¹⁹ (see table 2). Of these scales, locality or district marked the entry point to the fieldwork presented here, but only to allow for findings at the nearer scale as well. These scale levels have been distinguished in the case studies, to identify their yet specific role in (re)producing, mitigating or counteracting inequalities for young people in deprived urban areas.

Table 1: Interaction of area type and area effects in four Scottish neighbourhoods

Status	Area-effects	Poor area	Diverse area
Poor individual	positive	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support infrastructures – voluntary and community organisations • Local kin and friendship support • The ‘community’/people 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reduced workplace discrimination • Contact with those in work • Positive local role models • Heightened self-esteem
	negative	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stigmatization and discrimination • Geographical isolation • Lack of transport links • Lack of ‘weak ties’ to outside area • Overloaded welfare services • Territoriality 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of support infrastructure for poorer people • Conspicuous deprived status in affluent area • High quality private services but too expensive to access
Affluent individual	positive	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Able to escape area by car to access external services • Able to leave via housing market 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High quality services
	negative	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stigmatization • Poor quality physical environment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No negative effects

Source: Atkinson/Kintrea (2004: 451)

¹⁹ Suttles, in his study of a black community in Chicago, had distinguished between the block level, the „defended neighborhood“ level, a „community of limited liability“ and „expanded community of limited liability“ (Suttles 1972).

Table 2: Neighbourhood Scales according to Kearns/Parkinson (2001:2104)

Scale	Predominant function	Mechanism(s)
Home area	Psycho-social benefits (e.g. identity, belonging)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Familiarity • Community
Locality	Residential activities Social status and position	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Planning • Service provision • Housing market
Urban district or region	Landscape of social and economic opportunities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Employment connections • Leisure interests • Social networks

Kearns/Parkinson (2001:2104)

In addition to scale, the time dimension should be taken into account. Some of a neighbourhood's attributes are more durable than others (Galster 2001: 20114f), some can even “change at the very act of consuming them” (ibid: 2116), e.g. around a household move, when in-moving households differ substantially in status or attitude from those who moved out.

When conceptualizing the interplay of different attributes of a neighbourhood and their role in (re)producing, mitigating or counteracting social inequalities, an important reference is also Henri Lefebvre's thinking about the social production of space (Lefebvre 1974/1991). He distinguishes between spatial practices, the representation of space and representational spaces. The dimension of spatial practices (*l'espace percu*) refers to where specific practices are typically carried out: Spaces of housing, consumption, production. Previous spatial practices, e.g. the construction of an apartment block or shopping mall will have a significant impact on later practices (housing, shopping). An example for a representation of space (*l'espace concu*) is a map, more generally this dimensions refers to abstract manifestations of discourses about a space. When, for instance, a neighbourhood is labelled as a “development area” in an urban policy, this is a representation, and attention is brought to specific features of it. Representational spaces (*l'espace vecu*), in turn, are manifestations of a “lived space”. Here, the everyday routine of people is meant, and its symbolic expression. When, for instance, young people use a public square or a local park in a certain way, or a redundant building, they give it a meaning that may well be in contrast to the original idea of planners and architects. In the analysis of neighbourhoods that was carried out in our fieldwork, particular emphasis was put on recent social history and how the area has been used. It appears that,

across the board, a common interaction of these three dimensions of space can be seen: Many of the areas that were selected had been built for the particular purpose of housing workers and their families in either the 1920s/30s or in the 1960s/70s, two distinct periods of social and public housing as spatial practice with yet specific assumptions of family life, daily routines, consumption and use of private and public places (and ignoring spatial practices and demands of teenagers and young adults); and that a social change that happened since brought about a mismatch between perceived and lived space inside the buildings (eg overcrowding) and outside (eg vandalism), feeding rather negative representations of that space in form of a bad and seedy image and thus reproducing inequalities. Particular problems resulting from this constellation seem to occur for young people who are bound to these areas due to limited mobility. In more central areas, and most pronounced is here the Raval area in Barcelona, some subtle and other not so subtle signs make clear to local youth that most of the many attractions in their area are in fact not meant for them.

1.2 Social and Youth Services as a research focus (rationale, interaction, settings)

Social services are, next to social rights and benefits, a key means to social inclusion. They give a welfare system its face. Or, rather, they are an interface, as they are typically delivered as personalized services and co-produced in close interaction with the service user.

A first element to consider in the analysis is the rationale that drives services. How do they perceive of their users? In the field of youth work, in the wake of changing social policy paradigms from social rights to social investment²⁰ and work first principles, services have drastically changed the relation to their users. Discourses shifted from empowerment to employability, and young persons are increasingly seen as human capital. A most profound change has been around the introduction of sanctions and conditionalities related to welfare benefits. This seems to be an EU-wide trend. Young people in need of social assistance and social workers now form their relationship on basis of a contract, which sets out what the young person needs to do to continue receiving benefits. In case of breach, benefits are reduced or cut.

As Lipsky's seminal work on street level bureaucracy (1982) and numerous studies that were inspired by it, have demonstrated, the impact of front-line practitioners on the direction and outcomes of social programmes is rather strong:

²⁰ We refer to social investment here in the form of its actual implementation by EU Member States in recent years rather than the much broader concept that had been originally proposed in the early 1990s, for a discussion see Stigendal 2013 and Morel/Palier/Palme 2012.

“As front-line practitioners, they translate institutional policy into daily, situated practice. This gives them a significant degree of control with potentially profound consequences for both institutions and citizens” (Fletcher 2011: 446).

Following from this view, assuming a straightforward and smooth implementation of social policies and programmes would miss what is happening in practice, Rather, the position of these officers is structurally uncomfortable and conflicted. They “operate in a ‘corrupted world of service’”, struggling with “insufficient resources, high caseloads, unpredictable clients and Agency goals that are often vague, conflicting and ambiguous”, so that “consequently, public policy is effectively made in the crowded offices and daily encounters of street-level workers” (ibid: 447).

In addition to the practitioners that a service user is in contact with, he or she experiences a service through its setting. Most often and more precisely it is the “transit-space” (Augé 1995) of waiting rooms, corridors and offices through which the service is seen. And it is these spaces in which a person is turned into a “case”, “client” or “customer”.

For young people, schools and youth clubs are such settings in which they are, literally, put in place. The design and quality of these places tells them about the place the society has for them – and the absence of such a place, too. The case studies, in which such places were visited and described, show that high quality public facilities for young people and youth-oriented design are rare, despite prevailing social investment rhetoric. But some innovative pilots, run by enthusiastic individuals and often small-scale NGOs, can also be found. Rather than providing specific places such as youth clubs, or in addition to those, it appears, street work has been established as an important intervention to approach young people and work with them against the inequalities they face.

1.3 Neighbourhoods, social infrastructure and the socialization of young people

Neighbourhoods and public services are arenas with high relevance to people’s everyday lives, and, hence, their socialization. Both are not only used in a functional sense, but lived, experienced, smelled... on an everyday basis. It is difficult to avoid the immediacy of the neighbourhood just outside the door of your house, in particular for children, teenagers and people without a car outside. The same holds for those public services that you rely on, schools and youth clubs. They are spaces where social inequalities are experienced, and, depending on their make-up, potentially amplified, mitigated or even counteracted. They are sites of social learning (Bandura 1971): Neighbours in their neighbourhood, and service users at a service facility, learn through observing their immediate surrounding and through interaction with others (other neighbours, service

providers...). A recent study of how young people negotiate risks in their everyday life in London found:

“that the ways young people deal with risks are closely bound up with their developing identities as young men and young women. These identities are tied to social networks within the peer group, the family and the neighbourhood, creating as well as constraining safety in a context where crime and violence are commonplace” (Parkes/Connolly 2011: 2).

The socializing property of neighbourhoods i.e. the strong relation (even though not mono causal) between their structuring effect through their specific (socio-spatial, infrastructural, demographical, cultural etc.) characteristics and the context specific competencies developed by its inhabitants is what Bourdieu's concept of habitus renders account of (Bourdieu 1976). The concept of habitus aims to view human “ways of doing” or performances as the product of their incorporated collective and individual history and thus as a product of their differing socialization. Due to its “embeddedness”, that is, its being anchored in the social environment as a “structuring structure”, habitus enables the generation of “ways of doing” or practices spontaneously adapted to the situation and the demands of the environment or space of socialization. According to Bourdieu, habitus, considered as a concept to account for socialization and action, allows us also to recognize the similarity in practices or in performance of individuals that come from the same space or sphere of socialization.

The neighbourhood effects mentioned above contribute (as factors among others) to the emergence of a specific habitus of a young person. The habitus of that person, if not appreciated by gate keepers in mainstream society institutions (teachers, employers), can turn into a decisive factor of social exclusion and/or (re)produce social inequalities.

The habitus concept has been recently applied to territorial areas, as “habitus of place”, “meso-habitus” or “habitus of habitus”. This “meso-habitus” is a repository of historical developments and social structures, a “collective memory” and “image”, reproduced by social practices in that place and/or related to it (Dangschat 2009: 323). For areas with a negative image, the “meso-habitus”, even if it is only assumed rather than experienced, can be disadvantageous and stigmatizing, reinforcing exclusion, somewhat behind the person's back. Stories about such negative processes, in turn, can reinforce frustration and deviance. They are a potentially powerful attribute (that is not on Galster's list mentioned above) of an area. Such stories of “no-go areas” and “post code discrimination” are manifold in the case studies and seem, according to local experts that were interviewed, to play a key role in reproducing inequalities.

Figure 2 Children leaving a local Bar in Brno and a Playground in Malmö



Source: Jana Valkova and City of Malmö

2. The significance of neighbourhood and local social infrastructure in (re)producing, mitigating or counteracting social exclusion and inequality – a focus on 20 areas in 10 European cities

Table 3 The 20 CITISPYCE research areas and the number of inhabitants

City	inhabitants ²¹	Area 1	Inhabitants	Area 2	Inhabitants
Athens	9,9 Mio	Agia Sophia-Maniatika	one of 30 neighbourhoods in Municipality of Piraeus (163,688 inhabitants)	Elefsina	29,902 ²²
Barcelona	1,6 Mio	Trinitat Nova	7,627	El Raval	49,027 ²³
Birmingham	3,1 Mio	Lozells and East Handsworth	31,074	Bordesley Green	33,937 ²⁴
Brno	385,913	Cejl	about 10,000	Husovice	900-1,000 ²⁵
Hamburg	1,8 Mio	Dulsberg	17,282	Essener Straße	5,122 ²⁶
Krakow	758,400	Mistrzejowice Nowe	3,000-4,000	Rzaka	2,800-

²¹ 2011-2012 according to the national statistical offices

²² 2011 according to Hellenic Statistical Authority, 2012 (ELSTAT) (Tryfona et al. 2014:3,6)

²³ Jubany/Güell, Citispyce WP3 Report 2014:2f

²⁴ 2011, Census Birmingham, Birmingham City Council. birmingham.gov.uk/census

²⁵ Sirovatka et al. Citispyce WP3 Report 2014:3f

²⁶ 2011 and 2010 Statistikamt Nord

					4,000 ²⁷
Malmö	304,849	South Sofielund	4,611	North Sofielund	3,679 ²⁸
Rotterdam	616,528	Feijenoord-Midden (Afrikaanderwijk, Bloemhof, Hillesluis)	33.610	Middelland	11.547 ²⁹
Sofia	1,202,761	Fakulteta	15,000-35,000	Hristo Botev	8,000-10,000 ³⁰
Venice	268,909	Marghera	about 29,000	Mestre	about 90,000 ³¹

2.1 The case study areas at a glance

The twenty neighbourhoods were selected on basis of a number of characteristics that include a socio-economic situation that is less favourable than the city-wide average, an age structure that ensures that the neighbourhood is inhabited by young people (under 25), and a population composition that characterises the area as ethnically diverse (see above). Although they have deliberately not been selected on the basis of physical features, they also show some similarities in this regard, which is an indication for the close relation between physical and social space that was discussed above. In different shapes and intensities, the stories of change and decline are illustrative of wider processes of deindustrialisation, transformation of housing, social change and changing migration patterns. All areas have a history of housing where the working classes and their fate is closely tied to changing forms of employment and income generation, household forms and housing preferences on one hand, and public servicing, housing provision and connectivity on the other. A decisive period, it appears, was the very late 20th century, when the breakdown of the socialist regimes in Eastern Europe, combined with large scale deindustrialisation in the West, and not least the economisation and marketization of public sector operations shook up local economies and populations (see also Stigendal 2013). Whilst many of the areas have seen regeneration efforts in 1990s and 2000s, recent austerity policies seem to jeopardise achievements and exacerbate local problems. The images of the areas in the public perception, it seems, are rather stuck and hard to change, and play their own part in (re)producing stigmas and distance.

In *Athens*, both case study areas are traditional working class neighbourhoods located in the western part of the Attica region. Agia Sophia is a district of Piraeus, an industrial centre also known for its

²⁷ Modzdzen Citispyce WP3 Report 2014:3ff

²⁸ Malmö Statistic Office 2012, <http://www.malmo.se/Kommun--politik/Om-oss/Statistik/Befolkning.html>

²⁹ 2013, <http://www.rotterdamincijfers.nl/>, Tan/Spies Citispyce WP3 Report 2014

³⁰ Hajdinjak et al. Citispyce WP3 report 2014:2f

³¹ Campomori et al. Citiypce WP3 Report 2013:2

port, located between the City centre and the sea. It is a working class area that has not changed much over the years, the people who live here are on low incomes, many of them being migrant workers. Elefsina, which lies about 20 km away from the City centre, is a historic place, but has been heavily industrialised in the 20th century with noisy and polluting industries (factories, refineries, cement factories) and shipyards. It is a multicultural area, as its industrial character was a pole of attraction mainly for migrants in the past, and immigrants at present deriving from various countries (Tryfona, Pothoulaki and Papadimitriou 2014).

In *Barcelona*, El Raval is a very central neighbourhood, La Rambla being its eastern border. Known as “Barrio Chino” it had a dubious reputation for drugs and prostitution in the late 20th century and has been subject to urban regeneration projects since the early 1990s. Parts of it have been upgraded and gentrified, whilst others have not improved much. In recent years, there has been a rapid immigration process that transformed the local population and today about half of the inhabitants come from countries such as Pakistan, the Philippines and Bangladesh. Trinitat Nova on the other hand is a more peripheral housing estate built in the 1950s. It has also been undergoing renewal projects since the 1990s; in 2000 a new metro stop improved its connectivity significantly. It is amongst the poorest areas in Barcelona, with the highest share of unemployment, and also an ethnically diverse population (Jubany/Güell 2014).

The two case study areas in *Birmingham* are both densely populated neighbourhoods a few kilometres to the north west (Lozells & East Handsworth) and to the east (Bordesley Green) of the city centre, characterised by a very diverse population (85% and 89% minority ethnic respectively) and high levels of unemployment and deprivation. In both, settled Asian immigrant communities live alongside newly arriving migrants from Eastern Europe, but they differ in terms of connectivity, economic profile, housing and tenure mix (Hussain et al 2014).

In *Brno*, two areas were selected in which Romany people make up the majority of the population. The Cejl neighbourhood is a lively inner-city area, in which Roma live next to other inhabitants but without much contact. It is perceived as dangerous and a hotspot of drug dealing and prostitution. The Husovice area, in turn, is a peripheral area that has more the feel of a rural small town than an urban area. There has always been a Roma minority amongst its residents; in the socialist period a deliberate municipal housing allocation contributed to this. In more recent years, a change in population can be observed with some local Roma residents being pushed out into private dormitories and are followed by other Roma groups that have been pushed out of more central areas (including the Cejl neighbourhood) (Sirovatka/Krchnava/Hora/Valkova 2014).

In *Hamburg*, two neighbourhoods of the district north were selected. The Essener Straße area is a peripheral housing area that was built in the early 1980s to provide attractive yet affordable housing for young families and thus prevent further suburbanization. Over the years, children-rich families of various origins, including former Turkish guest worker families but also repatriates from former USSR found a home there. Whilst it has a calm appearance today, housing companies and planning authorities in the late 1990s, had sensed problems such as youth violence and vandalism and reacted with urban regeneration programmes. The Dulsberg area is much more central, easily accessible with public transport. It was built in the 1920s to provide modern houses for working class households. The housing stock is dominated by small apartments which become problematic when households grow in size but do not have the means to expand or move. Since the 1960s, guest workers and other immigrant groups have moved here, so that it has today a multicultural character. In the 1970s and 1980s, youth gangs and violence brought a negative image to the area with which it is still associated, although today social problems are much less visible (Gehrke/Güntner/Seukwa 2014).

Mistrzejowice Nowe and Rzaka are two dormitory suburbs of *Krakow*. Whilst in Mistrzejowice Nowe much of the housing stock was built in the 1980s for workers of what was then the Lenin Steelworks, housing in Rzaka was constructed around the same time, but it then targeted well educated civil servants and their families. After the regime change, unemployment was a serious problem in both areas. Today the social situation seems to have improved somewhat but is still below city average. A recent phenomenon is that a significant number of jobseekers have gone abroad and left their children back home. In both areas there is not much to do for young people, football hooligans occupy the public space and related violence is a pronounced problem (Mozdzen et al 2014).

South Sofielund and North Sofielund are two central and lively mixed use areas in *Malmö's* inner city. Whilst North Sofielund was mainly built in the 1930s and has a rather homogeneous outfit, South Sofielund appears more diverse, with structures from the 1920s and 1930s and from the 1950s. Both areas are known for high proportions of low income and jobless households, and for their multicultural population. They also have a reputation for vandalism and drug problems. Since the late 1990s, gentrification processes started in North Sofielund and first signs of population exchange are also seen in South Sofielund (Grander/Stigendal 2014).

In *Rotterdam*, one case study area is located in the southern part of the city and comprises neighbourhoods Afrikaanderwijk, Bloemhof and Hillesluis. It is a traditional port-related working class area, but “the dockworkers that used to live here moved to better neighbourhoods, and large migrant families now occupy the rather small houses”. Today, it is a multicultural and young area,

with low income, high unemployment and low qualification levels. Middelland, in contrast, is an inner city area, just west of the city centre, “booming and bustling with a metropolitan feel”. It can be described as a “neighbourhood of extremes”: Upmarket shops and restaurants are next to sex-shops and drug-related crime (Tan/Spies 2014:4f).

Fakulteta and Hristo Botev are two areas in *Sofia* that are home to Roma communities, but differ in some respects. Fakulteta is 4 km out of the centre and has had the reputation of a ghetto already in the socialist period. It is perceived as a “no-go area”, a “hotbed of social problems, including devastating levels of unemployment, poverty, social exclusion, poor or non-existing infrastructure, and low quality of housing, education and health care”. The “practically complete absence of official social infrastructure” has brought residents to develop alternative and self-organised coping strategies. Hristo Botev is at the city fringes, next to the airport and “almost completely cut-off from the city by railway lines”. Since it was built in the 1930s, Roma communities alongside ethnic Bulgarians have always inhabited it in friendly and quiet coexistence, a “well-ordered neighbourhood with developed and functional infrastructure”. But since the 1990s the population rose dramatically from 2000 to today around 10,000 with mainly Roma from other parts of Bulgaria coming in, changing the local atmosphere and producing similar problems to those in Fakulteta. In those years, public infrastructure and services were closed, so that “many Hristo Botev residents (...) feel as if ground has been pulled from under their feet” (Hajdinjak/Kosseva/Zhelyazkova 2014: 3f).

In *Venice*, Marghera and Mestre are two areas on the mainland, with industrial and residential functions as opposed to the culture and tourism oriented island. Marghera was built in the 1920s and 1930s as a residential working class area in the then popular shape of a garden city. Some of the people who were allocated there (mainly in Cà Emiliani in the southern part of the area) by the then fascist government were those who were not wanted elsewhere: the poor and political opponents. After WWII, however, petrochemical factories were put there, increasing already existing pollution problems; nevertheless in the 1970s large scale social housing was constructed. Decline of the industries after the oil crisis led to mass unemployment and related problems. In the 1990s, a significant population change took place with new arriving immigrants, mainly from Bangladesh. Mestre is an historic city, that after being annexed to Venice in 1926, and most radically after WWII, transformed dramatically into an industrial area with “large, crowded and aesthetically ugly residential sub-neighbourhoods for working class in Marghera’s factories, public employees and those who could not live in the downtown of the City of Venice”. Around the turn of the century, its identity began to change again, regaining some autonomy and more positive appreciation. The population is more mixed than in Marghera, also attracting middle class families, and it is known as

an “open minded town”. But social problems are visible, in particular in form of drug abuse, a problem that had occurred in the 1980s, then vanished to some extent, but, as in Marghera, came back in recent years (Campomori, Della Puppa, Pinocchio, Baccelliere 2014).


2.2 Three faces of inequalities: physical and social distance, decaying places and piecemeal services

The case studies reveal in which condition neighbourhoods and local social infrastructure were at the time of the research, in autumn 2013, and how these conditions have been produced over time.³² Configurations of attributes were identified that seem to manifest or even reinforce social inequalities and experience of exclusion. At the same time, we were also interested in local forms of mitigating and counteraction inequalities (this will be dealt with in Chapter 3). This research is informed by the discussion of “area effects” that was introduced in the previous chapter. Identifying causes of such effects will be an important starting point in the search for potential social innovation against inequalities and exclusion.

The analysis, it needs to be underlined, was in most cases carried out with adults who have a professional relationship to the neighbourhoods and services, mainly public officers, social and youth workers. This implies that much of the information gathered is based on perceptions of normality that prevail in these professionals’ worldviews and discourses. It may well be that the perception of young people currently living in that area, differ significantly from the perceptions presented here. The views of young people themselves will be explored and presented in Work Package 4.

The case study reports provide information about **socio spatial development** in an area, about **local social infrastructure** and about their respective role in (re)producing and tackling social inequalities (see figure 1). The synthesis presented in this paper, however, does not aim at comparing these cases and develop typologies or identify regional specificities. The selection of these areas was purposefully meant to include similarities and contrasts; comparing these features would not be of much use in the overall interest of the CITISPYCE project. Instead, and to the service of the CITISPYCE overall objectives, **this report is concerned about the significance of neighbourhood” (Kearns/Parkinson 2001) in producing, reproducing, mitigating or counteracting social inequalities and social exclusion across that range of different settings.**

³² Inspired by Lefebvre’s idea of the social production of space (1974/1991, also: Gottdiener 1994)

Figure 3 How to arrive from 20 Neighbourhood studies to 3 clusters of social inequality

The structure of our argument stems from analytical categories that were jointly developed by project partners at a midterm workshop in November 2013, after first interviews had been carried out and preliminary findings had emerged in most cases. These **8** categories are: **mobility, perceived social problems, transformation of public places, social relations in the neighbourhood, normative-cognitive frameworks of local services, availability, gaps and coherence of services**. The categories were helpful in systematising the huge amount of data presented in the ten city reports. For the sake of keeping the focus on factors that reveal the significance of neighbourhood, however, much detail had to be left aside in this paper, but may be drawn upon in future outputs of the research project.

In the following sections, three constellations of neighbourhood attributes are presented that appear to be significant in producing, reproducing, mitigating or counteracting social inequalities. These constellations stem from comparative analysis structured along the categories mentioned above and present a second stage of interpretation. Three clusters are distinguished:

- A) the first looks at the scale level of the area or locality and its relation to the wider city,
- B) the second cluster looks at specific places within the neighbourhood,

C) and the third is concerned with issues around local public services for young people, their purpose, quality, availability and coherence (see figure 1).

Understanding exclusion as a manifestation of inequalities and as a process and a state (for this distinction see Stigendal 2013) in which two realms are constructed - an “inside” and an “outside” -, we can identify an underlying theme that seems to be running as a red thread through most cases. This is a process of “othering” (Barter-Godfrey/Taket 2009, drawing on Spivak 1985). In some cases, neighbourhoods or housing estates have explicitly been built for the “other” (e.g. in the case of Venice Marghera, the “unwanted”), in other cases, the “other” have been pushed there either by market forces or by explicit practices of public and social housing providers. This division can structure everyday perceptions, when labels of these areas lead to prejudices and stigmatisation. And even in mixed areas, where poor and not so poor, native and newcomers mix, there are dividing lines that are hardly crossed and mark the “other”. Exclusion can also be the result of a paradox effect: A housing estate may have been built for the explicit and well-meant purpose of social inclusion, but has over time changed its face and function to the opposite. The causes can be bad connectivity, small apartments, bad insulation etc, social and lifestyle changes that no longer fit with the initial planning objectives, economic and other factors.

Whilst these are forms of “othering” by a majority society and its institutions vis a vis a minority³³, there are also stories of an antipodal “othering” by the “other” themselves, ie minority group vis a vis the majority and other groups: Some people living in the case study areas (being perceived as “other” by interview partners), are reported deliberately not to use mainstream services or, more precisely, schools and child care facilities that are frequented by more well off. These people turn (e.g. vis a vis their kids) the majority into “other”. A range of reasons for this can be thought of, fear of discrimination can play a role, or disrespect of majority norms and values. In some cases, religious affiliations are mentioned.

The first of these attribute bundles³⁴ relates to the scale level of **neighbourhood** (larger than a single street or block, an ensemble of streets and buildings). Here we find that throughout all cases there is a close relation between distance and social exclusion. What may sound tautological has many facets and is not a given physical distance could potentially be overcome by good transport connections. Distance becomes problematic, we argue, when combined with isolation, i.e. when no connection is provided. Distance is also not a mere matter of geography, topography and connectivity, but that there are “inner peripheries” that seem worlds apart when they are just next

³³ The terms „majority“ and „minority“ here are not limited to ethnicity, nationality, legal status or social status, but seen as a fluid and context specific category that is socially constructed and can change over time.

³⁴ Here, the workshop discussion about mobility and about social relations in the neighbourhood is reflected.

door. Somebody can be kept at a distance even when physically being very close (e.g. when a door is shut), at the same time emotional nearness can bridge long physical distances (e.g. in migrant diasporas). Hence, the symbolic dimension of distance will have to be discussed to understand how an excluding form of distance is produced. The terms “distance” and “isolation” are used here as signifiers for situations that could also be described as marginalisation, peripheralisation or segregation (Bernt/Colini 2013). We use these specific terms to grasp the particularity of marking a difference, linking up to the concept of “othering” that was introduced above.

A second bundle of attributes refers to places within neighbourhoods, specific **places**, squares, street corners, buildings or service facilities. At that level, basically all case studies hold stories of neglect³⁵, disinvestment, decay and closure. Abandoned places, when they lose their function, make space for uses that connote deviance, illegality and anomie. Vandalism, graffiti, gambling and drug abuse seem to be the rule in all case study areas, but they are only the more visible expressions that can occur at or in these respective places and give them a new meaning. But they can also take place elsewhere, hidden and private.

A third set of attributes is about those (public) **services** for young people that are still in place and being used, such as schools, street work and youth work, training and skills development schemes³⁶. Here, a complex change of service frameworks and policy reforms is observed, that resembles wider trends that were presented in the WP2 report (Stigendal 2013). It has many shapes: Embedded in work first schemes and depending on related funding programmes, services seemingly become more daunting, authoritative and repressive. That goes in hand with a new perspective on the young service users, driven by suspicion and centred on employability rather than broader concepts of empowerment and participation. At the same time, due to austerity measures, small scale civil society service providers seem to face increasingly rigid and bureaucratic funding contexts that, in some cases (Birmingham, Rotterdam, Hamburg) appear to replace trust as a mode of governance by contracts and hierarchic control, whilst in others public services are even absent and civil society struggles to compensate (Sofia, Athens). Young people, the service users, on the other hand (or rather: side), due to these changes, seem to lose their trust in public administration and providers, because they interpret the new regimes as manifestations of distrust. Hence, they don't see service providers as “on their side” anymore and eventually back off.

The dividing line that is drawn between the regime that sets the rules (e.g. education, youth work) and the user (young person perceived as “pupil” or “visitor”) goes right through the places of interaction and their personnel, “street level bureaucrats” such as youth workers and street workers,

³⁵ Here, the workshop discussion about perceived social problems and about the transformation of public places is reflected.

³⁶ Here, the workshop discussion about normative-cognitive frameworks of services, availability, gaps and coherence is reflected.

or teachers (Lipsky 2010). They have to bear the tension that is caused by two not trusting parties and mediate conflicts when they come up. These persons, potentially powerful gate keepers or door openers will be important allies in search for social innovation against the negative effects of that mutual distrust.

2.2.1 Distance and isolation

The position of a neighbourhood in the context of the city plays an important role in the perception and manifestation of inclusion or exclusion. In the case studies, numerous references were made to how distance and isolation reinforce experiences of social exclusion. This has two sides: If an area is isolated, bad connectivity will force residents to revert to what is on offer there (services, jobs) rather than leave the area and make use of services and facilities elsewhere. The lack of contact may then in turn lead to alienation and prejudice by residents of other areas, who may feel they live in a completely different world.

Distance is often the result of effective and intentional “distancing” through respective planning provisions in the past or at present. In Venice, for instance, a part of the Marghera district was built on purpose for the “unwanted” under the Fascist regime in the 1930s, whilst in Hamburg, the Langenhorn case study shows how a well meant innovative planning ideal of the 1980s (car-free housing) fell short of expectations and effectively failed. Some stories of distancing that we found in the case studies connect well to what has been described by Amin as “telescopic urbanism”, a “sanguine and disengaged approach to the urban poor (...)” in which “only particular parts of the city are projected as spaces of potentiality or attention” (Amin 2013:477).

The modes of producing distance resemble local and national systems of land use planning (and their change over time), housing allocation and public transport policies. The impetus to move into these areas, or to stay there, goes back to a range of individual circumstances and structural factors, recent trends in housing provision, such as neoliberalisation and financialisation (see Stigendal 2013) come to force. Skyrocketing rents and house prices in metropolitan areas drive households on low incomes to peripheries, force them to stay in small and overcrowded apartments, cut back in other expenses or even run into debts – factors that cause retreat and isolation. An important factor is also the allocation policy of housing providers who, when housing markets are tight, have long waiting lists and develop their own strategies for priorities as to who will be put where. A dramatic articulation can be seen in Brno:

“The (...) pattern of inequality/social exclusion is strongly supported by the recent neoliberalisation trends. These trends have led to three significant overlapping problems: The first one is the increasing housing costs due to rent deregulation and privatization of the

municipal housing. The other one is the increasing indebtedness among Roma which is partly due to lack of regular earned incomes, increasing housing costs and poorly controlled usury which is widespread in socially excluded Roma localities. The third trend is a deliberate effort of private owners and municipalities to push Roma out from their housing in the localities into private dormitories which have become a good business for private sector. Sometimes private owners use different illegal practices to move Roma out. Since municipality has no social housing at disposal it has to pay high benefits to cover the housing costs to people living in private dormitories: the owners require typically more than twice as high rents compared to the standard rents. These trends represent the specific form of gentrification, leading directly to housing and social exclusion” (Sirovatka/Krchnava, Hora, Valkova 2014: 39).


Across the board, migrants and ethnic minorities on low incomes seem to face the most severe problems of discrimination in the housing market. Again, the Brno report gets to the point:

“Chances to get independent housing are zero for the youth Roma due to a lack of cheap rented housing in the city and other problems like discrimination in delivery of public housing and, lack of money and indebtedness of Roma families. Rather they are prone to losing housing and shifted into dormitory” (Sirovatka/Krchnava, Hora, Valkova 2014: 38).

Undocumented migrants, as reported from Barcelona and Athens, certainly have the least choice as to where they live.

Distance can manifest itself in various ways. A peripheral location of a neighbourhood, that can be measured in kilometres and in the time needed to get there, can cause social exclusion. Public transport costs, long waiting times for buses or unpleasant experiences can discourage young people from trips to sports, culture or other facilities and friends. Hence, rather unsurprisingly, mono-functional housing estates at the periphery of urban agglomerations seem to be particularly prone to isolation.

Figure 4 Different forms of isolation in Krakow



Source: WP3 Report Mozdzen 2014:19

But there are also more symbolic distances that construct “inner peripheries” (ESPON 2012, Bromley 1997), this could be a river or even just a street corner that functions, on the mental map of residents, as a factual barrier that is just never crossed. Services, schools, play grounds on the other side could be reachable within minutes but are never used because they are meant to be for others only, perceived as risky places or because they are just not known. In Malmo, for instance,

“the after school centre has problems attracting the young people from Seved, just across the street Lönngatan, which seems to work as a physical and mental barrier between South and North Sofielund” (Grander/Stigendal 2014:16).

Policies to address physical and symbolic distances have come in the form of urban regeneration and area-based interventions in many case study cities, often with the support of EU funding. Often, however, these policies come as “end-of-the-pipe” strategies: They do not effectively change the connectivity and position of an area within the urban fabric but try to tackle problems inside the area only. The impact is, consequently, rather limited, and in some cases (Trinitat Nova, Barcelona; Cejl, Brno; Sofielund, Malmo) side-effects are produced that even reinforce processes of alienation. Such ambiguous effects are gentrification and crowding out of the less affluent population which can result from public investment and upgrading local housing stock and environment. Regeneration projects may openly accept struggles of poor residents for the sake of a “better” social mix (Cheshire 2009) or try to prevent displacement - in either case, the housing market will most probably decide about the area’s fate. This effect, however, is more likely to happen in inner city areas than in peripheral housing estates.

Bulgaria/ Sofia: Fakulteta

Fakulteta is an example of a neighbourhood that was explicitly built to accommodate the “other.” In the 1920s, the municipal authorities started to push the Roma out of central parts of Sofia and settling them in Fakulteta. Today, the area is an archetype of a Roma ghetto. Although it is located relatively close to the city centre in terms of distance, it is practically and symbolically isolated and remote. This is underlined by the very poor public transport connections, as only one infrequent bus line passes through the neighbourhood (it does not go to the city centre). The area is terribly overcrowded and overpopulated. Over the past two decades, new dwelling have been constructed on former green areas (parks, playgrounds, sport fields). The roads, pavements and other infrastructure are in a very poor condition.

Remoteness of the area has always reinforced the social exclusion, stigmatisation and isolation of people residing there. The isolation is strongly underlined by the fear of crossing the borders of Fakulteta. For outsiders, this is a no-go area, especially after dark, while the residents prefer staying in the area unless having to go to work or school. The municipality has almost completely abandoned its responsibilities in the area. The only municipal services available within Fakulteta are the primary school (I-VIII grade) and a small police station. All other public services (hospitals, employment bureau, bureau for social assistance, kindergartens) are located in neighbouring districts. Although physical distance is not a problem, young people from Fakulteta are seldom able to bridge the divide of fear and distrust that separates them from these institutions. The young see themselves as victims of discrimination and feel rejected. At the same time, the attitude of state and municipal officials towards them is often influenced by the very real stereotypes and prejudices.

Efforts to overcome the consequences of distance and isolation:

- very visible and underlined retreat into the community with high levels of inter-group solidarity
- NGO efforts to fill the gap left by the disengaged authorities (small kindergarten, health centre, community centre providing education, culture and leisure)
- protestant churches as alternative educational and social establishments

In the case of Fakulteta, actual and symbolic distance/remoteness in time led to neglect and decay in the area. For cost-cutting, most of the public services were closed and moved elsewhere. As a result, today residents of Fakulteta (especially the young) fear and distrust the official institutions and service providers, while the perceptions and practices of state and municipal officials are strongly affected by deep stereotypes and prejudices against people from the neighbourhood. This further strengthens the remoteness and isolation of Fakulteta and deepens the divide between it and the rest of the city.

England/ Birmingham: Lozells/ East Handsworth and Bordesley Green

The two neighbourhoods selected in Birmingham are affected differently by distance. In Lozells and East Handsworth, road networks within the neighbourhood and between it and other parts of the city, have a divisive impact. The area is cut off from major parts of the city by a major roundabout that acts as a 'concrete collar'. The flow of traffic and people into and out of the area is reduced because of the negative connotations of this road infrastructure. Further, within the area there is also a road (Gerrard Street) running through the neighbourhood that acts a dividing line between communities of different ethnic origin. These work to reinforce inequalities in the area as well as mediate new types of connections within the area and across the city. In Bordesley Green, the road infrastructure facilitates a regular and busy flow of traffic with numerous places across the city and beyond. The area bustles throughout the day with heavy commercial vehicles visiting a large recycling and global freight enterprise on its outskirts. Within Bordesley Green there are various main roads that carry trade and people into the various formal and informal businesses occupying disused factories and warehouses. There is certain openness to innovations in this area that the city council is seeking to appropriate in one of its Area Action Plans for regeneration and development.

Figure 5 Gerrard Street dividing different ethnic groups in Lozells and East Handsworth



Source: Jill Robinson

Figure 6 Old industrial buildings put to new uses in Bordesley Green



Source: Ajmal Hussain

Sweden/ Malmö: Sofielund

The Garage is a meeting place and a city district library, run by the City of Malmö. The aim of the Garage is to function as a meeting place, for the locals in the area as well as for citizens from the rest of the city. The Garage is situated in the area of North Sofielund in Malmö, close to the busy street of Lönngatan, separating the districts of North and South Sofielund. In the context of the Garage, aspects of distance (both physical and symbolic) can be perceived. The activities at the Garage are of various types, designed to attract visitors from all over the city. In that sense, the Garage is creating closeness rather than distance, since about 50% of the visitors come from parts of the city other than North Sofielund. But even though efforts are being made, and despite its location, the Garage does not manage to attract any larger numbers of local youth living in the directly adjoining area of South Sofielund. Distance, physical as well as social, seems to be a reason for this. The busy street of Lönngatan can, in these aspects, be perceived as one of the barriers creating distance and dividing the greater area in two (North and South Sofielund). The street of Lönngatan does not only constitute a concrete physical aspect of distance, dividing the areas from each other, but also constitutes a barrier of social nature creating distance between the people living on different sides of the street.

Figure7 The busy street of Lönngatan, separating the two districts (in the background: The Garage and Arena 305, North Sofielund)



Figure 8 The Garage – library and “public living room”



Source: Jonas Alwall

Spain/ Barcelona: Trinitat Nova

The origin of the neighbourhood of Trinitat Nova is related to the expansion of the city to host in-land migrant workers that came in the 1950s and 1960s for economic reasons. Blocks of apartments badly equipped, known as ‘vertical slums’, were built in the outskirts of the city. Decades later, in the 1990s, the neighbours started to protest due to the problems with aluminosis and the use of asbestos which provoked serious health problems. The demands were much focused on improving the housing conditions as well as on attracting public funding for social infrastructure and better connection with public transport. Today, whilst some of the petitions have been achieved (e.g. new dwellings, urban furniture, metro station, small buses), spaces for young people to meet up, undertake activities or playing sports activities are still insufficient. Some of them go to nearby areas, but others feel detached from their everyday lives. In this sense, Trinitat Nova has been marked by the physical distance, which has in turn affected the symbolic distance with other parts of the city. At the same time, it shows the story of a neglected area by public authorities where the housing deficits have been the hallmark of vulnerabilities in the economic and social realms.

Figure 9 New buildings of social housing where many neighbours have been reallocated after the demolition of old buildings affected by aluminosis



Source: Jubany 2014

Distance can also be understood in social rather than geographic terms. The perceived safety of personal networks, consisting of kin and friends or e.g. ethnic communities, is an important resource for individuals facing hardship and deprivation. The local community can be a safe haven when stigmatization and discrimination become so strong, that leaving and mixing is no option. Examples have been mentioned in particular for the Roma communities in Sofia and Brno (mentioning also the internal differentiations of these communities). From Rotterdam and Birmingham, incidences of “area code discrimination” are reported. In such instances, in fear of negative experiences, people prefer to stay “in a bubble” amongst themselves within their community, where they - besides own social services, shops of daily goods and leisure time activities - look for and find orientation: Isolation turns into self-isolation.

Italy/ Venice: Marghera

Marghera tells a story of many kinds of distances, one inside the other, a mix of physical and social distance. On one hand, there is the physical distance between Venice lagoon (historical Venice) and the mainland neighbourhood of Marghera: there are two bridges (4 km), one for trains and one for cars, motors or pedestrians which connect the Venice city and the mainland. Nevertheless, a well evident physical distance still remains. At the same time, there is a distance also between two parts of Marghera: the northern and the southern, recognizable as different already for the architecture, the houses and the public spaces in general. On the other, the physical distance became a social distance due to the peculiar history of this neighbourhood. Until 1921 Venice lagoon was a municipality on its own and Marghera simply did not exist. It was born and built as a kind of Venice branch harbour (the original name was Marghera Harbour), following the idea of the so called Big Venice (Venice as a city leader in culture and economy). The original idea was to create a “Garden City” where people that worked in the harbour or lived in the unhealthy lagoon could move to. During the Second World War this area was repeatedly bombarded and subsequently, in the post-war reconstruction time, the original idea of the Garden City vanished in large parts. As a matter of fact, since the Fifties -and until the Seventies- the industry in Marghera had a rapid development following the European trend of the Trente Glorieuses. Many factories (the petrochemical centre and the boat yards) were built and the neighbourhood took on more and more the appearance of a working class area also with a high and dangerous level of air pollution. Nowadays the neighbourhood is divided in two areas: The Northern part with the central square and the municipal offices, which maintains some of the original characteristics, e.g. there are many gardens along the streets, even built on the large traffic circles, and large avenues. The Southern part, with a high concentration of social problems, contains Cà Emiliana and Cita (the “Bronx” of the entire Veneto region) and has about 900 social housing flats. Cita gives an example of what the comparative report has defined: “exclusion can also be the result of a paradox effect: a housing estate may have been built for the explicit and well-meant purpose of social inclusion, but has over time changed its face and function to the opposite. The causes can be bad connectivity, small apartments, bad insulation, etc, social and lifestyle changes that no longer fit with the initial planning objectives and other factors.”

Figure 10 Social housing in Cita



Source: Campomori

Figure 11 Houses in the highly deprived area called Cà Emiliani (South Marghera)



Source: Campomori

Netherlands/ Rotterdam: Feijenoord-Midden

In Rotterdam the river Nieuwe Maas divides the northern and southern part of the city. Although several bridges, a tunnel, a tram and a metro line connect them, the two parts of the city remain quite distinct from each other. The southern part of Rotterdam traditionally housed blue-collar workers with jobs in the port area. When they moved to the suburbs, there was a high influx of migrant workers. The area has been associated with poverty and problems since. The southern part of Rotterdam is still referred to as 'South', while the northern part is called 'Rotterdam'. When coming from the South by public transport the first stop is called 'Vasteland' meaning mainland. One of the research areas, Feijenoord-Midden, is well known for being the most deprived neighbourhood of southern Rotterdam for a long time. Geographically the area is located closest to the bridge and therefore to the northern or 'main' part of the city. It is actually quite central. Public transportation is excellent, with a variety of trams and metros leaving to the other side every few minutes. Transportation to the city centre does not take more than 10 minutes and costs a little over 1 euro. According to professionals working with families and young people, however, people in Feijenoord-Midden do not tend to cross the bridge. Young people will sometimes go downtown for shopping or a night out, but not travel beyond the city centre. Most people, including young people, remain in their neighbourhood. Professionals say young people 'live in a bubble', 'are geographically limited' or 'have no clue what is going on outside their (neighbour) hood'. With 'neighbourhood' they refer to a rather small area of space. One professional gives the example of a young person, working in a guidance-to-work-project, who was asked to get more paint in the adjacent neighbourhood. It was only a few blocks away but he didn't know the building or street referred to and was insecure about how to get there, as he had never been there. Other professionals say many children only play in the street right in front of their house between the parked cars while there is a playground a few streets further down. According to professionals, people living in this area feel at ease in their neighbourhood and have little connection to the world outside. In Rotterdam, distance is not about kilometres, lack of transport or being surrounded by industrial terrain. Distance is self-imposed and symbolic.

Figure 12 Feijenoord-Midden is a stony environment where many streets have a mixed profile: living, shopping, traffic. The biggest open space is the Afrikaandermarkt that turns in a market twice a week. Next to the market is a large but unattractive park.



Such a “**retreat**” (Merton 1938) into family and private life that reinforces distance to other social groups is observed in various case studies (Brno, Krakow, Hamburg, Rotterdam, Sofia). The retreat can come in many forms and is, in fact, a reciprocal process: For example, parents can decide not to put their children in schools where they would be exposed to unwanted expectations and risks, and at the same time these schools might have enrolment practices that wouldn't let those children in anyways. The Rotterdam report comes to a dramatic conclusion:

“(...) in the day-to-day construction of social reality in these areas, cultural elements and individual (in)competences seem to prevail. Cultural factors include mono (sub)cultures often along ethnical lines; a lack of parental attention, guidance and control; a lack of positive role models and the reproduction of a street culture in which the ‘strongest’ groups occupy public spaces. Individual (in)competences include limited time horizons (and lack of willingness to invest); a lack of soft skills and the inability to deal with dominant, mainstream, white work culture; and limited abilities and possibilities to transfer ‘street skills’ to regular economic activities. Children who grow up in these areas are already so much behind by the time they are twenty years old, that social exclusion becomes a self-reproducing process” (Tan/Spies 2014:36).

In Sofia Fakulteta, ‘bussing’ of Roma kids to better schools outside the area was meant to provide for their social inclusion, but in effect caused a “white flight” in those schools, where uneasy parents take their kids off after the arrival of too many Roma children. This contradicts the idea behind it and shows the deep roots of discrimination.

Clearly, school related retreat is a far-reaching obstacle to social inclusion: Good education would open doors for careers and social mobility out of the prospects of low-skilled jobs or early marriage that some parents foresee for their children (Hamburg case studies). In the reclusive everyday life, habits and fashions may be routine that are difficult to get over in job interviews and rather pave the way (in particular when frustrating experiences with job interviews come on top) for deviant careers.³⁷

Financial hardship and unemployment of young people often leads to a prolonged financial dependency on the core-family and hence to prolonged influence of parents’ worldviews and authority. Young people have to stay with their families until their 30s instead of becoming (financially and socially) independent and having a family of their own (Barcelona, Athens). Whilst with younger children, parents can decide where to put them in school (see above), in later years parents may want to have a say in decisions about partners and professional careers. Escape strategies of young people without sufficient resources may imply risks such as becoming homeless or financially dependent on (and exploitable by) acquaintances. The situation in the south of Rotterdam is illustrative:

“As houses are rather small and families rather big, many children are sent outside to play. Mothers stay inside and elder brothers and sisters look after the young ones, who gradually grow up in the street culture this way. Social deprivation is handed over from one generation to

³⁷A number of studies on youth gangs could be quoted here as external reference, an example being Taylor 1997.

the next. There are limited opportunities for young people, and a lack of positive role models as social climbers move out of the area (...) There is strong cohesion within certain subgroups (in general along ethnic lines) and people experience their part of the neighbourhood as a supportive resource. On the other hand, there is no broader form of cohesion or sense of being part of the local community, and everything that can help one climb the social ladder is outside the neighbourhood. People want to move out of the area but often cannot as they lack a safety net elsewhere” (Tan/Spies 2014:9).


2.2.2 Decay and neglect

Basically all case studies mention decaying and vandalised squares, facilities and buildings as a problem: Places that had been serviced and catered once but have lost their function (park, squares, walls, urban furniture). After businesses and public services left, other attractions have emerged and come in. Cutbacks in public services for young people, that once demonstrated respect and care for that age group, came just at a time of decline of conventional and structure-giving family and employment- models.

Poland/ Krakow: Rzaka and Mistrzejowice

In both neighbourhoods we perceive a problem of public spaces neglect. In Rzaka there are many places that people don't take care of. In Mistrzejowice some public places built as a way of facilitating sports activity among young people are utilised by vandals and problematic youth (children of the street and some older folks as well). There still seems to be a lack of feeling of security among inhabitants, despite the fact that the police and municipal guard took notice of that places and (at least officially) patrol them more often. Neither city authorities nor district council do much to improve the state of social infrastructure, focusing rather on 'hard infrastructure', like roads or pavements. In Mistrzejowice, a local NGO was even punished (in a way of higher fees) by the city council for refurbishing its premises on its own.

Figure13Skatepark andTrialpark in Mistrzejowice



Source: Michał Możdżeń

Germany/ Hamburg: Dulsberg and Essener Strasse

In Hamburg we have seen for some years a strong decrease in municipal funding for reliable and steady measures of youth work (In 2012 funding was reduced by 15%). At the same time open socio-spatial, community oriented measures are pushed forward to replace the cost-intensive individual social services offered by the ASD (general social service) for individuals and families. This has been heavily criticised by social policy experts and youth workers because severe cases cannot be dealt with in such a way. Meanwhile, Hamburg's school and transition system into the labour market was transformed under the strategy "*nobody should be left behind*" which puts a strong emphasize on work first and employability measures and combines high requirements and rigid sanctions for individuals. Although job orientation measures and early interventions are now implemented into the new "whole day" school model already in year eight, youth work as a whole is less sustainable and more project based then ever before. This can also be detected in the two fieldwork areas, which have been or still are part of urban regeneration programmes. Both are striking examples for unsustainable structures: once established structures for youth work cannot survive after the end of funding. This leads to a severe lack of structures young people can rely on during their development phase. In both areas sport has been a crucial factor for attracting young people and getting them off the street. In Dulsberg, a lively football scene had been established around the "*House of Youth*". After the end of the funding stream for neighbourhood development there was no implementation as a regular measure. A similar situation has been detected in the area of Essener Strasse, where a dedicated father voluntarily established a football group. This group, which was attended by around 30 people between 1994 and 2010 each week and from 2000-2010 received some additional support by the neighbourhood development programme, unfortunately fell apart after he resigned from his voluntary work. According to the interviewed experts, young people in the research areas found different strategies to cope with this neglect of public spaces and youth work measures: males get harder to reach by open youth work and tend to search for identification and orientation in radical groups (e.g. Salafists) whereas girls are more likely to stay hidden "behind curtains" and solve the disorientation by new dependencies like early motherhood or living with a "sugar-daddy".

Figure 14 Youth Club football trophies in Dulsberg



Source: Gehrke

Figure 15 Football Group in Essener Strasse



Source: Gehrke

Spain/ Barcelona: Raval

Raval is a predominantly working-class neighbourhood which has historically been neglected. Despite being accessible due to its location in the city centre, it has often been seen as a no-go area (association with drugs, prostitution, etc.) and within certain sectors of population (e.g. tourists) today this is to some extent still so, especially in the southern part of Raval. Since the '90s, the Olympic Games and the subsequent processes of urban regeneration and gentrification, there has been much investment in infrastructure that produced economic benefits (e.g. new housings and cultural equipments). Also, there is a long tradition of assistance and intervention by NGOs and associations which provide support to people with few resources. This model is based on the outsourcing of social policies to the third sector built around short or mid-term projects and public tenders. Whilst it covers some of the people's needs, structural solutions like a greater public investment in social infrastructure for young people are reported to be still insufficient.

Figure16 Rambla del Raval: Main urban transformation in Southern Raval (2000) which implied the demolition of many dwellings and the expulsion of the people living in them



Source: Jubany

Figure 17 One of the four playgrounds of the neighbourhood of Raval



Source: Jubany

Poland/ Krakow: Mistrzejowice

Low levels of trust among people responsible for the delivery of different services seem to be the problem especially in Mistrzejowice. Local activists do not feel the support coming from the political sphere. Some experts interviewed suggested a low level of competences among the district council members. Among council members some resentment can be felt towards the municipal authorities (they say that there is a high demand for the actions of the district council among inhabitants but they do not have enough authority and financial independence to deal with the problems adequately). On the other hand, none of the district councils (Biezanow and Mistrzejowice) have taken part in the participatory budgeting scheme started for 2014 budget year. There are also big barriers in communication between institutions of different sorts, which hinder providing the youth with services of an adequate quality. Most problems stem from the fact that the part of political authorities located nearest to the community (mainly district councils) do not have much say in most big Polish cities or, in fact, any substantial budgets. Inflated demands on the part of citizens cannot be met by the districts themselves and require close co-operation with city authorities, which, in the age of austerity, would rather see services cut than expanded. Nonetheless, some problems, especially in Mistrzejowice, can be ascribed to a low level of political experience that members of district council have accumulated. This can explain both the low level of collaboration with local stakeholders and flaws in the decision making process, as with the building of both the trial park and skate park in the Mistrzejowice District.

In those abandoned places, a gap opens up that may be filled by other influences and values. Just as distance and isolation, vanishing (public and legal) opportunity structures can provoke anomie, dissociation from societal norms and values (Merton 1938). Many field interviews: show such a dialectic relation:

Malmö, Sofielund

“The development of the housing sector in Seved has resulted in that many young people couldn’t care less about their area. They develop a careless approach to their physical environment. Since their houses are not being looked-after by the landlords, why should they take care of the houses, stairs, elevators, facades or environments? Graffiti and vandalism could be argued to increase as a symptom of the landlords’ neglect of the buildings (Grander & Stigendal, 2012). And those young people who want to change things, but have no support, what are they to do? If they try to tidy up, who cares? And who will listen to them?”(Grander/Stigendal 2014:14).

Athens, Agia-Sophia

“The observation visits and interviews conducted in Agia Sophia revealed various problems that the local society faces, mainly due to the shortages in social infrastructure. One of them is the limited number of local public services specially addressed to youth, which leads to many social problems such as withdrawal from social and everyday affairs, abusive

behaviour, migration to other countries in search for better life perspectives etc.” (Tryfona et al. 2014:20).

Birmingham

“The way authorities viewed problems in the inner-city or in deprived areas was criticised. Some respondents expressed scepticism about the Local Authority’s interest in certain neighbourhoods, particularly after what they perceived were years of neglect that had forced people to live in the same conditions or to navigate adversity themselves (...)” (Hussain 2014:28).

Krakow, Rzaka

“Our respondents also point to significant inadequacies in local social infrastructure, i.e. the lack of a cultural institution, poorly developed sports infrastructure, the lack of local government-maintained kindergarten or nursery or no clubs for local residents (that would constitute a socialising meeting centre). They are available in the other parts of the district, however they are relatively distant, which often results in shrinking demand on the part of Rzaka residents (young people in particular). Often after school young people hang around the neighbourhood looking for affordable alcohols. Except for the public park, there is virtually nowhere that they could meet.” (Mozdzen et al. 2014:52).

The social consequences of decay and neglect are crucial in our research: the sites that are affected are often important places in the socialisation of young people, where social norms and values are learned and taken on. Good quality public space, where young people hang out, can be read as a sign of respect, closing these places or letting them run down certainly not. They will then find other places and strategies to cope with a situation perceived as neglect. Attention, the opposite of neglect, will be sought and found. This quest, it seems, has a gender connotation: Radicalisation, drug use, violence and gambling are three strategies of young men that are reported from most case study areas, albeit in different forms (These are certainly issues that need be taken up in Work Package 4). In some cities, youth workers report that IT devices led to new cultures of appointment, meeting and dating that are much less bound to specific places than in the past when gangs were often bound to specific squares or street corners. It becomes much more difficult to track and get in touch with them. For girls and young women, strategies are mentioned that are even harder to come by, such as early motherhood or following elder men to escape the reach of their parents. An example from the Hamburg report:

Hamburg, Dulsberg

“Several experts expressed the view that young people tend nowadays to be much more attached to their ethnic group and identify much stronger with it than before. ‘It is an artificial search for identification with a culture that is no longer theirs but they can use it to define themselves and separate from other kids.’ For some groups the wish or the need for an own identity becomes so strong that they are easily attracted by radical (Islamic) movements and let themselves guide by religious teachers. Youth workers also say that they find it harder to get hold of the young people: ‘we do not manage to give them enough orientation in today’s time of uncertainty and then they search for closer guidance somewhere else’.” (Gehrke et al. 2014:10).

2.2.3 Piecemeal and authoritative approaches to youth and social services

In most of the case study areas, some public services for the social inclusion of young people are in place. Concerns about a lack of facilities are reported from both case study areas in Krakow (Mistrzejowice and Rzaka), from Sofia (Fakulteta and Hristo Botev) and Athens (Agia Sofia and Elefsina). For those areas, where services are in place, these can be categorised into:

- General leisure, cultural and sports facilities
- Youth work and youth clubs targeted at young people in the area to spend time outside school
- Street work that addresses specific young people hanging out in public space and aims at providing advice, counselling and information about social services
- Measures to tackle youth unemployment, including training and qualification schemes, apprenticeships and similar approaches
- Social assistance and social security schemes that aim at providing minimum income for long-term unemployed and their families, or other income support for low income groups, including public and social housing and/or housing benefits
- Schools.

The availability and quality of these services differs dramatically between cities and even within cities. In most cases, youth-related provisions are embedded in national and/or regional frameworks; Barcelona, Birmingham, Krakow, Malmö, Rotterdam, Venice, and, less explicitly, Hamburg and Sofia have local youth policies or strategies in place that aim at facilitating

participation and engagement (see: Map of Policy Frameworks). A general trend seems to be that, although youth services are available, employability and preventing anti-social behaviour have taken over as the main objectives. In Barcelona, Birmingham, Krakow, Hamburg, Malmö, Rotterdam, Sofia and Venice specific local youth employment strategies are in place. Typically, such strategies include sanctions in instances of non-compliance and expect service users to actively engage in training and job search as a condition to receive social assistance.

The move towards employability targets implies a personalisation with individualised schemes rather than open approaches and facilities. It also implies that such services are not seen as basic infrastructure that ensures good quality of life and social inclusion, but as an investment for which a return is expected, in terms of human capital that is traded at the labour market, productivity and eventual taxes that are generated alongside work-based income. And finally, these objectives demand service providers (who are often non-governmental organisations and associations with their own agenda and remit) to adjust their programmes accordingly.

A recurrent theme in most reports is about recent reforms and reorganisation that seem to toughen the services and are described as high-handed and at times even arrogant, a result of work first and employability principles and their implementation under stressful conditions of austerity measures. The new workfare paradigms are described as being problem focused instead of seeing the potential of young people (see the elaboration of this point in WP 2 report, Stigendal 2013) and jeopardise a trustingly relationship between youth workers, jobcentre staff and other street level bureaucrats on one side and the young people on the other. As is reported from the newly established Youth Jobcentre in Hamburg:

“The newly established Youth Jobcentre is also seen as a positive development, but rigid provisions in social assistance regulations could jeopardise a trustworthy relationship between the case managers and the young persons” (Gehrke et al. 2014:39).

Apart from tough rhetoric, a subtler sign of that trend is a destabilisation of funding. Long-term services are being replaced by short-term projects, which need less of a commitment by public funders. Priority setting in public budgets under austerity measures seems not to leave much space for young people and social inclusion. This practice stands against the active inclusion and social investment strategies that governments in the EU subscribe to. It is also at odds with the public commitments to youth participation as it undermines opportunities for the young people to participate. Comments like “stew welfare” (Venice) and a “Balkan Syndrome” (Sofia), if

unadjusted and piecemeal, are only particularly pronounced expressions of what seems a common problem. The presence of EU funding in basically all case study areas can either be read as positive attention, or compensating for a lack of local, regional or national funding. As a bottom line, services seem to be increasingly legitimised by **output** than by their input, reflecting a broader policy shift from social rights to social investment.³⁸

Greece/ Athens

The new services introduced in both areas (Agia Sophia - Piraeus and Elefsina) in recent years, such as the Municipal Health Centre, the Bureau of investigation for the homeless, etc. address mainly emergent social needs, which have been aggravated due to the economic crisis. In this context it is important to point out that these services are not structurally developed to efficiently tackle social inequalities in an integrative way and boost social progress in local communities; instead, they are mostly temporary measures for dealing with the effects of the economic crisis. Furthermore, both areas do not indicate integrated and targeted youth services in order to address systematically the numerous problems young people face. Regarding the area of Agia Sophia, one interviewee stated:

“...The young people exhibit a rather pessimistic attitude towards the current situation and their future perspectives. Many wish to migrate to other countries in order to pursue better life standards, because here they are not given the chance to evolve and create...” (GR-NH1-IV-EX1).

The current administrative reform plan in Greece, is aimed at accelerating decentralisation by increasing the administrative and financial independence at the local government level and decentralizing services. Due to the economic crisis, however, the process was not completed and currently fails to attain these objectives. More specifically, while a large number of responsibilities were transferred from central government to local government level, the state funds to municipalities were reduced by 60% (Ministry of Interior, Decentralization and Electronic Government, 2013). As a result, municipal authorities have to account for larger municipal units with increased responsibilities and fewer financial resources, the majority of which come from the state. Consequently, the “interrupted” process of decentralisation results in limited and fragmented services, most of the time of low quality. In addition, this operational process creates confusion for citizens who are not aware, and properly informed, of the responsibilities corresponding to each service. This applies mostly to areas/municipalities with higher population numbers, which need to meet the needs of a larger group of citizens spread in wider geographical area.

³⁸ The conclusions of the WP 2 baseline report (Stigendal 2013) address youth rights as a focus of social innovation.

Netherlands/ Rotterdam

Youth work in Rotterdam is subject to different kinds of transformations, some following from changes in governance, some following from changes in the content of the work. Regarding governance, youth work is now a responsibility of the municipal department of societal development. Until recently it was a responsibility of the city districts, but as this government level is now abandoned because of national legislation, youth work is centralized to the municipal level. Also, youth work is delivered by contracted third sector organisations. Budget cuts as a reaction to the economic crisis have caused a big social welfare organization that was active in five city districts to go bankrupt. The new tendering procedures for contracting youth work have resulted in new providers and a partial loss of the existing social infrastructure in the city. An important part of youth work is now organized as a flexible pool of staff at the city level. They can be directed towards hot spots in the city, and every half year this is re-evaluated. In addition, youth work is also part of the welfare services that are contracted for city areas (that cross-cut the previous districts). The size of this youth work is only a small part of what it used to be.

A second source of transformation in youth work follows from discussions on the content of the work. Youth work has traditionally had different institutional ambitions attached to it: reducing the number of NEETs, help decrease unemployment, reduce crime, establish a sense of community, provide young people with free time activities that may elevate them, improve safety in public places by decreasing (experienced) nuisance and annoyance by young people and so on. Within these ambitions a shift can be witnessed, away from free time activities inside youth or community centers, towards outreach work in public spaces and individual coaching in young people's homes. Public safety and fighting unemployment have become prime concerns (i.e. youth work as a means for achieving societal goals). The paradox that can be witnessed in the last decades, is that the approach towards young people from the 'soft sector' (welfare) has toughened, while at the same time the approach towards young people from the 'hard sector' (police and justice) has partly softened through the development of preventive policies.

Organisationally, workfarism is accompanied by a complex process of centralising control of youth services and social services whilst implementation is being decentralised. In contrast to subsidiarism, this phenomenon of “**centralised decentralisation**” does not allocate much leeway and discretion at the front end, only as long as centrally set objectives are met. In other words: Pressure to deliver is scaled down, decision-making powers are upscaled.

In cities with longer traditions of subsidiarity and local self-determination this is felt as an unsettling side effect of austerity policies. Illustrative examples are reported from Birmingham and Hamburg:

Birmingham

“Concerns were expressed about the move away from a community or micro-level focus and towards a district level one. The favouring of medium and/or larger scale delivery partners/organisations was seen as detrimental to targeting problems in diverse and densely populated neighbourhoods where more differentiated approaches were required (...). The shifts taking place in the distribution of power and resources i.e. away from local government and away from ‘communities’ at the micro-level, were also believed as leading to further inequalities” (Hussain 2014:27).

Hamburg

“Experts we spoke to express an overall approval of the JBA (youth Job Centre) and the pooling of services in one place (...) But some experts see the emergence of the JBA and its stronger attempt to reach every young person double sided: ‘Following around young people until they find a job can be molesting, if they are without any kind of state transfer because of their individual decisions. For others that come from families which cannot give them a proper guidance and support, this system is a good and important chance to get on track’. Throughout the interviews, experts expressed the view that many small and local initiatives fear to be closed down because of the new introduction of the JBA. This leads to longer ways for young people to reach support and assistance. Also, to ask for help in a ‘big’ institution might be a higher threshold than to talk to your local job-initiative social worker (...) interviewees criticise, saying that ‘this cannot substitute long built trust and relationships and they do not reach the kids that completely pulled out and put their heads in the sand like an ostrich’” (Gehrke et al. 2014:17).

3. Hints towards social innovation tackling isolation, decay and exclusionary servicing

The three themes presented here describe processes and manifestations of inequalities and exclusion in which the local level (at varying scales) plays a crucial role. We distinguished between the scale levels of an area/neighbourhood (signifying distance and isolation as specific problem constellations), specific places within those areas (discussing effects of decay and neglect) and the social infrastructure available for young people (which appears to be increasingly piecemeal and authoritative). These three scale levels could, in turn, be the focus point of local strategies against exclusion and lend themselves as starting points for local social innovation.

- Physical and symbolic distance could be bridged through building connections. Here we’d look particularly for innovative and inclusive approaches to urban planning, which are expressed in the idea of the just city (Marcuse et al 2009, Soja 2010, Fainstein 2011).
- Decay and neglect could be countered through renewed attention and positive recognition, which resembles current debates and interest in “urban pioneers” that bring new uses to abandoned places (Colomb 2012) and, particularly, the “social practice of communing” (Harvey 2012), like, most prominently urban gardening.

- Exclusionary forms of servicing could be addressed through innovation in service provision. Following from a study of Jalonen and Juntunen (2011), favourable conditions for innovation in complex welfare systems are “trust, responsive communication processes, connectivity, interdependencies, and diversity” (ibid, 413). Reliable and robust funding frameworks could bring an end the piecemeal ad-hocism that seems to prevail.

Examples for how processes and manifestations of exclusion are tackled at these scale levels are mentioned in most reports. Yet, these examples are not so numerous, and it may be no surprise that, in times of austerity measures, mostly non-governmental actors are presented as drivers of positive change.

3.1 Areas: Bridging distance for spatial justice?

At the scale level of areas or estates, the bad news is that the case studies tell us little about new social innovation. Instead, they hold rich information about the risks, failures and side-effects of past social innovations. This is good news, as lesson can be drawn and held against too easy solutions:

Social housing estates that turned into traps against social mobility when badly serviced and connected (Birmingham, Hamburg, Venice), universal housing policies that are integrative only as long as they are not being marketised (Malmö), and social mix strategies that seem, in the long run, at least risk producing gentrification and displacement of those less affluent households that had initially been the justification of the programmes (Barcelona, Birmingham, Brno, Malmö, Venice). These stories straighten overly positive expectations of regeneration schemes (Barcelona Trinitat Nova seems a particularly telling case that illustrates the pitfalls of participation mechanisms).

An innovative tool to planning is reported from Hamburg, where since 2009 a “social monitoring” system collects information about the social situation across the city on the basis of small-scale statistical units and can spot positive and negative trends as a basis for allocating resources and public facilities.

In Malmö, a “Commission for a Socially Sustainable Malmö” was established in 2010 and brought together senior public officers and local researchers. It has just finished its work and produced a range of measures to tackle health related inequalities. It is still to be seen, however, how these will be implemented.

3.2 Places: Reclaiming neglected space

When we turn to individual spots within the areas that are seemingly abandoned and reinforce an image and impression of decay, a number of approaches come to the fore that may not look

innovative at first sight but are reported effectively to reach young people and provide space for positive activities.

A “classic” is certainly street soccer (Hamburg, Rotterdam), Another outdoor activity that has more recently come into fashion is urban gardening (Rotterdam). Quite a few stories are told from the case study areas about engaged and creative individuals that initiated new uses. Indeed the Rotterdam report mentions a whole plethora of self-organised projects (but they seem mainly driven by adults rather than youth). There are also stories of creatively re-used old derelict buildings like an old factory in Malmö Sofielund, which now hosts a youth club (Arena 305), community centre and library (The Garage), which sees itself as a “creative living room”, and an old brewery that has been turned by skateboarders into an indoor skatepark, which is today “considered one of the best and largest in northern Europe” (Grander/Stigendal 2014).

Key problems though for such activities are sustainability and resources. In Hamburg, Essener Straße, football events stopped when the active father who organised the training felt too old after some years and no one took over. In that area, however, an interesting and low-key approach to resourcing is reported. Through the local urban regeneration programme, a small budget was made available for use by residents - with the condition that funded activities should benefit the area. Young people received some of this money to organise the tournaments.

A general impression is that community plans, neighbourhood committees and other mechanisms that foster participation of residents in decision-making have become key elements of integration urban regeneration schemes and can be used as opportunities to address problems of decay and neglect, and find partners and resources to tackle these.

3.3. Services: Back to basics (rights, coordination and respect)

Youth services, where they are in place, seem to be bound to conflicting agendas of public order, employability, and also human rights and social inclusion in a broader sense. Resources seem scarce and limited to short-term projects rather than robust and reliable infrastructure and long-term perspectives. In such circumstances, innovative approaches to servicing seem to be about resistance against rigid and narrow policy goals, and subversive strategies of providers to stretch those agendas and make full use of the leeway they leave in implementation (cf. Barnes/Prior 2009). A senior bureaucrat from Birmingham comes to the point: “Innovations are really going back to basics” (Hussain et al 2014: 32). The Rotterdam report lists a number of elements that are regarded by local youth workers as key for a good service, including continuity, competence-orientation, openness and experimentation.

A general observation is that civil society organisations seem much closer to local problems and better placed to address these than municipal departments and civil servants. This is particularly evident in the Roma settlements in Brno and Sofia, where public administration is neither active nor trusted. Some of these projects are far-reaching and complex, such as the “triangle approach” of the Brno based association IQRS that combines a campaign “Ethnic-friendly employer”, a media campaign about active Roma “We do work”, counselling and training (Sirovatka /Krcnava/Hora/Valkova 2014: 42). The bottom-line, though, is low threshold, trust and acceptance - values that are also driving the Feijenoord Werkt project in the south of Rotterdam, a low-threshold facility that provides counselling and assistance to jobseekers. In Athens, some community-based self-help projects, initiated either by local administration or by civil society, have been set up in recent years to mitigate the dramatic economic problems and their side-effects, including social groceries and health centres, clothes exchange, communal cooking etc. (Tryfona, Pothoulaki & Papadimitriou 2014, p. 39). The old brewery skatepark in Malmö is a positive example of how a local initiative can be turned into a sustainable and inclusive social facility; since 2006 it even hosts an independent school (Grander/Stigendal 2014).

Public service innovation seems to be mainly about integrating fragmented services. The Youth Jobcentre in Hamburg is one example, the Stadsmariner scheme in Rotterdam another. The latter brings together social workers, police and other bodies, aims at outreach and confronting people with the local state in situations that seem problematic. A spin-off of the project is the “College Hillesluis” that started as a “Pocket-money”, providing young people with small incentives to carry out tasks like cleaning public amenities and distributing information leaflets:

“In the philosophy of College Hillesluis there is a mismatch between the collective identities of Moroccan youngsters and the individual identity the Dutch society requires (...) The competence approach (...) is aimed at working together, building a positive identity, earn money and be proud of achievements” (Tan/Spies 2014: 22).

The project aims at growing and has recently been turned into a foundation with a broader remit, but funding remains piecemeal and problematic, as is so often the case for such initiatives. A pilot in Feijenoord Midden had to stop whilst in Delfshaven it will continue and new projects are planned. Such problems about finding sustainable finances seem symptomatic for the current state of funding frameworks that are more interested in promoting short-term projects and new ideas than long-term infrastructure. The interest of funders in initiating innovation rather than its diffusion and mainstreaming is understandable in the current political climate, but it seems to lie across with the social problems that these new projects are about to tackle.

4. Concluding remarks

The local matters: Good quality housing, good transport connections, a good school, sports or cultural association or youth club, a competent teacher or mentor can make a huge difference in the path of life of young people. In this paper, based on 20 case studies from ten European cities, we show that areas, places and service facilities are three scale levels at which practices of “othering” manifest themselves, (re)producing, mitigating or even counteracting social inequalities. Some concluding remarks have to be made though about the limitations of these findings.

The limitations relate, above all, to the material that formed the basis of this synthesis. The case studies all followed a template, but local research teams brought in specific emphasis and interpretations, which may, in our second stage analysis, have led to flaws and bias. Not least, the reports represent professional and adult views on the areas, and most of the interviewed experts are not themselves facing the hardship, deprivation, discrimination or exclusion they talk about. They see it, know of it or work with it through their professional and adult lenses. The perspectives of the young people experiencing these inequalities may well differ.

So, the findings need to be seen in the wider context of the CITISPYCE project. This paper focuses on neighbourhoods and local services, which we have conceptualised as a meso-level of society. But to really comprehend the role of this level, the findings need to be balanced with factors that operate at macro-level and micro-level. Hence, we aim at returning to this material after the second phase of the fieldwork.

It also needs to be emphasised that this paper does not do justice to the depth and breadth of the ten city reports. As described in section 2, we concentrated on those elements that point towards the significance of neighbourhoods and services as such. By this approach, we excluded in particular the at times dramatic stories of deprivation and precarious living conditions in those areas that relate to wider, not spatially bound phenomena such as discrimination against minority groups (irrespective of where they live) and, specifically pronounced in Athens, the financial and economic crisis. And for young people, a most decisive of all local factors of inequalities might be schools. We only briefly touched on education systems, as these are usually designed at regional and national level (Stigendal 2013 includes a look at education systems). Some of the case studies go into more depth here, and the next work package will also shed some light on how young people experience education and respective facilities and services.

A final remark is about the concept of social innovation and its relevance and place in tackling social inequalities. As fragmentation and piecemeal servicing appear to be a serious problem; as local experts refer to the need of reliable infrastructure rather than new ideas; as past social

innovations seem not to have sustainably mitigated social inequalities but in some cases even led to their reinforcing; and as recent policy fashions are met with reservation by practitioners, new supposed innovations need to be handled with care and put into perspective. When new ideas will be piloted in future Work Packages of the CITISPYCE project, we may well think again in project formats (that may fit with funding rhythms and objectives). We should then at least be sensitive to the consequences and side-effects of formating and packaging practices and consider these in our concepts.

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Chapter 5: Young people's voices and experiences of social inequalities and social innovations

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1. Introduction

This phase of research sought to build on earlier ones (described in chapters 3 and 4) that investigated the macro level causes and symptoms of inequalities and meso-level dynamics in the form of infrastructural causes and manifestations of inequalities in specified areas of the city identified as case study areas for this research.

This phase of further qualitative investigation involved trying to capture young people's sentiments toward issues uncovered in both the previous phases, through broadening out the methodology to include participant observation and depth-interviews through multiple encounters with young people. The objectives were to capture more about the lived effects of inequalities and how young people might traverse these in their day-to-day social, cultural and economic activities.

Young people expressed a range of positions with regard to their neighbourhoods and the city as a whole; belonging to minority ethnic communities; treatment by statutory agencies and employers and the role played by different public and private infrastructures in shaping their life chances.

Despite distinctive contextual variables that result in very different economic impacts and political forms of restructuring, what emerges is a picture of young people who are isolated by the shifts in the economy as a result of the economic crisis and subsequent neo-liberal restructuring of the welfare state. A significant feature has been the shrinking economy, which incorporates young people in limited and undesirable ways, or which 'expels' (Sassen 2014) them leading them to innovate, despite significant constraints in a number of ways.

The innovations we uncovered are in turn marked by their precarious nature, however, which respectively provided a useful starting point for discussions with stakeholders in the following stages of the work programme of this project. The precariousness of young people's innovations heightened in a context of austerity, leads to the key question of what local forms of (political) intervention might alleviate the precariousness, leading to more robust and enduring forms of innovation.

2. Methods

This chapter draws on ten country reports on the findings of fieldwork phase two carried out in each of the cities of the CITISPYCE project between February – June 2014. The primary objective of the fieldwork was to investigate young people's perceptions, experiences and social practices in relation to social inequalities as they manifest, and to obtain insights into socially innovative practices young people were engaged in or that were operating in the cities/neighbourhoods of the CITISPYCE project.

To this end, a detailed fieldwork strategy was elaborated by the leader of this phase, Aston University in conjunction with the Scientific Supervisor, University of Barcelona. The strategy included common guidelines on selecting a sample of young people as well as for conducting interviews and participant observation. All fieldwork instruments were informed by the findings of the preceding phases of the work programme. This fieldwork strategy was shared, discussed, modified and then adopted by all partners.


As the fieldwork progressed partners were encouraged to share experiences based on recruitment and access to the sample as well as following up reflections from initial interviews and observations. As a result the guide for interviews, which had been arranged along the lines of themes emerging from fieldwork phase 1³⁹, was modified slightly so as to make this less structured, shorter and aligned more explicitly to questions about the neighbourhood, city, social inequalities and social innovations. In addition, partners also reported other adaptations they undertook in light of their own contexts. These included: extended observations at NGOs or community centres and drawing on fieldwork notes, conversations with civic actors working closely with young people on innovative projects and attendance at social and commercial events aimed at young people.

National specific adaptations to the fieldwork strategy related more to the sampling. As a result, there is some variation in the age ranges, spread of young people from the case study neighbourhoods and socio-economic profiles. For example, in Krakow the sample is representative

³⁹ This in turn had been informed by key themes emerging from national background/baseline study reports namely the seven prospects for innovation (see Appendix 1)

more of the younger end of the 16-24 age spectrum; in Brno and Sofia the sample is exclusively focused on Roma communities concentrated in the two case study areas; in Rotterdam, Barcelona and Hamburg the sample consists heavily of migrants and in some cases their children who are still officially identified as such; in Venice, Malmo and Athens the sample is a contrast between two case study areas drawing in a range of ethnic groups and socio economic profiles; while in Birmingham the sample draws on young people from different socio economic backgrounds albeit almost all from minority ethnic backgrounds in the case study areas as well as from around the city.

Key features of the sample:



3. Young people and the City

This section of the chapter draws on young people's responses in relation to the case study areas in which they lived. It also registers young people's sentiments and experiences of being citizens of the city too. This line of investigation follows on from concerns expressed in the previous fieldwork phase (meso-level) over understanding the "interplay of different attributes of the neighbourhood and their role in (re)producing, mitigating or counteracting inequalities (Güntner et al 2014: 11).

The analysis continues with the adoption of Lefebvre's ideas about the production of space (Lefebvre 1974/1991). It recognises that social space is produced by techniques of order including locality, layout and materiality, and these spatial effects impact not only on how space is perceived

and lived, but also on how inhabitants perceive themselves. Hall refers to this in her ethnographic study ‘City Street and Citizen’ as “symbolic spatial order” (2012:40). This section also reveals young people’s awareness of sentiments in broader society toward them as a social group categorised by age (youth). This can be seen particularly in how their social practices are represented and apprehended symbolically by statutory agencies as a cause and symptom of inequalities.

3.1 Urban Imaginations

Young people articulated much about social relations in their areas, between different groups resident there, as well as how these relations were structured by policy and politics. These revealed complex and paradoxical relationships toward their localities.

For example: ambivalent feelings of fear and happiness to live in an area that was officially known as one with high levels of multiple deprivation:

“People think bad things about this neighbourhood and it is the contrary. Until you don’t live here and you are not within, you don’t know what it is. [...] As there is much immigration, they think there are just robberies. Also because there are prostitutes, but it does not have anything to do. Bad fame”. [ES-IV-NH2-Y4]

‘Rzaka is a poor district, even a pathological one. (...) I think that people don’t want to have jobs. There are quite a few pathological families of alcoholics.’ [PO-IV-NH2-Y5]

Sometimes referring to the physicality of their area:

"I feel that the whole of Sofielund is very clearly enclosed by major roads. /.../ If you are experiencing social barriers against society in terms of getting jobs or an education, I believe that physical barriers can reinforce that feeling "(SE-IV-NS-Y20).

“We are not isolated, but we do not have all the conveniences of Athens...All we have are buses, not even the suburban railway passes through...In order to go to Athens you need your own means of transportation, on the other hand gas is expensive. Aren’t all these limitations?” (GR-IV-NH2-Y1)

Some young people also defended their areas with a sense of pride:

A person that born in Marghera, since the early age, he or she used to hear: “Do you live in Marghera!? What a nerve! How do you feel there? – and faces as if to say – How can you feel fine in Marghera guys!?” [...] Being from of Marghera means being alternative, being “other”, being something else [...] People used to say: “Ah, Marghera!? There is

only the lane with the whores". That is, you know? They think like that about us. Or "Marghera? Full of immigrants, full of Bangladeshi" Or once again: "When I take the bus number six or number three to go to Marghera always feel stinks!" Got it? If you are from Marghera you should be ashamed of that, [instead] in Marghera there's the pride of being from Marghera. We, as people from Marghera, have the pride that makes you say: "I'm not like everyone, I'm not like all the rest, I am the rebel of society" (IT-IV-NH2-Y15)

Associations with areas marked as negative (i.e. ghettos, street) were converted into positives by young people through garnering notoriety and respect as a result of living there and building reputations based on the 'character' of those areas. These became key forms of social capital, particularly when other forms of capital were denied or unavailable to them (Anderson 1990: 66-77).

This trend was more apparent where individuals had access to strong personal and social networks. Personal networks can be described as family connections, whereas social networks refer to extended networks of friends and associates. Young people seemed to be aware of the social capital created by networks as it helped them to achieve status, prestige and generate an income or find employment, for example.

"I grew up here, I know the people, it is calm. I can go everywhere, I know everyone."
(BG-IV-NH2-YP30)

As noted from the earlier phase of fieldwork, the case study areas (with exception of Poland) were significant for their diversity of population. This ethnic diversity was simultaneously valued and loathed:

"The area is diverse and multicultural, it's what I consider to be Malmö's best part to live in /.../ People move around here which I see as a positive security aspect" (SE-IV-NS-Y20).

"I don't know where these settlers came from. They should just make them a ghetto and separate them from us." (BG-IV-NH2-YP28)

"[T]his is a difficult Land, at the same time it's one of the world's best areas, because I was born here, but also because I see a lot of positive things as, for example, the so-called 'resilience' factor that is when you are in the s[hit].... you can bring out a lot, for example, the interculturality that we have been able to achieve. (IT -15- NH2 - Y15)

Some areas and spaces were marked as belonging to specific social groups. In Malmo, Hamburg, Brno, Rotterdam and Birmingham there were organisations and networks associated with Muslims, a minority group particularly maligned and hyper-visible as a result of state regimes of surveillance and debates around integration in these countries. Spaces associated with this minority group appeared to be obscure to people who did not belong or identify with those communities, while they were a key source of support and meeting for young Muslims. For young people of Muslim background, such organisations that appeared to specifically serve this faith group were perceived as filling the gap in services that they believed the local authority should be responsible for:

” [...]Norra Grängesbergsgatan... it's loaded with NGOs. There is one called Kontrapunkt, then there are yoga centres, arcades, clubs and a place that serves free food every Tuesday. I feel welcome there but I do not know about the guys on the street feels /.../ There's a place down in Norra Grängesbergsgatan where guys usually hang out, it's quite 'trashy'. They just hang there as it is a venue in some way and there is even a mosque in the basement” (SE-IV-OTH-Y3).

The concentration of particular ethnic groups and communities in our case study areas was reported as leading to territoriality, which often manifested in conflict or violence between different neighbourhoods and areas. This was expressed through ‘postcode wars’ and neighbourhood rivalries. While this trend of neighbourhood nationalism (Back 1996) was apparent in almost all countries in this study, it was not always something that young people got involved in:

“I am with the people of my neighbourhood. [...] I don't feel comfortable here with them [people from outside], you know? [...] I don't feel like making a joke.. I like slapping people [for fun] and I cannot slap them because they are not my friends...” [ES-FG1-P2]

‘there's certain people that obviously I don't get on with because of where I'm from so it's one of them ones' 'it's postcodes' (UK-FG1 participant)

In all countries young people suggested there were dominant narratives about their areas, which involved crime, litter, over population, newcomers to the area, drugs and disorder. These also led to simplistic impressions of ‘community’, ghetto or survival and squalor, and which were sometimes even glamorised.

Local narratives, as espoused by young people, often differed from localizing governmental practices. This was evident when young people complained about the way agencies and service providers addressed their areas (see also below 4.1):

“Handsworth’s ok but if I had kids I wouldn’t want them to grow up in Handsworth’. Because of the people that are in it ‘the council have moved a certain stereotype of people into a certain area, for example, if you go into Sparkbrook or Alum Rock you see bare Asians... so it’s like they’ve moved the crack heads and ex-cons and people that can’t get no jobs into Handsworth making mans look like we live on James Turner Street’”⁴⁰ (UK-FG2 participant)

Young people suggested that policy decisions and actions having an impact on their areas were shaped by a combination of factors (historical and contemporary) and actors, and, therefore, could not straightforwardly be reduced to a few characteristics of their areas. This was similar to the ‘narrative web’ in which “places are invoked and reinvented through the interface of practice, regulation, and rumour” (Back & Keith 2004: 68). A key example was the issue of what types of services local authorities believed were needed in deprived neighbourhoods or that communities in those areas ‘deserved’.

For example, as noted in the comparative report on the first fieldwork phase (Güntner et al 2013), urban density was viewed as a concern amongst planners, policy makers and practitioners concerned about the sustainability of services in areas of multiple deprivation represented by the case study areas. Yet in the contexts of our neighbourhoods young people also saw density as conducive to cultural vitality, diversity and ‘community’. Tonkiss discusses this in terms of good and bad density (Tonkiss, 2013: 37-39). Young people’s sentiments in relation to their neighbourhoods, i.e., how people lived and perceived them as a result of the different things density offered (excitement, danger, congestion, loneliness) resembles what Tonkiss refers to as ‘affective density’ (2013: 40-50).

Thinking in affective terms, young people pointed to high levels of income and wealth in *other* parts of the city or concentrated among certain classes of people as symbolising inequality. Young people referred to development taking place in other parts of the city as symbolising where wealth and opportunity were concentrated, in contrast to their own neighbourhoods. This also pointed to awareness about certain causes of inequalities as emanating from shifts in the global economy and how this impacted the distribution of wealth and availability of work for young people (see below 4.1).

3.1.1 Relationships with other areas/centre

The familiarity and closeness to others, however, resulting from the density of their neighbourhoods could also be off-putting for some young people:

⁴⁰ Street in Handsworth used in a TV documentary about use/abuse of ‘benefits’ called Benefits Street

“...I will talk to you about Piraeus, because I refrain from going to my neighbourhood, Agia Sophia. I do not like the area, where I live, I never did. There is a certain perception that does not match mine. It is a ghettoized area, there are cliques in which I do not participate for several reasons and therefore, I prefer the centre of Piraeus...” (GR-IV-NHI-Y7)

“The fact that there are so many of my countrymen here, many Bangladeshis. I do not see it as a nuisance in itself, but is not the best, let's say. In the sense that whatever you do will attract a lot of attention of your countrymen who may speak, I do not know how it happens... if I went around with a girl in Marghera, it would be a problem, it is a small community and people would talk a lot. Especially for my fellow countrymen. Talk to each other and.. the community is small and, therefore, all come to know everything. People know me, I don't know how they can know me, but they know me, they know who my parents are, what I usually do, what I don't usually to do...It's a bit annoying. So I try to go away from the neighbourhood.” (IT-2-NH2-Y2)

Urban theorists have discussed density as the intensity of occupation, interaction and mobility that characterise the social life of urban form (Tonkiss, 2013: 49). In all the country reports young people spoke of the limits of living in deprived areas and the monoculture that encapsulates them. Some sought to manage this through interlinked patterns of fixity (with like-minded others) and mobility (**navigating across** different areas of the city) where they made strategic moves across the city, most notably the city centre or places of consumption and leisure, gathering social and cultural resources to help mitigate the effects of social inequalities (see below 5.4.2 for more detail). Thus intra-city density provided access to resources; employment, services and choices that could help ameliorate certain effects of inequality (Tonkiss, 2013: 40):

‘The city centre is neutral – all of us have a more-or-less similar distance to cover. Therefore, we meet in our district very rarely.’ [PO-IV-NHI-Y21]

Fostering links with people of similar ethnic and socio-economic backgrounds *in other parts of the city* was a key way that young people acquired dense networks of familiarity, where, in their terms, more than one local area, widens the network and the social resources available to them.

3.1.2 Displacement of young people

Feelings of neglect and isolation were, however, more prominent among our sample; most evident in Hamburg, Krakow, Malmo, Sofia and Venice (although the subject was alluded to in different ways in all cities). Feelings of neglect and isolation could be linked to experiences of abandonment by principalities, the state and institutions young people assumed were traditional outlets of social

support. Whether real or imagined, there was a general perception that due to the lack of health, education, public space, housing, jobs or support services, young people and their neighbourhoods were left to their own:

“There is no park, no benches where you could sit, there is nothing apart from the school. That is why everyone gathers there, because there is just nowhere else to go.” (BG-IV-NH2-YP35)

“Since there are no spaces for young people, it increases the people in the street. Then the police suspects of so many young people in the streets, they must be smoking joints, [but] it is not always so, in some cases yes. But it is not their fault if they do not have a space, they won't stay the whole day at home, overwhelmed between four walls”. [ES-FG2]

The area effects flowing from overcrowded and densely populated neighbourhoods, poor or desperate living conditions was a concern for young people; expressed as having particularly negative effects on those in education or studying.

Many young people overtly expressed that their neighbourhoods had been neglected and cited examples of squalor in their areas. Across all the cities, participants complained that limited public and open space and availability of leisure activities often meant that young people would congregate on street corners and parks if available or in places of leisure and consumption. This in turn would place young people in the public eye as a nuisance by older generations and the police.

Many young people drew a link between the lack of activities, amenities and the absence of public space and idleness and boredom, which in turn would lead to illicit activities and even criminality.

Young people expressed hyper localised negative sentiments, sometimes in relation to not wanting to work in their own areas, because jobs there were seen as dead end or of no ‘prestige’. In other cases mainly in cities where youth unemployment was particularly high, young people expressed this in their desires to emigrate or to leave the locality or city for another permanently:

“...I have already taken the first steps for migrating to the USA or Australia. I will find a Greek school to teach there. I have one goal. I struggled to enter higher education and I am struggling to graduate. I will not allow anyone to take this away from me. I will exercise my profession either in Greece or abroad...” (GR-IV-NH1-Y10)

The next section of this chapter focuses on how the above area effects combine with structural and macro factors (Stigendal 2013) to compound social inequalities. These appear to play out in nuanced ways in everyday aspects of young people's lives.

4. On Social Inequalities and Social Innovations

4.1 Social Inequalities

4.1.1 Retreat

Young people narrated a sense of how the economic crisis had prompted a retreat into a limited rather than expansive set of available options and prospects, as well as a retreat into themselves or things familiar and local to them. In addition to their areas or neighbourhoods, family was the most pertinent example but some young people also suggested other phenomena such as ‘money men’, drug dealers, pimps and racketeers.⁴¹

“We have a very high rate of unemployment, much inactivity, then kids don’t study or don’t want to finish the lower secondary school, some do it. But what we see is much school absenteeism. This creates that the kids do not do anything and remain the whole day in the streets, with all what this involves. When you are 20 something, you want to have a certain independence from your parents, have some money to do your own things. This results in shady deals. I don’t want to create a social alarm, but shady deals are the everyday in Roquetes”. [ES-IV-OTH-Y2]

‘you’re asking me if I can’t work, how am I gonna make money? I ain’t gonna lie to you I would go out there and sell drugs to people... and I will give fake £50 notes to people, sometimes you have to do certain things to live enit. I see it as if I can’t get no money from nowhere and the only way I can get money is to sell drugs to people then that’s what I’m gonna do to eat, no one else is gonna put food on my table’ (UK-FG2 participant)

“Before I started this VET I was selling drugs. That was a proper alternative for me that really paid off. But now, school became more important.” [DE-FG2-Y2]

4.1.2 Engagement

Respondents across all cities suggested that ‘problems’ to do with young people were interpreted through a local lens and then translated into policy largely while young people were absent or through controlled means. For example, staged one-off meetings between young people and decision makers or individuals in positions of authority who they did not identify with.

Young people were forthright in their opinions about the way official institutions operated:

⁴¹ Statistical data relating to the increase in unemployment and levels of educational attainment for younger groups were compared in Chapter 3.

“They [the municipal officials] are not interested, they don’t care. Who does what, who is idle, who works, who does not. They just do nothing.” (BG-IV-NHI-YP16)

“I don’t use any local services. There is nothing happening that would be attractive for me in terms of the services offered. (...) Actually, I find it difficult to say what should happen for the services to be attractive for me.” [PO-IV-NHI-YP3]

Not surprisingly language was a key barrier for those from migrant backgrounds. The country reports reveal that multiple sites of inequality, barriers to participation and engagement are enforced for young people as a result of poor language skills. This trend of language as a barrier was more notable in Hamburg, Malmo, Rotterdam and Venice, where young people whose parents had little or no knowledge of European languages felt disadvantaged in terms of guidance and support to access education and employment opportunities.

“It was hard for my parents. My father had nearly no education in Turkey and my mother has higher secondary but couldn’t really help me either in for example German, so I didn’t really get help from home.” DE-NHI-IV-Y6

Limited language skills or awareness of technical jargon also restricted access to public services for young people as they complained they were unable to understand and complete complex applications or communicate clearly. This also resulted in discrimination and racism (see below). It is important to note that a significant proportions of young people interviewed from migrant backgrounds were also increasingly *self-reliant*. They made use of information and communication technology to improve their understanding of processes and language to support their families too.

4.1.3 Sociality/collectivity

Limited by the lack of public resources young people also resorted to social mediums such as local NGOs and social media for support to access opportunities. Some made constructive use of these while others remained sceptical.

Shopping and consumption were seen as among the few outlets for sociality, because of the comparative ‘neutral’ quality in shopping spaces; spaces that readily absorb varieties of people from wide-ranging areas.

Closely linked to this was the issue of ‘safety’, which was particularly pertinent in Bulgaria, Birmingham, Venice, Brno and Poland. Many young people expressed their hesitation to venture out of their own areas; leading to a retreat into ‘community’.

A deep sense of individualism was also cited as working against the forming of collectives and thinking socially in all cities.

“They do something if they get something back, something that benefits them, that they see it clear not in the long term, they want it now, the immediacy is also very important. [...] I think that at a social level everything is slower, but they want everything now and as they don’t see an immediate reciprocity, they get bored or they get fed up with it, as there is not this perseverance, [...] they are very volatile”. [ES-IV-OTH-Y1]

‘It depends on what I would be supposed to do, on how much effort it would require. I could help to organize some stuff. Obviously not for free.’ [PO-IV-NH2-YP7]

‘Considering the social problems (regarding social contacts) in our district and many others in Kraków, I have an impression that they are linked to architecture. Bleak apartment buildings do not encourage people to form closer relationships within the neighbourhood. The society is atomized – everyone lives just for himself and neighbours are treated as strangers or, under the best circumstances, neutrally. We do not visit each other. Actually, we do not even know each other.’ PO-NH2-IV-YP21

“Why should I work and do something for this neighbourhood? Nonsense! What for?” (BG-IV-NH2-YP29)

In cities suffering from higher levels of youth unemployment, young people’s collectivity and cooperation was negatively affected by competition over scarce resources too:

“Now, those who find a good job hide this and don’t tell anyone that they work. The trust is gone. To bring someone [where you work] and trust him that he would not embarrass you. There are many such cases, that is why people became colder to one another.” (BG-IV-NH1-YP20)

A deep sense of fatalism could be seen as pervading young people’s lives and outlooks as a result of the economic crisis. This was exacerbated by the myriad forms of discrimination young people claimed they suffered.

4.1.4 Discrimination

All ten country reports revealed numerous ways that young people experienced discrimination. This manifested along different axes of race, ethnicity, gender and age (in addition to association with area as already noted above) and impacted opportunities to access services and employment:

“It is really hard and I recognize that we are migrants right now because we just cannot find a flat. There can be no other reason because we always get a refusal and the next day the flat is online again.” DE-NH2-IV-Y18

“There is a lot of racial discrimination in Bulgaria. You have to be white, to speak nicely and intelligently. When our people go [to ask for a job] and are recognised to be Gypsies, they get insulted. They treat them very bad.” (BG-IV-NH2-YP33)

“My brother is 25. For five years, he has been unable to find work and lives on our parents’ back. Nobody hires him because of his colour – he is very dark. They have told him directly many times: Yes, we are looking for people, but we don’t hire Gypsies.” (BG-IV-NH2-YP45)

“There is racism [...] if, however, you're an immigrant and you come here, most of the people frown at you wrong because “you're stealing our jobs” and, especially for many employers these is an excellent opportunity because often happens that the employer assumes that these immigrants that are paid less because maybe they're moonlighting, I mean irregular work, without contract, or because they simply are paid less because it's okay to pay less an immigrant and maybe they do not say anything and they work twenty hours a day.” [IT-IV-NH1-YP1]

By law enforcement agencies:

‘The police are pitiful. They drive around, you’re sitting at a tram stop and they have you empty your pockets. And you’re doing nothing, just sitting there. In my opinion the police are not necessary here.’ [PO-IV-NH2-YP1]

“`At first the officer was really unfriendly. Then he realized that we were talking German and he became nicer. He said: “you are talking good German.” Yes, I was born here.” [DE-FG1-NH2]

‘The municipal police are not needed. They cost money, but they do nothing. They are paid for fining other people.’ [PO-IV-NH2-YP4]

“This happened to me, walking in the street and they did a raid, and they were just stopping many Moroccan young people [...] I was walking and the police tells me ‘you go there’, suspecting. When I saw what was happening I said ‘I am from here’, and he [the policeman] tells me ‘your face is not really that Spanish’, and I say ‘I swear it, I live just here’, I was just standing in front of the door and in the end he says ‘ok, go away’ and I was like ‘fuck!’” [ES-FG2-P1]

By gender:

“To find a job maybe [the girls] have some more advantages. Although it is paradoxical. Consider Venice or here in Marghera area, most of the activities are ... bar! In the bar the employers want girls as workers. A lot of them, a lot of girl, work in Venice, in the touristic sector.” [IT-15-NH2-Y15]

“In my opinion, the only one thing is that, in Mestre, the job places are more accessible to the girls... in Mestre. Why ? The bartender, the waitress... What do they look so much? The good looking, you know? Therefore... For a boy... to find a job in Mestre maybe it is harder, maybe a girl asks in a few shops, maybe in the centre, and get something... While maybe a guy has more difficulties because the demand is always... “good looking”! [IT-18-NH1-Y17]

For many women, disadvantage was also compounded by employers’ attitudes toward their responsibilities to care for children or family members. In Athens and Barcelona particularly young women narrated that the economic crisis and resultant deregulation of the employment sector and ‘flexibilization’ of working conditions in the name of competitiveness and growth, increased the obstacles faced by women with children, single parent families and other socially vulnerable groups when entering the labour market.

“...I went to an interview 5 months ago, for a job position at a Super Market. I didn’t get the job because I have a child and despite my previous experience. Furthermore, my child is at nursery school. They thought I wouldn’t be devoted to my job and I will need days off when my child gets sick...” [GR-IV-NH1-Y2]

In Krakow, Rotterdam and Barcelona particularly, young people also felt pathologised by elders or what they perceived as mainstream ‘community’ and society. Importantly, some young people in these cities also referred to law enforcement agencies as particularly responsible and perceived them as non-representative of young people.

‘Quite often during holidays, when young people stay outside, older people are just waiting for a mistake to criticize the youth. They often call the police (...) and ‘anesthetize’ it. (...) As for the older people, I haven’t said earlier that they increase our group sense of security, because they monitor the area.’ [PO-IV-NH2-YP1]

4.1.5 Welfare/services

The deficiency in services as outlined in Chapter 4, which generated the theme of ‘Piecemeal and authoritative approaches to youth and social services (Güntner et al 2013) was commented upon by young people in all cities. As already noted, a common complaint young people had was that services were scarce or being withdrawn. Concern about the retrenchment of welfare services was expressed mostly in relation to access to benefits (social income in some countries) education and training provision and housing. Some young people commented on the divide this was resulting in society between the rich and poor or the ‘haves and have-nots’.

“This last government... Without being partial I can tell you it is commonly known that the gaps have widened. /.../ No measures have been taken to lessen this gap. If you work you should have a better living standard, but now the gaps have become too wide. The difference is also incredible in what you earn if you work, compared to those who don’t work” [SE-IV-SS-Y4].

Much of these sentiments reflected on young people’s sense of their own neighbourhoods becoming polarised (Malmo) or ghettoised (Birmingham, Brno, Hamburg, Netherlands, Sofia). Young people referred to the lack of suitable housing or the dense and over population of their areas, which played into them becoming less desirable areas to live in and be associated with. As noted above, this trend was prevalent in all cities where the research was carried out.

Importantly, young people also commented on the difficulty they experienced finding out about services:

“In this ‘information age’ are people expected to know or find out everything themselves?!” [UK-IV-OTH-YP23]

“People might be very dependent on exactly the contributions they receive, so if the rent would be increased due to changes in the property maybe people cannot live there. It also feels like they focus more on the areas where highly educated people live” (SE-IV-OTH-Y11).

“I arranged everything with the authorities and sometimes I heard from them ‘these people think that Germany is paradise and they come here and want everything for free’. The employees are unfriendly and embittered. It’s hard and I never had someone giving helpful advice were to apply for this and that. I had to inquire myself.” [DE-NH2-IV-Y18]

‘I do not know what I want to do. I think about it all the time, but can’t make up my mind. I do not know which university to choose, which secondary school. I do not have an idea where I want to work when I am older, because I know that even if I come up with an idea, it’s nearly impossible that I will be working there. I won’t get that job, it’s very difficult to get a job nowadays, especially without useful connections. I have no idea what my future will look like.’ [PO-NH1-INV-YP3]

“But I don’t know where to go or how to start things. I know it would work if I took my responsibility and got something started, but I don’t know how” (SE-IV-SS-Y13).

4.1.6 Signposts

These sentiments revealed a further trend negatively affecting young people and reinforcing inequalities, which we characterise as the loss of signposts. Young people who expressed despair about their conditions in terms of services and opportunities, revealed there to be a falling out of key layers of support that were expected to help the transition from child to adulthood. Given the significant shrinking of welfare services such as careers advice and the burgeoning distance between young people and statutory agencies, there was less availability of information and guidance about things in a young person’s emerging landscape that might enable them to experiment or innovate.

“The problem here is that the majority of young people have no access to the same resources we (two staff members of a youth centre) had and I guess that the replacement becomes difficult”. [ES-IV-OTH-Y12]

“It seems to me that they are good talkers. And then they do this brainwashing and they put you somewhere and later you are thinking, well that was nothing that I ever wanted at it was agreed otherwise.” [DE-OTH-IV-Y5]

“If I want to find out what has happened at school, we have, for example, a Facebook group. I join in and have all the information at hand. I don’t need to wander from door to door. (...) the idea came from the students themselves, to put all the information in a single place.’ [PO-IV-NH2-YP3]

“Back then, I didn’t know what I was supposed to choose. I didn’t know what I wanted to do in the future. I just chose the education that seemed easiest /.../ after graduating I understood, and was not very happy” (SE-FG-SS-Y30).

Young people recognised that inefficacy of existing policies and actions contributed to their plight:

“90% of the staff at the Y. is incompetent. They gave me mainly job offers for VET as store man, but I really did not wanted that. Then, I have to admit, I have turned to Jan [from the homework help place in NH2]. Because you recognize that the staff is only helping you because they have to not because they want to. It always feels much imposed. With Jan, he is doing it really good and really puts much effort in it. He doesn’t forget and always asks. And therefore this is much better. I only went there because of the children’s allowance, I have to admit. [DE-NH2-IV-Y7+Y15]

“Theoretically, there is a counsellor and she should be organizing visits to other schools [at higher secondary level], but she is not doing it. There were one or two trips, but it’s not enough. The headmaster doesn’t agree to more.” [PO-IV-NH1-YP3]

“...we always talk about eighteen-plus but actually we need to look at younger than that, because by eighteen-plus they know what they want, if they’re stuck in a rut and hating on everyone that’s what they’re going to do, you’re kind of a bit late to change their minds in that sense. We hear it every day, kids are so much more advanced these days, no they’re not, they’ve just got more tools and that’s all it is. And you know what if they’ve got more tools then you need to up your game as well and do a little bit more early on” [UK-IV-NH1-YP12]

4.1.7 Education

Discrimination impacts the quality of education available to young people from minority ethnic backgrounds living in deprived areas. Young people in Brno and Sofia specifically spoke about experiences of segregation in education and poor access to quality education beginning in pre-school. Some even recognised that the poor quality of education they received was due to the way provision was funded based on head counts, for example. Because Roma populations were relatively small in the case study neighbourhoods within Brno and Sofia they were allocated less funding for education compared to other areas.

Young people also narrated worrying ideas about the *value* of education, particularly what they perceived and experienced as the inability of university education to result in desirable employment:

“... I would never rely on my University degree to find a job. It’s one thing to be a plumber and another to be a political scientist! If your faucet gets broken you will call the plumber, but who will call me? There are so many political scientists who are nothing, just thin air”
[GR-IV-NH1-Y7]

“I had to pass difficult tests although I just wanted to work. And then they put me into disability level although I am able to work and told me I had to take a lower secondary degree before I could start to work.” [DE-FG2-Y1]

“I wanted to make money, not be in debt, that’s why I decided not to go to university” [UK-IV-OTH-YP5]

Education alone was not sufficient in the current economic climate. Support around this was key too:

‘Generally speaking, education gives you better opportunities for a better job, undoubtedly. But for someone with less education, connections become most important.’ [PO-NH2-IV-YP13]

“It’s hard for people who interrupted their education [at high-school level] to find employment or gain experience. (...). Actually, the only chance for them to find a job is by using connections. I went to the employment agency, but the place is always crowded, often even the tickets run out, so and you have to arrive very early.’ [PO-IV-NH2-YP13]

These experiences in relation to education when considered alongside what young people narrated about the importance of signposts (above), resonate with findings of a recent study conducted by researchers at the London School of Economics (LSE) entitled “*Black and minority ethnic access to higher education: a reassessment*”⁴². A key finding of this study was that young people from lower social class backgrounds and some ethnic minority groups were less likely to attend schools that are geared towards getting pupils into higher education or to come from families who are familiar with the application process. The report also underlined the importance of good advice from teachers to help students choose the right qualifications and to assist them with the application process. These factors are considered to have a major impact on young people from disadvantaged backgrounds being able to access higher education.

⁴² <http://www.lse.ac.uk/newsAndMedia/PDF/NuffieldBriefing.pdf>

4.1.8 Employment

The above issues collectively worked to compound young people's employment prospects. Young people revealed levels of fatalism toward worsening employment conditions and high levels of unemployment (especially in the south of Europe) that limited their work prospects and hampered their broader life chances too:

"... The financial situation for young people in Greece is very difficult, the salaries are quite low nowadays and basically, there are no jobs. Anyone who works nowadays is very lucky. I feel very lucky I work..." [GR-IV-NH2-Y1]

"At the moment I see more people who have given up, because it is not leading anywhere. At a certain point they think: all the effort doesn't pay back, so I might as well quit" [NL-IV-OTH-Y44].

"I do not know what I want to do. I think about it all the time, but can't make up my mind. I do not know which university to choose, which secondary school. I do not have an idea where I want to work when I am older, because I know that even if I come up with an idea, it's nearly impossible that I will be working there. I won't get that job; it's very difficult to get a job nowadays, especially without useful connections. I have no idea what my future will look like." [PO-IV-NH2-YP3]

"We worked all day long, 10 days and then the boss just disappeared. Can't find him anywhere. He also changed his phone number. We were ten people, each was supposed to take 350 leva (180 EUR), but nobody got even one cent." [BG-IV-NH1-YP11]

"I am a delivery driver at Joey's Pizza and earn 450€. I have to work two times a week, mainly Saturday and Sunday." [DE-NH1-IV-Y2]

"I work in three different places: in two different transport companies in Venice and in a pizza place in Marghera and I study in a evening school course because I had a bit of "accidents". [...] Should I go to school every evening, but, because of the work schedules and all things, it is impossible...however, it is a bit hard to be able to be always present, both for work schedules and for the fatigue... it's tough. [...] My parents worked until last year, now, unfortunately, because of the crisis they have been fired, they have to stay at

home. Both of them. My father worked in a restaurant in Venice and my mother had always in an office in Venice. (IT-FG1-5P)

Young people's employability was impacted by more factors:

"It's hard to get a job, that's why I'm in school. But then you also need contacts to get a job. You've got to be specialised in something" (SE-IV-SS-Y13).

"... They work at any available position with very little money; regardless of their plans and their studies... You are subject to this kind of pressure, you have to like your job, you have to accept anything because there is so high demand from people who want to find employment and this builds up pressure. So, either you like it or not, you must submit to it and psychologically, that is the worst that can happen..." (GR-FG3-P1)

"...The most regular problem we saw in job advertisements was taverns asking for cleaning ladies with University degree, because OAED (the Manpower Employment Organization-governmental organization) had proclaimed a subsidized program for hiring University graduates..." (GR-FG3-P2)

These experiences revealed much about young people's sentiments toward structural shifts taking place in the economy that resulted in limited opportunities for highly skilled workers or in areas of the economy servicing shrinking and highly specialised sectors of finance and service industries (Sassen 2014). They also revealed the importance of making connections to help navigate the displacement young people faced in the economy.

Where young people did make use of contacts or connections these were generally friends and family leading to more informal outcomes. One consequence of this is 'social closure' - limited access to the labour market. Across all cities of the study, young people particularly those who felt resigned to their neighbourhoods, were closed in the low end of the secondary labour market or informal economy. In many cases (Rotterdam, Brno, Sofia, Birmingham) this even led to a pull toward the shadow or illicit economy.

The country reports on the fieldwork at the micro -level were rich in their revelations of the inequalities faced by young people, many of which have explicit implications for policy. These can be summarised as:

- A severe limiting of available options and prospects for young people; leading to a retreat into themselves, their localities and family as the only available sources of support
- Disengagement of young people with official/statutory structures; caused by poor language and interpersonal skills possessed by young people and abandonment by service providers
- The loosening of social ties; caused by pathologisation and over-policing of young people and deprived neighbourhoods as well as competition in the economy
- Myriad forms of discrimination; based on gender, ethnicity, age and area
- Shrinking welfare services
- The loss of signposts; less availability of information and guidance about things in a young person's emerging landscape
- Diminishing quality and value of education
- Significant structural shifts in the availability and type of employment available to young people

4.2 Social innovations

"...First of all, I would like to mention that it (innovation) is a totally utopian term to me, because nothing is innovative...I believe that everything is based on something else. I do not think that there is something innovative by definition. Someone sees something somewhere, combines it with something else and this is how innovation comes up..." (GR-IV-NH1-Y7)

The ten country reports provide information about social innovations that operate at different levels (top-down, bottom-up), involve a range of actors (young people, NGO's, municipalities) and have impact at different scales (individual, neighbourhood, ethnic group/community, family).

From the interviews and social practices observed it is possible to discern three definite trends, however, relating to social innovations. These are: the importance of technology and social media; the use of networks and being 'mobile'; and the expansion of zones of familiarity (i.e. de-ghettoisation) through uses of alternative spaces. A further important aspect noticeable was that social innovations which young people spoke about or encountered, relied in varying degrees on external support. This support could be financial or a policy action. What is clear across the cities was that social innovations were not independent of some sort of external resource/support for their validation or sustainability.

Appendix 1 is a detailed example from Rotterdam of a way to address the need for a mix of macro-, meso- and micro-level solutions to tackle inequalities and support innovations.

This was apparent in young people's explicit efforts to engage with structures of power, and more practically/ directly, to be involved in a process of transformation:

“We would like to get involved in change. We actually have an entire plan ready and a campaign vision. We know how many votes we can count on, how many people from particular lists can be elected. We are thinking of participating in the municipal elections (in November).” [PO-IV-NHI-YP18]

And also from examining individual innovative social practices to consider what were critical resources for them. For young people who were involved in innovative activities, the provisions of other actors such as the state, funding agencies, NGOs or older generations were of key importance to them, particularly for their sustainability. Amin describes this as “the political economy of urban infrastructural distribution’ (Amin, 2013: 24).

4.2.1 Technology and Social Media

A key trend apparent in all countries was young people's use of technology and social media as both a form of empowerment and activation, as well as a tool that enabled them to detach themselves (albeit momentarily) from the realities they described of their neighbourhoods. Here they are able to access other localities (even if virtually), and extend their networks of familiarity.

We use the term technology here to refer to computers, smartphones and the Internet, while social media specifically refers to websites and applications such as WhatsApp, YouTube, Facebook, Twitter and AskFM. There were numerous examples from the fieldwork of young people devising innovative ways to learn, study, communicate and organise social networks together. Technology and Social Media was also cited as key to some young people's entrepreneurial activities.

Although technology was widely adopted where and when it was affordable, there did appear to be a marked difference in usage between young people at the early end of the 16-24 age spectrum and those at the older end. The former tended to spend a larger amount of time online in virtual space and the latter in physical public or private spaces. Technology was, however, also used to transform weak online ties into strong offline ties, and in addition, virtual space allowed younger people to engage without the need for public spaces.

An example was the ‘Educational Demos’ programme in Barcelona. This project was run by a youth organisation and aimed to create a meeting point for different kinds of young people; to promote and practice sport activities; and to develop projects of cooperation to organise leisure and educational activities; to develop tools to facilitate access to the labour market and training courses with a special emphasis to new technologies. It was intended to become a laboratory of citizen

innovation, where participants can test the different uses of technology and find answers to their social needs. It was also aimed at undertaking educational work of social awareness and solidarity by engaging participants in the improvement of the neighbourhood from a positive and critical approach. The specific programme of ‘Educational Demos’ is focused on the elaboration of rap and hip-hop compositions related to the defence of human rights. Youngsters are involved from the beginning by choosing the topic to the end composing the rhymes and lyrics, recording and producing videos, and performing in concerts.

4.2.2 Networks/mobility

Networks are about interactions, which when carried out face-to-face enable better exchanges of tacit knowledge (Elliot & Urry 2010: 45-64). Young people made use of networks in a number of ways. These were often organic networks of like-minded individuals based in their neighbourhoods as discussed above, but also networks set up by government agencies or NGOs to bring young people together around different activities targeting their personal development.

“Because of the economic climate people have changed their priorities to getting involved in volunteering and other opportunities to get experience. There are a lot of schemes around to help us such as City Youth, Beatfreaks, Envision, University of the First Age and youth Ambassadors”. (UK-IV-NH2-YP40)

Some young people had set up their own ‘self-help’ type organisations even targeting children at a younger age:

“Currently we go into schools and work with young girls looking at transformational learning, it’s not informational learning where you give them information, we give them tools and things to kind of spark in their brains and awaken them to different processes and thoughts, and possibilities in their life and purposes.” (UK-IV-NH1-YP37)

Sometimes working together was altruistic or just a necessity:

“I have a group of friends, we do everyday stuff, borrow something, and get opinions on various aspects of life... I know I can turn to them at any time and get help and it works both ways. I have quite a problem to get such assistance. It is not at all formal, we do things out of kindness to help others.’ [PO-IV-NH2-YP22]

At other times it was strategic:

“These contacts come into play where they relay their contacts onto you and you relay your contacts onto them and it’s like a shared network” [UK-IV-NH2-YP21]

“When I have to study for math classes, I watch YouTube tutorials a lot. Most teachers don’t know about them but we have a Whatsapp group with the whole class and if you have problems you can ask there and you get hints from the group and someone will send a tutorial link and also share funny stuff. There are boys and girls in this group”. [DE-NH2-IV-Y10]

There was a clear contrast between the importance made of strong and weak ties. In cases where austerity and inequality were most felt, strong ties seem to be more important. Where, however, young people innovated they employed weak ties through ‘knowing’ people using social media and mobile telecommunications (Elliot & Urry 2010: 49-50). Other people were relied on or utilised in limited respects e.g. to know about where and when an important event may be happening or posting information about an opportunity.

Examples included: the Complex approach to employment of Roma (NGO IQ Roma services) project in Brno, which was a ‘triangle’ of mutually reinforcing employment projects/activities aimed at a particular ethnic group; ESF funded preparatory project in Malmo that aims to create better conditions for multisectoral collaboration in order to prevent exclusion and try to create a socially sustainable society.

4.2.3 Expanding zones of familiarity - creating spaces for meeting/networking

As noted in sections 5.3 and 5.4.1 above, place in terms of neighbourhoods that young people’s lives were confined to, were reported as having limiting effects on them. It is not surprising, then, that young people would also attempt to de-ghettoise, breakout of and expand zones of familiarity in the city. There were numerous examples of young people seeking out public spaces such as youth centres, libraries and NGOs in alternative parts of the city. Young people attributed different languages to those spaces. These became spaces that allow young people to experiment and interact with new peoples and ideas.

“For me one [the most important thing] is a space to work from, a lot of us tend to work from our bedrooms or coffee shops, which is nice but sometimes we want to be surrounded by other creative and like-minded people and don’t want to be in a coffee shop all the time. So we developed a studio space that is a co-working creative work space for creative people, artist and designers and we’ve a got great collection of people from fashion designers, illustrators, writers, poets, when we talk about supporting the creative industries we’re talking about all aspects of it.” (UK-IV-NH1-YP33)

Unofficial and private/commercial spaces were instrumental in nurturing togetherness of young people. These were also spaces where young people sought out people who might be influential.

“Sometimes we participate in various events at the meeting place. Sometimes they have festivities for children and young people. I often meet different officers there. They help with everything, if you need specific papers or other help. But as I said more recently, I have not seen so many young people in our community because most are in jail. Or they have married, I don’t know” (SE-IV-SS-Y6).

“It’s great if you could get a job in the future. The meeting place helps with that. I usually meet the preventive workers there; we exercise and go fishing together. I didn’t know them before, I came in contact with them since I live here in Seved, and we met at the gym” (SE-IV-SS-Y7).

Although sceptical of state sponsored initiatives, sometimes young people gave things a try and were surprised. Spaces or initiatives that were open and reflective of diverse ideas and people were valued:

“[...] We were hanging out there and saw all the NGOs and thought its just fucking "Svennar" (slang for Swedish natives) who do not understand anything. So I thought at first. Well, It’s kind of only Swedes at these NGOs, but there was obviously some Arabs and Serbs as well”(SE-IV-NS-Y2).

An example was ‘The Loft’ in Birmingham: a pop-up arts space in the city centre. This had been set up by a recent graduate from university who negotiated free use of a vacant commercial unit from a private landlord for a six-month period. The space became a success in attracting young creatives to hire desk space on flexible and cheap(er) terms than available around the city, to share knowledge and also have space to experiment and showcase to the public for free.

‘Communing’ of the sort young people practiced through their networking, use of public spaces such as coffee shops to work in and social media, constituted what Tonkiss (2014) refers to as ‘many small designs on the city...that recede behind the exigencies of private and the standard scripts of public life’ to form an ‘infrastructure of common life that provides sites of autonomy, creativity and collectivity in the making and re-making of cities and subjects’ (Tonkiss, 2013: 176).

A similar trend of making alternative use of public and private spaces was noted in the Chapter 4 (in the second dimension of social innovation). It was connected to the reclaiming or making new use of spaces which may be neglected within the same neighbourhood and as contributing to the urban regeneration process of the city. This has been popularised in recent narratives of ‘The right to the

city' (Brenner et al 2012; Harvey 2013). CITISPYCE partners cited examples from a number of cities (e.g. urban gardening, skate parks in abandoned squares, spaces of co-creation in old factories)⁴³.

This section has revealed some key resources that are required for innovation by young people. Against a context of segregation, stigmatisation and resource constraints elaborated in 4.1 above, the following appear to be key techniques and mechanisms for initiating innovations:

- Use of technology and social media; to supplement and buttress conventional forms of social contact
- Innovative use of networking; being mobile across the city and among groups of people unlike themselves to discover new opportunities
- Expanding zones of familiarity; breaking out of their own neighbourhoods (perceived as 'ghettos') and familiarising themselves with NGOs and civic buildings/spaces in other parts of the city
- New forms of 'togetherness' or 'communing'; that help to regenerate vacated and under-used parts of the city as well as making young people visible in a constructive light.

5. Conclusions

This phase of fieldwork with young people involved listening to their experiences in relation to the effects of the economic crisis, impacts which resonate on them and their prospects and participation, as well as in the constrained resources within their local neighbourhoods. It also involved observing young people's social and cultural practices as they sought to mitigate against the area effects identified in Work package 3 (Chapter 4) and those of a shrunken economy and shifting macro political climate of welfare retrenchment outlined in Work package 2 (Chapter 3).

The fieldwork reveals that there seems to be promise in young people being connected with alternative life worlds, such as things going on across the country or around the world, with young people being able to imagine and live a world beyond their neighbourhoods.

What limited young people's sense of an outside (beyond their localities or limited frames of 'community' based on area or ethnicity) were their perceptions about statutory agencies and more specifically experiences of treatment at the hands of statutory agencies, such as the Police, educational establishments, careers services as well as macro-economic forces that had resulted in reduced opportunities for young people. The combined effect of these forces tended to reinforce

⁴³ See <http://bcncomuns.net/es/> as an example.

pathologies about young people, minority ethnic groups and deprived areas and ultimate new forms of inequality. In addition, the symbolic relegation imposed on highly segregated local neighbourhoods, has an explicit connection with how young people are perceived and how they perceive themselves. Improvements to resources and spaces within local neighbourhoods are part of their narrative, as well as the need to find ways to engage in society beyond the local area.

Young people were able to break away from limiting factors when connections were brokered *across* generations, spaces and ethnic groups and also *within* the constituency of young people as well. While young people themselves could initiate some of these as illuminated in examples above of networks and innovative uses of social capital and space beyond their own neighbourhoods, the sustainability of innovations is a key next question.

The innovative practices we encountered were in their infancy but are nonetheless remarkable in a context of segregation, stigmatisation and resource constraints. Primary techniques and mechanisms for initiating innovations include: new forms of networking and movement around the city as well as the expansion of zones of familiarity for young people who might be condemned to lives in deprived neighbourhoods. The ability to sustain innovations beyond initiation remains a challenge.

A further set of questions to explore now would be how city authorities can work with young people to cultivate and enhance their social innovations. This may include: considering what actors are successfully engaging with young people with positive effects and finding ways of supporting these; nurturing spaces (public and private) that promote contact between young people to discover, experiment and innovate; brokering dialogue between bureaucracies and social/civic platforms serving young people; and providing signposts that help young people successfully transition from childhood to adulthood and, which register the new vocabularies and risks that are heart of young people's lives.

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