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Combating inequalities through innovative social practices of, and for,
young people in cities across Europe

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Work Package 6 Final Report

Social innovation in action

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1. Introduction

Work Package 6 builds on previous work packages by setting up pilots to test the success factors and transferability of innovative approaches from one local context to another, within the cities of consortium partners. In this section we will shortly sum up the most important conclusions from preceding work packages and outline the place of WP6 in relation to other work packages. Before going into the selection of the pilots (Section 3), we will first examine social innovation more conceptually (Section 2). Sections 4 and 5 are the main parts of this report, dealing with the implementation of the pilots and the central ideas, or the logic of the pilots. Table 4 provides a quick overview of their content. In Section 6 we reflect on our findings and draw some conclusions.

Whereas in previous Work Packages (WP 1-4) the researchers from the consortium were leading, in WP5, and especially WP6, policy-makers are taking the lead, as the most important aspect is the setting up of new practices. WP7 again focuses on the evaluation of innovative practices.

Work Package 6 can be considered as an action-learning phase in CITISPYCE. Nine pilots have been set up in our consortium cities to study social innovation in action. Social innovation is a diffuse concept, but in a very general sense it is looked at as a (potential) solution for pressing social problems. Work packages 2-4 focused on social inequalities (“the problems” and their causes) on macro-, meso- and micro-levels; in policy frameworks and social structures, in the social infrastructure of disadvantaged neighbourhoods in our cities, and in the experiences of young people.

In WP2, among others, several perspectives on combating social exclusion were distinguished:

- social exclusion as an individual problem:
- the moral underclass perspective: moral education of “want-nots”
- a self-exclusion perspective: create a sense of belonging for “feel-nots”
- social exclusion as a problem of structure: redistribution of resources and opportunities for “have-nots”
- social exclusion as a problem of both structure and individual: social integration of “do-nots”

In WP3, three local perspectives on combating social exclusion were distinguished:

- Bridging social and physical distances (solution) to address social isolation (problem)
- ‘Communing’, developing new forms of togetherness (solutions) to tackle decay (problem)
- Developing trust, responsive communication, connectivity, interdependencies and diversity (solutions) to tackle exclusionary forms of servicing, ad-hoc and piecemeal policies (problem)

In WP4 several forms of social exclusion were distinguished:

- Limited opportunities and retreat into familiar territory
- Limited opportunities for engagement and collectivity
- Discrimination
- Retrenchment of welfare services (benefits, education and training, housing)
- Loss of signposts
- Worries about the value of education
- Fatalism about life prospects and opportunities in the labour market

CITISPYCE is designed in a way that we can not only bring out patterns of (re)production of social inequalities on macro-, meso- and micro- levels, but can also bring out gaps between policies as they are ‘on paper’, as they play out in practice in disadvantaged neighbourhoods, and as they are experienced by young people. Part of the pilot approach was to create linkages between these levels, by creating opportunities for young people, local authorities and organizations to get to know and get involved with each other; to both create new forms of ‘communing’ and ‘togetherness’, as well as invite them to step outside their comfort zones.

Work Package 5 turned the focus from social inequalities and patterns of reproduction, to social innovation and patterns of production of new structures, by making an inventory of socially innovative practices (SIPs) as selected by policy-makers and practitioners. The aim was not completeness, but diversity and a more general idea about the state of affairs in the different cities: what is going on, and what SIPs are considered successful?

2. Social innovation

In Work Package 5 social innovation was defined as practices that:

- i) meet new social needs or better meet the already existing ones of specific vulnerable groups like young people;
- ii) find new ways of meeting social needs which are more effective, efficient and/or sustainable than the alternatives;
- iii) empower people, allowing them to participate and increase their capabilities;
- iv) promote the awareness of rights and active citizenship;
- v) turn social challenges to opportunities; and
- vi) increase social capital, social trust and enhance society’s capacity to undertake actions at the local level.¹

¹ In the CITISPYCE proposal, we have presented several different views on social innovation. Social innovation is described as “a way forward by providing new solutions to pressing social demands while making better use of available resources” (Empowering people, driving change. Social Innovation in the European Union, BEPA 2010). This definition seems to focus on new, more effective and efficient ways to address existing social

This definition implies that we look at social innovation as context-dependent since it addresses social problems as they are experienced in a specific context, but in a new way in that specific context. What is new in one context, however, may be ‘old news’ or irrelevant in another context. We are not looking for things that we have not yet seen before, but rather for new matches between local social needs and socially innovative practices that have not yet been tried in that specific context. Schematically: $P + C \rightarrow S \rightarrow R$. **P** Practice + **C** Context together can constitute a **S** Strategy that leads to a certain **R** Result. **S** should be repeatable.

‘Social innovation’ can be regarded as something in between ‘social invention’ (implying full, conscious agency) and ‘social development’ (implying less clear agency). Social development is something normally described from a bystander’s perspective, from the outside². This means that there are aspects of social innovation that may not always be labelled as such (Moulaert et al., 2013, Chapter 1). Social invention and its inherent active agency is normally described from an insider’s perspective³. Work Package 6 makes the turn from the first to the latter. The pilots that were carried out in WP6 can be regarded as a form of action research or action learning, with active involvement from an insider’s perspective, and as an attempt to gain more insight into how social innovation works. In other words, as a more or less conscious attempt to set in motion social development. If we look at the study of social innovation as an attempt to gain more rational control over social development, the attempt may include several general approaches:

Addressing the micro-level of individuals: A pedagogical, or *learning* approach: building the personal strength and problem-solving capacity of disadvantaged people and the people who can help them. This can encompass strengthening resilience, developing competences, building social capital and networks, providing access to media and information resources, access to education and the labour market, support in how to start one’s own business (stimulating entrepreneurship), and so on.

Addressing the meso-level ‘between’ people: An approach of *creating conditions* that enable empowerment and strengthening of resilience, i.e. *giving space* to people and/or organizations, and *building trust and connections* between citizens, organizations and government, strengthening social ties and creating links between people that can enable them to support each other.

demands. According to Social Innovation Europe, “Social innovation is about new ideas that work to address pressing unmet needs. We simply describe it as innovations that are both social in their ends and in their means. Social innovations are new ideas (products, services and models) that simultaneously meet social needs and create new social relationships or collaborations.” This definition seems to emphasize the social nature of the innovations we are looking at. It also draws attention to the relation of products, services and models to social *needs* – i.e. the subjective experience of social inequalities. In this view, strengthening of social ties, in some way or another, also seems to be a defining aspect of social innovation.

² Compare the definition at the beginning of section 2. This is an outsider’s perspective, it is probably not what an actor would think or would say when asked to describe what he or she was doing.

³ An inside perspective could be described in terms of an action plan: what, why, how, who, when.

Part of ‘creation conditions’ could also be *protection*, for example, through minimizing unintended adverse effects of mainstream policies - social exclusion that results from the tightening of requirements attached to social welfare provisions that seem to be a common response to the crisis in many EU countries (Loedemel and Moreira 2014).

Addressing institutions and services: An approach aimed at *preserving services* in times of austerity. This approach addresses mostly the level of organization of services. In the delivery of services there is room for more effectiveness and efficiency, as generally a lot of time and energy is spent on eligibility, control and management issues (i.e. meeting tax payer’s needs) rather than on achieving results (i.e. meeting pressing social needs).

Addressing gaps in services: This approach can entail *setting up new services* through entrepreneurial activities, by NGOs or the public sector.

Addressing the macro-level of allocation of resources (jobs, education, housing etc): This approach aims at new ways or forms of providing people with resources, e.g. through exchange and second hand markets, #daretoask (crowd mining for information, services or goods on twitter), or redistribution (e.g. basic income schemes, food bank).

Addressing societal trends: Identifying and using technological and cultural developments to help change the way people communicate, exchange information and views, and create new meaning together (e.g. through social media, online communities etc).

These approaches are not mutually exclusive, and in practice can be combined. Social innovation can take place at several, interrelated levels: “bottom-up” participative actions to deal with a shared problem or social need at a local level; innovative responses to broader societal challenges from social actors for the greater good; and innovations in public governance to create conditions in which social innovation can flourish. The origins (i.e. agency) of social innovations can be located or projected at different levels: individual, social network, society; in the public sector or in civil society and NGOs. Different views contain normative aspects and implicit views of people.

In this report we use a broad perspective on social innovation, juxtaposing different views rather than choosing between them. Nine pilots have been set up that differ in a lot of ways, but what they have in common is their aim to improve links between disadvantaged people’s needs, strategies and resources on the one hand, and societal needs and resources on the other.

3. Selection of pilots

3.1 Process

The selection of the pilots builds on the ‘menu of innovative practices’ from Work Package 5. This Menu consists of 45 projects, initiatives and practices regarded as socially innovative by researchers and/or policy-makers in their respective contexts. These practices have been developed and fostered by local authorities and independent public institutions from the “top-down”, as well as by associations, grass-root organisations and groups of young people from a “bottom-up” perspective, and combinations of those, with varying degrees of organisation and different structures of governance. A description with fiches on all practices was sent to stakeholders prior to an interactive Workshop.

The Workshop was held in Krakow on the 19th of September 2014 as part of WP5, to present a selection of socially innovative practices (SIPs) and discuss these with policy-makers and young people from the ten cities involved in CITISPYCE. The selection of the SIPs included in the menu, as well as the selection of SIPs presented at the Workshop, was made in consultation between researchers, policy-makers and young people from each city. The Workshop was set up as a market place, where ‘sellers’ (SIPs selected and invited by the consortium partners) and ‘buyers’ (policy makers, NGOs, research institutes involved in the consortium, and interested in setting up and running a pilot in their city) could develop pilot ideas together.

Setting up a pilot could consist of:

- a transfer of an innovative practice from one location to another, with adaptation to a different local context;
- the development of a new initiative based on opportunities identified in field work, and informed by good practices from other cities;
- adding new elements to already existing initiatives, informed by good practices from other cities.

Whatever choice was made to arrive at a pilot, every pilot had to provide a pilot-plan following a checklist. In the checklist perceived success factors or ‘working ingredients’ were especially important, in order to be able to relate what is being done to the production and reproduction of social inequalities described in earlier work packages.

The transfer of innovative approaches from one city to another could be aided by:

- exchange meetings between practitioners from both ‘sending’ and ‘receiving’ cities, through a study visit to the ‘original’ SIP and/or inviting ‘original’ experts to aid in the setting up of a similar practice in a new city;
- providing more elaborate method descriptions than provided in the fiches of WP5 (either already existing descriptions or new descriptions made by researchers from the ‘sending’ city);
- expert consultation from consortium-coordinators.

The preparation phase for the pilots lasted from October to December 2014, following up on the intentions expressed at the Workshop in Krakow, linking up partners and actors, developing a format for pilot plans and for reporting in cooperation between WP6 and WP7 leaders, exchange visits, establishing cooperations and pilot plans being written. On 5th December most pilot plans were sent to the coordinator. As December, with its holidays and end-of-year business, is not a good period for starting new pilots, early January was set as the starting date for the pilots, and the rest of December was used for further fine-tuning and preparation.

3.2 Expressions of interest and final selection

The selection of pilots consisted of several steps:

- initial expression of interest at the Workshop in Krakow;
- further discussion within each city, establishing cooperation;
- exchange between cities to fine-tune the transfer of a SIP
- final selection and pilot plan.

In the stakeholders meeting in Krakow, policy makers and young people presented an express of interest in possible pilots. This may at least partially reflect the extent to which SIPs were successful in ‘selling’ themselves and generating enthusiasm about their approaches and central ideas. The pilots finally chosen differ considerably from these initial expressions of interest (see Table 1). There seem to be several reasons for this. Firstly, following the Krakow Workshop there was further discussion and thought regarding the selection of the pilots in several cities. This is reported in progress updates from Athens, Brno, Krakow, Birmingham and Rotterdam.

Secondly, opinions, enthusiasm and intentions are only the first step towards putting something into practice. Other factors are also important: the feasibility of a pilot within the time and budget constraints, the possibility of establishing cooperation with an NGO, existing policies and projects that already cover part of what an innovative practice intends, the needs of an area, a possibility (or lack thereof) for upscaling. (see Table 1).

Thirdly, the additional possibilities and resources that CITISPYCE provides has made some pilots possible that would otherwise might not have been. Further exchanges, and an invitation (e.g. by Birmingham) to some interested partners (e.g. Krakow and Venice) to further discuss the design and content of an intend pilot inspired by ‘Beatfrecks’, has shaped these pilots in a way that normally, without such an arena, may not have happened.

For these reasons, the inclusion of a piloting phase in the research design seems to provide valuable insights and opportunities.

Table 1: selection of pilots			
City	Interested in	Pilot selection and idea	Reasons for (change of) choice
Athens	-The Loft and Beatfrees, irmingham - Theatre of the Oppressed, Barcelona	Transfer and adaptation of The Loft project from Birmingham. Shelter of ideas – The Loft. Use temporary space for meetings, exchanging ideas and enhancing entrepreneurship of artists	There was not yet something like The Loft project in the district; it fits the needs of the area, seemed flexible to adjust, and fits within the budget and time constraints for the pilot.
Birmingham	- Buzinezzclub, Rotterdam - Local Bazaar, Athens - Theatre of the Oppressed, Barcelona	Transfer of the community market project from Athens: Local Bazaar. Organize a market for exchange of used goods, where young people can meet and make new connections.	Already many policies in place in education and employment; wish to try something new to develop social capital. This pilot lies within municipal authority, possibility for mainstreaming.
Brno	- Educational Demos, Barcelona - Refugee project Hamburg - Buzinezzclub and Challenge Sport, Rotterdam	Transfer of Educational Demos from Barcelona. Recording studio. Give young Roma musicians the opportunity to record and distribute their music.	There are already policies in place in education, (self)employment, sport and so on, but little to develop cultural activities. Roma people like music and dance.
Hamburg	- Welcome tours - Roma project, Sofia - Challenge Sport, Rotterdam	Pilot based on own fieldwork: Welcome tours for refugees (Moin Moin, Hamburg). Awareness and access to cultural opportunities in their city.	Pilot came out of fieldwork in WP3 and 4
Krakow	Challenge Sport, Rotterdam	Transfer from Beatfrees, combined with fieldwork and existing policies: Hidden Wings. Discovering inner potential. Activity workshops for lower-secondary school pupils by older youth in the role of trainers.	Too little time to implement Challenge Sport, no existing infrastructure could be used. Beatfrees could be linked to an existing NGO in the district.
Malmö	No initial interest	Pilot that links to other project: Multisectoral learning. Bringing in young people already involved in planning phase of new policies	Choice was made prior to Krakow meeting. Opportunity to start pilot earlier.
Rotterdam	Interested in exchange with Malmö on developing integrated, preventive policies	Pilot based on fieldwork combined with existing policies. Integrated intake and diagnosis. Develop a single intake for young people in need of support, to prevent drop out and identify gaps in services.	Budget cuts and trend towards evidence-based working, little opportunity for mainstreaming of new initiatives. Lots of initiatives were already tried. Hence pilot linked to existing policy development.

Sofia	IQ Roma Service, Brno	Transfer of IQ Roma Service from Brno. Integrated approach for Roma youth. Improve employability and job-openings for young Roma	Opportunity to use experiences and example from a city with a similar target group. There is a gap in employment services for Roma.
Venice	Theatre of the oppressed and Educational Demos, Barcelona	Transfer of Beatfrees from Birmingham. Show and tell. Organise virtual spaces and a public event for expression.	Budget cuts, no opportunities to involve city. Small scale pilot using contacts from WP3 and WP4.

All cities except Barcelona sent in a pilot plan, which means nine pilots were set up. In the project plan 7-12 pilots were foreseen. The initial interests as expressed in the Workshop, and the pilots finally chosen, are summed up in Table 1. Barcelona is not running a pilot itself (this was accounted for in the allocation of resources in the consortium), but contributes as a ‘sending’ city to the implementation of the pilot in Brno.

3.3 Reflections on the selection of pilots and lessons to be learned

This selection of pilots is the outcome of a process of deliberate consideration involving policy makers, young people and researchers. SIPs that raised some initial interest regarding their ‘operational principle’ were not always feasible within the constraints of the pilots in regard to time, budgets and existing local infrastructure.

These nine pilots are not necessarily already social innovations in themselves, and not all are in the area of education and employment, as aimed for in the CITISPYCE project plan. The pilots can be considered to contain interesting and promising seeds for social innovations. Some pilots may prepare the ground for further initiatives in education and employment: on an individual level, by developing social capital and resilience of young people that may improve their readiness for work; or at the level of governance by providing insights into how processes of developing social innovations can work.

There are several reasons mentioned why these pilots have been chosen and not others.

In some cases, there are already a lot of policies in place for education and employment. These policy areas are generally more strictly regulated than, for example, activities in young people’s spare time. New initiatives may conflict with some existing policies. In some cities, municipal authority over policies in education and employment is limited, and there is little perspective for mainstreaming of new initiatives in these areas. These reasons are mentioned in progress reports from Birmingham, Brno and Rotterdam. Conversely, in Sofia there are already services for Roma in several areas, but not as yet in employment.

Additionally, some CITISPYCE partners have contacts in culture and media (e.g. Aston University), and municipalities are partly involved through different departments (e.g. employment in Malmö, social development and youth in Rotterdam, integration of newcomers in Hamburg, welfare and sports in Krakow), which leads to some differing ‘natural’ opportunities for pilots.

Although it was not possible to control the selection of pilots from a research perspective, there seems to be a good variation in a number of dimensions. Some are transferred from one city to another, others are developed on the basis of local opportunities; some are designed more “top-down”, others more “bottom-up”; some are run by NGOs, some by municipalities; some emphasize training and competence development in innovative ways, others emphasize offering opportunities, co-creation and using and building on young people’s ambitions, building social networks and strengthening communities; some use traditional printed media to reach young people, others (also) rely on social media and websites; some target a specific group (e.g. refugees, Roma, artists), others aim at excluded young people more generally.

The most important broad conclusions we can draw are (1) that an entrepreneurial presentation of SIPs through pitching and showing what might be possible to achieve (as done at the stakeholders meeting in Krakow) can create enthusiasm and interest, and (2) that windows of opportunity play an important role in the matching of SIPs and local social needs, and that institutional and organizational contexts play an important role in considerations for starting a specific pilot. The feasibility of a pilot in the local organizational and institutional context, and within the limited time frame, seem to be more important than considerations about target groups, which social needs to address, and what innovative ideas are central to a pilot.

4. Implementation of pilots

The implementation of the pilots faced challenges in two main areas: (1) establishing a working relationship (mutual commitment) with participants that includes the intended success factors, and (2) how a pilot establishes a position in the institutional field of existing (and partly competing) organizations, and establishes cooperation with other organizations. We will go into the first issue – the extent to which intended success factors have been implemented – in the next section. As an introduction, Table 4 provides an overview of the nature of the nine pilots and gives an idea of their content.

4.1 Progress made

The pilots have reached different stages of development (see Table 2). These differences can be attributed to several factors. First of all, some pilots (Malmö and to some extent Hamburg) started early with their preparation and could go into their main activities sooner than other pilots.

More important, though, seems to be effect of the involvement of public administrations on the speed of implementation. Municipalities often have time-consuming policy processes, or maybe better put: have policy processes with a dynamic timeframe of their own (e.g. Birmingham, Rotterdam). In the latter case the decision for this particular pilot was made later in the process, and the plan was adjusted in the implementation stage in order to provide a better link to the existing policy process. Also, establishing a formal cooperation in some cases required a tendering procedure to contract an NGO to run a pilot. In Brno this has been

time-consuming, and further delay was caused by reconstruction in the premises selected for running the pilot. By contrast, this took little time in Krakow, since an NGO was involved with which the municipality already had a formal cooperation. The pilot in Sofia required an extensive preparation with exchange visits with Brno.

Table 2: progress in implementation		
City	Delivery	Extend to which pilot has been implemented according to plan*
Athens	NGO in cooperation with City	successfully implemented in process and content
Birmingham	City	delayed, not very successful main activity
Brno	NGO through University	still in preparation phase, but aims still partly realized
Hamburg	University	implemented according to plan, too little time to fully realize ambitions
Krakow	NGO through city	successfully implemented in process and content
Malmö	NGO in cooperation with University of Malmö	mostly successful implementation process
Rotterdam	City	delayed, change of plan and successfully implemented
Sofia	NGO direct	successfully implemented in process and content
Venice	NGO direct	successfully implemented in process and content

* Implementation within time frame for WP6: December 2014 – April 2015

4.2 Actors

In the implementation of the pilots, a distinction can be made with regard to the collective actors initiating or supporting initiatives for/of young people. In some cases initiative or support comes from the public sector, in some cases from the private sector (NGOs, social enterprises), and in some cases from relatively independent public institutions such as schools and universities (compare John Wilkins, cited in Lévesque 2013, in: Mouleart et al., 2013).

Although the aim of CITISPYCE was to identify innovative practices of young people themselves, and try to support these practices in order to see how far these could be developed into social innovations, this has happened only to a limited extent. In Hamburg a refugee whom the researchers met in previous fieldwork, helped design and implement the pilot. Young people were involved in setting up the pilots in Athens, Malmö and Venice as well, but not in the sense that these pilots were linked to existing innovative practices of young people themselves. The fieldwork for WP4 did not bring out as many innovative practices of young people as hoped for. It did, however, bring out some socially innovative entrepreneurial initiatives of young people, such as Beatfrecks, The Loft, and the

Buzinezzclub, some of which have been adopted, adapted and implemented by actors in other cities.

Researchers in most cases had an active role in setting up the pilots, bringing people together, involving stakeholders and so on. In Athens, Hamburg, Malmö, Rotterdam, and Venice researchers also had an active role in organizing and carrying out activities.

In all pilots, organizations were engaged to organize and scale-up activities. These organizations range from local authorities (public sector) to independent public institutions (universities), to NGOs (private sector).

From one view, organizations in the private sector can be considered to be the most promising engines of innovation, and vehicles for grass roots initiatives. From another view, independent institutions can take on an advocacy role for groups who lack the resources and power to push things through themselves. And from yet another view, public administrations, through New Public Management as well as partnership-approaches, can aim for innovation in public services with a wide reach (Mouleart et al 2013, Ch.2). In CITISPYCE, local authorities initiated three out of the nine pilots (Birmingham, Krakow, Rotterdam), NGOs four (Athens, Malmö, Sofia, Venice), and universities (independent public institutions; Brno, Hamburg) the remaining two.

The pilots in Birmingham and Rotterdam experienced considerable delays. Slow bureaucracy is one of the explanations given for this: “(..) difficulties in connecting with and winning the active support of appropriate level staff in other departments of the City Council (...)”. More generally, issues that can be identified that prevent a smooth implementation, are:

- ***Internal barriers in the municipality*** between policymakers and practitioners in different departments. Within municipalities there is more than one department involved in tackling school drop-out, youth unemployment and social inclusion.
- ***Different policy silos within the municipality***. Each has a different focus and communicates partly different messages to partners and to young people (e.g. prevention of school drop-out and social exclusion versus prevention of people entering the benefit system). In addition, there seems to be some distance between policy makers and practitioners.
- ***Institutional aversion to risk***. For example, in the Birmingham pilot there were concerns expressed about the reputation of the City Council if activities undertaken during the swap-trade event (Bazaar) were outside the law, e.g. if someone were to offer stolen goods for sale on City Council owned property and at a City Council run event. In the Rotterdam pilot there was a reluctance from the public side to take up an offer from private partners, without an additional contract for these private partners, to start coaching young people with multiple problems in the four-week waiting period before they could become eligible for a social benefit and activation services. It seems that public

officials were afraid this might be misused as a means to stimulate referral of these young people to the private organizations which had initially provided their services at no cost.

- ***Reluctance to consider collaboration/co-creation with external agencies.*** This was observed in the Birmingham pilot, where public officials seemed reluctant to use an external organization's connections to reach young people, preferring to rely on their own links. In the Rotterdam pilot, collaboration was an explicit aim, and also succeeded, although there was also a reluctance to involve external partners in some parts of the process.
- ***An emphasis on rules and regulations – on a ‘rightfulness’ perspective rather than effectiveness-perspective on new ideas.*** This is often seen as embodied by public officials, but the Rotterdam pilot shows that private partners initially were equally, or even more concerned with bureaucracy (policy processes, agreements, contracts and resources) around the initiative than the public sector.

In contrast, the implementation of the pilot in Krakow ran smoothly. The already existing cooperation with an NGO was an important factor in deciding on this specific pilot. The smooth implementation according to plan shows that if cooperation can be worked out, the implementation and impact of an initiative can benefit from the active involvement of a public administration.

To some extent, the pilots initiated by universities (independent public organizations) in Brno and Hamburg met with barriers similar to municipalities. Bureaucracy around tendering procedures, in order to establish a formal cooperation with the delivering NGO, prevented a quick implementation of the pilot in Brno. Thanks to support from the city district which quickly rented the NGO a location to run the pilot for a symbolic rent, however, it was possible for preparations involving young people in planning the project to get underway. By contrast, the planned activities in Hamburg had already been carried out. Nevertheless, establishing a position for the pilot amongst other organizations that were also active within refugee communities, and establishing cooperation, has been a challenge. In this case lack of time to build trust was a problem, in particular with the young people themselves. There were also some bureaucratic issues identified that prevent flexible solutions (such as the need to have a bank account to join a sports association, which makes it very difficult for young newcomers to access such facilities) and this became a small but significant factor later.

Pilots initiated by NGOs have also faced difficulties in implementation. In Athens a lot of time has been spent on involving the municipality. The implementation of the pilot depended to a large extent on its support, in terms of providing a space. In relation to the implementation of the pilot, the active participation in meetings with participants and members of the City Council, the Mayor of Elefsina, the Deputy Mayor of Economics, and the Head of the Municipal Benefit Enterprise, and the Mayor of Elefsina, contributed

considerably to bridging the gap between young people and authorities. There was even some discussion of the possible development of the idea of this pilot initiative into a social enterprise.

The reserved reception of this idea by local authorities led to disappointment and discouragement; not, however, to the point that the participants gave up because they are looking for alternative ways to continue.

In Venice, involving local authorities has been experienced as a partly frustrating experience, in the sense that bureaucracy, difficulties in communicating and a lack of flexibility have slowed the organization of the pilot event. Other creative solutions were found, though. For example, because of difficulties in obtaining permits for the use of a public space (a park), a private location was arranged for the event. Eventually, the event was successful in involving a large number of young people, social organisations and associations and local institutions. This has led to the neighbourhood municipality issuing a public notice that provides financial remuneration for groups and associations of young people who will present recreational and cultural projects in the neighbourhoods and for young mediators-facilitators of youth events. In this case, an initiative developed in the private sector, once successful, was adopted by the public sector.

The Malmö pilot did not face comparable implementation challenges, as the University linked the pilot – involving young people already in the planning phase of new policies –to an ongoing cooperation with an NGO, to develop multisectoral collaboration.

Implementation issues regarding the internal workings of pilots are addressed in the next section. With regard to the organisation of the pilots, some general conclusions might be drawn from their experiences in implementation:

- Young social entrepreneurs (e.g. in Birmingham, Rotterdam) and young people with ideas (e.g. in Hamburg) in many cases are at the roots of socially innovative practices (SIPs). Many SIPs begin with the talents and capabilities of the people involved;
- According to the people involved, the active engagement and support of the public sector and its resources is an important success factor, or measure of success, in social innovation. From our pilots, this seems to be irrespective of which actor takes the initiative;
- Pilots initiated by NGOs have been more successfully implemented than pilots initiated by public administrations. Actor-ship, and relative independence of NGOs from public policy processes, may have something to do with this, but the smaller scale of the pilots may also be important.
- Rules and regulations seem to be a frustrating barrier for all actors. This is not, however, to be equated with the public sector as an actor. It is not only the public sector that reproduces these rules and regulations. The reason for this is

that rules and regulations are also a resource, and rules and regulations can be point of access to these resources. In many cases, however, rules and regulations are a barrier, e.g. obtaining re-building permits for the location of Amaro Records in Brno; refugees in Hamburg not being allowed to open a bank account which prevents them from taking part in activities of sports associations; tendering procedures delaying the implementation of a pilot; difficulties in obtaining permits to organize activities in a park in Venice where young people hang out anyway; and so on.

- Successful implementation often depends on key individuals willing to take chances, for whom the goal is more important than avoiding risks, who inspire, have authority, and make things happen. This human factor seems to be more important than structures, plans and decisions. In several pilot reports there appear key individuals who make a difference, e.g. the involvement of a social worker/educator who had a good connection to many young people in Venice, and very experienced and highly rated trainers in Krakow.
- Successful implementation depends also on good, unselfish cooperation, involving and respecting everyone and every organization that can contribute something.

4.3 Top-down and bottom-up

In addition to distinguishing public-private-independent organizations, a “top-down” versus a “bottom-up” approach can also be distinguished in implementation strategies. A “bottom-up” approach starts from initiatives by ‘participants’ themselves, and links resources and support to these own initiatives. A “top-down” strategy sets out an approach and programme and then recruits participants. Although these strategies can be easily associated with particular actors, this is not necessarily so. Also, in practice these strategies co-exist or alternate. In organising a particular activity there is always some turning point, where the development phase ends, and where involving people no longer means ‘thinking along’, but ‘participating in an activity’. In the Venice pilot there are two groups of participants described, a core group of young people involved in organising the event, and a group involved in (successful) word-of-mouth ‘marketing’. Although the turning point may be diffuse, the further into the process, as plans or activities have started to crystallize, the more ‘top-down’ a strategy normally becomes from the point of view of new participants entering later in the process. Alternatively, an idea can start “top-down”, but becomes ‘opened up’ and changed in the process, such as in the Rotterdam pilot. Here, the municipality wanted to develop a new integrated intake procedure for young people, but in the process the aim shifted towards establishing a more general public-private partnership. This is seen as a more effective way of organizing services, and a way to maintain the level of services, as much as possible, in times of austerity.

Table 3 contains an overview of participants, working principles, initial implementation strategies, and communication strategies of the pilots. In some instances traditional (printed) and more modern (website) media are ways to inform potential participants about the activities. In others, however, websites and social media are virtual spaces for young people to express themselves and communicate with each other. In the Venice pilot a ‘modern’ use of social media, in addition to word-of-mouth communication, was an important part of the implementation.

Table 3: target groups, working principles and communication strategies				
City	Target group	Working principles Impact on Education & Employment*	Implementation	Communication
Athens Entrepreneurship artists	Specific: young artists. Open to the public	Connect people (network building) Develop knowledge Bridging between local authorities and young people <i>Indirect impact on E&E</i>	Top-down & bottom-up	Printed media (flyers, posters) Website, Facebook
B’ham Local Bazaar	General: people in disadvantaged districts	Provide opportunities for low-budget trading Build community Develop competences <i>Indirect impact on E&E</i>	Top-down	Printed media (flyers, posters) Social media Website
Brno Recording studio	Specific: Roma motivated to develop their own cultural strength	Offer opportunities Build network/community Develop competences <i>Indirect impact on E&E</i>	Top-down	Social media (Facebook, website, group-sms system)
Hamburg Bus tours	Specific: young asylum seekers waiting for admission	Offer opportunities, open doors Broaden knowledge <i>Indirect impact on E&E</i>	Bottom-up	Printed media (flyers, posters) Facebook
Krakow Discovering inner potential	General: lower secondary school pupils and older young people in disadvantaged city districts	Offer workshops Develop talents and competences <i>Indirect impact on E&E</i>	Top-down	Printed media (flyers, posters) Website
Malmö Policy	General: excluded	Involve young people as experts in policy design	Bottom-up	

involvement	young people	Bridging between young people and government structures <i>Indirect impact on E&E</i>		
R'dam Integrated intake	General: all young people requiring support in education and employment	Indirect: connect professionals from different organisations involved, develop integrated intake Make gaps in services visible <i>Direct impact on E&E</i>	Top-down & bottom-up	
Sofia Integrated approach for Roma	Specific: Roma motivated and ready for work	Develop competences Gain trust from employers <i>Direct impact on E&E</i>	Top-down	Printed media (flyers, posters) Website
Venice Space for expression	General: young people in disadvantaged districts who want to express themselves	Provide space (opportunity) Build community <i>Indirect impact on E&E</i>	Bottom-up	Social media Website

* direct impact means that the pilot directly addresses issues of education and employment, indirect can also be read as 'preparatory'.

4.4 Transferability

Six of the pilots involved a transfer of SIPs from other consortium cities. The four pilots that made the most progress in implementing their plan, have all involved a transfer and exchange. There are several factors that may contribute to this:

- more realistic planning, based on previous experiences elsewhere;
- inspiration from study visits;
- saving time by learning from experiences and the possibility to use tools already developed;
- feedback partner(s) to discuss problems;

These elements are all mentioned in pilot reports. Between these, exchange visits and meeting experienced and inspiring people and key individuals seem to be regarded as the most important.

On the other hand, the Birmingham report mentions that more openness for external ideas and support might have helped in the implementation of the pilot, and in that sense visiting the Local bazaar in Athens might have helped – for inspiration and possibly team-building.

Activities undertaken in the transfer of the pilots in Athens, Birmingham, Brno, Krakow, Sofia and Venice are:

Regular communication and producing a description of the SIP (Barcelona) for the receiving partner (Brno), and a study visit of young people and a youth worker from Brno to Barcelona to look at the 'original' SIP;

Study visits from Krakow and Venice to Birmingham to look at Beatfreeks, and exchange ideas with the local experts of this SIP. A visit of the inspirational founder of Beatfreeks to Krakow and frequent contacts via social media with Venice;

Expert visit from Birmingham to Athens to facilitate the transfer of The Loft.

A study visit of experts from HESED, Sofia to IQ Roma Service in Brno to look at and learn from the original project in order to help set up a similar SIP in Sofia, and a return visit of practitioners/experts from IQ Roma Service.

Several partners have consulted other partners, especially cities, for ideas and good practices in tackling issues in setting up their own pilots.

A transfer of a SIP from one context to another seems to be quite possible and effective. All transfers involved adaptation to the local context, in some cases more than others.

Elements that are mentioned in pilots as being transferred from elsewhere mostly have to do with the internal working of a SIP, and with an implementation strategy. For example, in the transfer of IQ Roma Service from Brno to Sofia, the innovative elements from the perspective of the receiving city are individual counselling, rather than general services, and a focus on employers as a second 'target group' of the approach.

What struck visitors from Venice most when visiting Beatfreeks was that staff meetings took less than 15 minutes, and the enthusiasm, creativity, fun, efficiency, respect and professionalism of the group. Elements that were transferred are; the continuous use of social networks to involve and give visibility to young people in the area, the formation of a small group of young people with different skills who helped to create the project, coordinate activities and make decisions, and to organize an event that provides young people with a safe and comfortable space to meet, to express themselves and to share their passions.

In Krakow the elements taken from Beatfreeks are a module on social media in the wider programme of workshops, a partnership-approach between young people and their tutors, and a final event that involves young people as well as their families and friends, key local stakeholders, and that is covered in the local media.

5. Central ideas: the logic of interventions

The previous section focused on the implementation of the pilots in an organizational sense. This section concentrates on the implementation of intended internal success factors – the working ingredients of the approach – and establishing a working relation with young people as participants.

5.1 Central ideas and success factors in SIPs

A central idea of CITISPYCE is to look at what young people in disadvantaged neighbourhoods in cities are doing that could be regarded as socially innovative. Then, to see if, how and to what extent policies or practices can be linked to them in order to stimulate self-efficacy. Involving young people in some way seems to be a central element in all pilots, although the way this is done (or envisaged) differs according to target groups, situations and local contexts. Most pilots seem to focus on issues such as strengthening self-confidence, social ties and community identity, using each other's talents and networks to create more opportunities, building social networks and so on – issues that are relevant for employment and education through developing social capital, resilience and readiness for work. With the exception of the Sofia and Rotterdam pilots, employment and education opportunities are not an immediate goal, however.

Table 4: central ideas, aims and intended success factors of the pilots

City & Delivering organisation	Title and idea	Aim	Intended success factors	Focus
Athens NGO direct	Shelter of Ideas - The Loft. Use temporary space for meeting, exchanging ideas and enhancing entrepreneurship of artists	Strengthen cooperation between artists to create better opportunities	- Support from municipality - Provide an opportunity (space and support; space for interaction and workshops on entrepreneurship)	Competences (learning)
B'ham City	Local Bazaar. Organize a market for exchange of used goods, where young people can meet and connect with each other	- Organize local bazaar - Create new entrepreneurs - Provide new perspectives	- Bring people together and make them communicate (familiarise) - Create a new positive narrative - Connect young people to opportunities to work	Competences (learning) Opportunities ('communing')
Brno NGO subcontracted by university	Amaro Records recording studio. Give young Roma musicians the opportunity to record and distribute their music.	- Strengthen competences and network - Bridging the distance between majority and Roma minority - Offering opportunities	- Involving experienced musicians - Providing resource (studio and exposure) otherwise unavailable - Improving skills at the same time as developing social capital	Competences (learning) Opportunities (resources)
Hamburg University of	Welcome tours for refugees (moin	Increase self-sufficiency	- Guides in own languages (bridge language barriers)	Competences (learning)

Applied Sciences & local social work administration	moin Hamburg). Show them around 'their' city.	(knowledge and social capital) of young refugees	- Motivate young refugees to take part - Commitment of local organizations and institutions to cooperate	Opportunities (awareness/knowledge)
Krakow NGO subcontracted by city	Hidden Wings. Discovering inner potential. Activity workshops for lower-secondary school pupils, by older youth in the role of trainers.	- Strengthen soft skills and social networks - Develop entrepreneurial attitudes and internal locus of control	- Well prepared trainers (pedagogical skills, entrepreneurial attitude) - Broad stakeholder participation - Motivate young people to participate - Give feeling they participate in 'something special'	Competences (learning)
Malmö NGO direct	Multisectoral learning. Involving young people already in the planning phase of new policies	- Multisectoral collaboration - Learn about causes and effects of social inequality	Involve young people already in the planning phase Open agenda (not pre-set) Create mutual knowledge	Competences/ learning (knowledge)
Rotterdam City	Integrated intake and diagnosis. Develop a single intake for young people in need of support, to prevent drop out and identify gaps in services.	- Adequate support towards employment or education for every young person - Develop integrated intake and diagnosis	- Involve all stakeholders - Feedback loops	Allocation of support
Sofia NGO direct	Integrated approach for Roma youth. Improve employability and job-openings for young Roma	Improve employment prospects for Roma youth	- Develop relevant job skill training - Building trust with employers	Competences (learning)
Venice NGO direct	Show and tell. Organise virtual spaces and a public event for expression.	- Strengthen self-confidence - Develop competences	- Bring people together - Get people to get to know each other	Competences (learning) Opportunities ('communing')

“Learning” approaches

A central idea of almost all pilots, in addition to ‘involving young people’, is developing self-sufficiency (and/or self-efficacy) of young people. Doing and learning, and learning by doing, are important principles. In some cases the emphasis is more on tangible activities, and learning is thought of as a spin-off, as a natural consequence of giving space and bringing people together, letting them get to know each other and each other’s talents (for example Birmingham). In other cases the emphasis is more on learning, and the activities are thought of as instrumental (for example Krakow and Hamburg). Some pilots seem to have taken the shape of action learning groups, where reflection and making new plans go hand-in-hand (for example Malmö and Rotterdam). In most cases coaching, actively facilitating, organising workshops (e.g. on entrepreneurship) and visits for participants, are part of the pilots. Combinations of doing and learning in meaningful activities, in all pilots, seem to be thought of as a way to create involvement.

In most pilot reports it is reported that participants have an ambition to sustain their activities, which indicates that involvement has been achieved.

In Athens, entrepreneurship workshops were added to the pilot, which contributed to participants developing an idea to form a social enterprise. In Venice, participants were challenged to think and plan for themselves in organising the event, through asking them questions: “Who should be involved? How? Do you know if other young people are interested? Where can the event take place? How can we promote it? What local services do you know?” Step-by-step, participants were given more responsibilities and autonomy, and challenged to take these up.

Part of the Sofia pilot is a counselling programme for young Roma that aims to develop their job skills. In the pilot it soon became clear that considerable attention needed to be devoted to learning time management. This is because participants who have never been employed before, or have been without jobs for a long time, often had little sense of timekeeping, and for them being half an hour or an hour late for an appointment was something normal. For other participants counselling focused solely on technical job skills. Most participants were enthusiastic about the sessions: *“Here I discover and learn what I want. First I was not sure if I can go through with this, because I have never worked before. But then we made the test, and she showed me how to write an email on the computer and other things, and I realised that I can do this.”*

“Even if nothing happens here, if I do not succeed in finding work here, what I learn here will be very useful for me wherever I go.”

Creating conditions: giving space, building trust and bridging

Building trust requires respect for the interests, time and limits of young people. The use of the same communication tools (social media) can help to build a group identity. An important aim, and measure of involvement, is the extent to which participants feel ownership of the project or activity.

Creating involvement is also achieved through bridging, that is establishing natural “intergenerational” connections, for example in Krakow through leaders/tutors whom participants can relate to, identify with, and look-up to. *“When I look at him [the tutor], when he’s doing things, it helps a lot, he’s an interesting person.”*

“When I conduct a workshop, I try to do it the way it is done in the streets – older people teach younger generations, it’s a relay of generations. I have learned a lot from others, and then I saw how important it is to transfer experiences and knowledge.” And a participant: *“When we’ve learned something new, we would like to pass it on to others”.*

Involving experienced musicians is also an important element of the Brno pilot, and involving guides with more experience of living in Germany for young refugees is an important element in the Hamburg pilot.

In the pilot reports on Athens, Brno and Venice word-of-mouth and peer-to-peer communication is mentioned as an important success factor. Furthermore, in the reports on the pilots in Birmingham and Hamburg it is mentioned as something that has not yet sufficiently happened, and could contribute to the SIPs gaining more momentum.

Connecting young people to local authorities and other organizations that may be of use to them has been mentioned before (e.g. Malmö, Hamburg, Athens, Venice), and is also a way to build trust. This connection becomes stronger if there is something at stake. Almost all pilot reports mention shared decision making as a success factor in creating involvement, a sense of ownership and belonging. It requires that the people involved express their needs and share their difficulties, ask questions and listen, suggest possible solutions and build consensus.

In the Sofia pilot, building a connection with employers is an additional element, and considered to be a critical success factor. As participants are often not capable of approaching employers themselves through lack of experience and an adequate social network, the pilot aims to build a network of employers willing to engage with this target group. The fact that early into the pilot two participants were offered a job through this new network of employers generated a lot of interest from young people in participating – though in many cases still not enough to engage in the counselling programme.

A last success factor we would like to single out from the pilot reports is ‘time’. Several pilot reports mention that building trust in many cases takes more than one positive experience. For example, the Hamburg pilot experienced some difficulties in recruiting participants for the bus tours, even though in preparatory interviews many young refugees had indicated they liked the idea. Coming from situations in which their basic trust may have been put to the test, it seems it is not so easy to restore. Trust is hard to gain, and easy to lose.

5.2 The balancing act of strengthening resilience, stimulating self-sufficiency and self-efficacy, building competences and social networks

From the pilot descriptions it becomes evident that there are no simple recipes when it comes to strengthening resilience, building human capital, empowerment or whatever else we choose

to call it. Even though a “bottom-up” approach, linking to young people’s own initiatives and interests, involving young people as much as possible in every step taken, and building a positive identity through ‘communing’, are, in a way, considered as ‘default-ingredients’ in stimulating social innovation, there do not seem to be any hard and fast rules. Depending on the context, a supportive approach may need to be alternated with a compensatory approach, an approach of giving space by a more ‘pedagogic’ or paternalistic approach. In short: the most important success factor is probably not a single method consisting of certain success factors as such, but professionalism and key individuals who do the right thing at the right moment. As a professional from Sofia put it, both the consultant and the participant are learning “*the proper steps of this dance*” and moving forwards towards the goal.

An important pitfall in any kind of support is that participants can become dependent upon it. Whilst knowing they have a trusted person to whom they can turn for help and advice can boost participants’ self-confidence, the main goal is to empower them to act independently and confidently.

The Venice report mentions a role change of the initiators in the course of the project. “*We tried to give some responsibilities and tasks to everyone in the group because we thought they were independent and would be able to perform these tasks by themselves. But this step was too early because they needed to develop their group identity and to have a coordinator to support their assignment. For example, we tried to give some tasks, but sometimes they forgot or did not do these. Therefore we changed our way of working and decided to support them and become a reference figure for them.*”

The balancing act of providing adequate support is a challenge both on the level of interaction between professionals and participants, as it is on the level of positioning a SIP regarding the target group it aims to support.

Different central ideas of pilots contain different – implicit – views of people

In some cases young people are thought of as entrepreneurial; as willing and able to recognize and use spaces and opportunities that are offered, or emerge, to good ends. It is assumed that offering space and opportunities will provide a way to overcome social inequalities. The ‘problem’ is mainly defined at the level of the social distribution of resources – a macro-level – assuming that young people’s disposition (micro-level) and social network (meso-level) will enable them to take advantage of opportunities that come along (for example Athens, Birmingham, Malmö).

Other pilots seem to be based on an implicit notion of resignation among young people in disadvantaged neighbourhoods. For example, through workshops in different cultural activities (for example Krakow and Brno) it is assumed that participants will revive their ambitions and hope, find new talents and develop competences, thereby recognizing and creating new opportunities for themselves for overcoming social inequalities.

In some pilots young people seem to be conceived of as lacking a supportive network and role models they can relate to. It is assumed that bringing people with similar interests together

and provide them a space an opportunities, can help them develop a new, positive identity, that in turn will provide new ways to overcome social inequalities (for example Krakow, Brno, Athens, Hamburg).

Another implicit difference between pilots is a “top-down” or “bottom-up” approach. This applies to governance structures (see section 4.3), but also to the way young people are approached. In practice it will probably never be completely the one or the other, but there are different implicit assumptions about young people, their self-sufficiency and organisational abilities contained in both approaches. “Bottom-up” approaches, if taken to the extreme, rely on young people to know best what is good for them, and on their ability to realize these goals if given space. *Bottom-up approaches are based on a logic of developing what is already present: support through empowerment, giving space and providing opportunities.* “Top-down” approaches, on the other hand, assume that young people are not always or sufficiently able to see what is good for them, and not always able and sufficiently resourced to make that happen. *Top-down approaches are based on a logic of compensation: (temporarily) taking over the direction of the process through paternalism and/or advocacy.* In practice, of course, both approaches can alternate and there are different shades of grey in between black and white. The most important challenge seems to be to find an adequate balance between these approaches.

We could look at the pilot in Venice as a typical example of a “bottom-up” approach, and the pilot in Sofia as a typical example of a “top-down” approach. Both pilots seem to be evaluated as largely positive by participants. An important difference seems to be that they address partly different target groups. Participants in the Sofia pilot had to learn how to use email, whereas participants in the Venice pilot were actively using social media, for example. A “bottom-up” approach assumes some competences on the part of participants, whereas a “top-down” approach is aimed at helping participants discover what could be possible, and what it would take to make it happen.

Different logics of intervention and different views of people can be put into a typology, juxtaposing different approaches to social innovation as adequate for different contexts and different ideal-types of young people. In operationalization there is normativity involved. The most important dimensions seem to be:

Ambition: aiming at integration into mainstream society through school/job versus resignation or aiming for ‘alternative’ integration. When talking about socially excluded young people, most of our social systems aim to get these young people into education or (low-skilled) jobs. Starting one’s own business is sometimes a possibility too, but this is generally not something that is actively promoted. Low-skilled work or running a business require different, sometimes even opposing competences, e.g. obedience versus waywardness. Entrepreneurial spirit can be put to use in socially acceptable ways, but also in socially unacceptable ways, as has become clear from ‘decay’ tendencies described in several WP3 and WP4 reports. This means that there may be a thin line, and a grey area, between social innovation through entrepreneurial initiatives and anti-social innovation through ‘criminal’ entrepreneurial initiatives. Law enforcement may be part of an approach.

‘Ambition’ can also be contrasted with ‘lack of ambition’, or resignation, which can result from social exclusion.

Ability: low versus high resilience, self-sufficiency and/or self-efficacy in taking care of one’s self and sustaining one’s livelihood. Of course this is partly context-dependent. We can make a distinction between general life-skills – basic competences that are expected from citizens – and more specific skills, such as employee-skills, entrepreneurial skills, or specific job-skills. For the purpose of this typology we can probably limit ourselves to general abilities, such as planning ahead, bureaucratic competences, being able to recognize and communicate what one would need, and so on. Different approaches assume different levels of basic ability and knowledge from participants.

Another aspect of ability is one’s personal resources, not only ‘inside one’s self’, but also ‘outside one’s self’: one’s social network. Work Packages 3 and 4 have shown that a supportive social network can provide a lot of opportunities, and the lack of such support can be a severe hindrance toward social inclusion for young people.

A suggested typology of logics of intervention and ideal-types of participants

Ambition: integration into mainstream society through school/job

Learning and counselling; social capital; matching	Motivated to integrate into mainstream society, but lacking competences and/or social network	Motivated and ready for a job without further support, but lacking opportunities	Offering opportunities
<i>Low ability and support</i> Empowerment: developing ambition, competences and social network	Living day by day, opportunistically. Given up hope and lacking competences, social support and motivation to change	Aiming for ‘alternative’ ways to get ahead, with sufficient competences and/or social support	<i>High ability and support</i> Stimulating and enabling entrepreneurship; co-creation; ‘communing’

Resignation or aiming for ‘alternative’ integration

law enforcement

Key: *Italic*: analytical dimensions **Bold**: policies and interventions Standard: type of person

If there is a match between the logic of an approach and the ‘type’ of participants (regarding ambitions and abilities, including social network), we can expect the SIP to ‘work’, and we can expect a bottom-up approach (or: no need for paternalism). If there is a (partial) mismatch between the logic of an approach and the ‘type of participants’, we can expect some tensions. From the SIP we can expect top-down elements (paternalism and/or advocacy) to enter into the approach. These can be productive but can also put the relationship to the test. From participants, if approached in a way that does not sufficiently link to their ambitions and abilities, either by going in a direction they do not (yet) want to go, by over-asking them with regard to their abilities or by taking over things they are able to handle themselves, we can expect resistance, withdrawal or passivity (learned helplessness).

Examples of friction between intentions and what actually happens are, obviously, also described in all pilot reports. For example, in the Malmö pilot, in some meetings young people were much quieter and less open than usual, as they felt they were being steered. *“The participants were mostly performers of a task we steered entirely and we felt they were not used to think aloud and talk about what they thought of their future”*. This comment mentions both a mismatch regarding ambitions between leaders and participants in that situation, and a perceived mismatch of ambitions – leaders asking participants to do something they were not used to [did not yet have the competence to]. *“There was too much focus on the outcomes, we wanted results, and I think that was wrong”*, one of the leaders said. This is an example of a mismatch of ambitions at a micro level of an interaction in a specific context.

An example of a mismatch in the positioning of a SIP could be what happened at one point in the Sofia pilot. The project targets young Roma who are motivated to integrate into mainstream society but in need of support. Attracted by the success of two participants getting a job early in the project, young people also came to the project who only wanted a job but did not want to put in any effort. In terms of the typology above, the project in its approach targets young people who can be placed in the upper left corner, but also attracted young people from the lower left corner, with a more opportunistic outlook on the world, living day by day and not very motivated to invest in long-term returns. Rather than individual counselling in a more formal setting, these latter youngsters might benefit from an approach such as Amaro Records in Brno, providing them with immediate quick-wins, or more informal outreach counselling, where social workers adapt to the culture and habits of participants rather than ask participants to adapt themselves to ‘middle-class’ ways of doing things.

An example of a mismatch at the level of the (original) pilot plan might be the Rotterdam pilot, where the original pilot plan may have been too ambitious and not have been sufficiently connected to the state of affairs in the ‘landscape of provisions’, but not yet sufficiently linked to the mutual ambitions and abilities of organizations and the policy process at the time.

Restoring a match, by taking a step back and reaching a new (or renewed) consensus, can often put an initiative back on track. As all of these pilots also show, there are always second chances and perseverance may be the single most important success factor, as is explicitly or implicitly clear from all pilot reports.

An interesting case in this regard is also the Hamburg report. The bus tours target young refugees with often un-recognized competences. Facilitating them with a guide in their own language aims to ‘release’ these existing competences rather than to address them as poor-German speakers, thereby making them feel inferior and incompetent. In this sense, the logic of the SIP could be interpreted as positioned in the upper half of the typology – addressing people who are motivated to integrate into, for them, a new society. The pilot did experience difficulties in finding participants for the tours, however, even though many refugees had expressed interest in preceding interviews. The most important reasons for this seem to be a lack of trust and resignation, and possibly that young people through social media and the internet have already found their own resources. In other words: the project may need more time to (re-)develop young refugees’ hopes and ambitions before it can help to ‘set free’ their competences and abilities.

6. Reflections and general conclusions

The most important conclusions we can draw from the nine pilots, seem to be:

- Young social entrepreneurs (e.g. in Birmingham, Rotterdam) and young people with ideas (e.g. in Hamburg) in many cases are at the root of socially innovative practices. Many socially innovative practices begin with talents and capabilities of the people involved.
- Windows of opportunity play an important role in the matching of SIPs and local social needs and in supporting individual initiatives in scaling up. The feasibility of a pilot in the local organizational and institutional context, policy framework and time frame, seems, in practice, to be more important than considerations about target groups, which social needs to address, and what innovative central ideas to pilot.
- According to the people involved, the involvement and active support of the public sector and its resources is an important success factor, or measure of success, in social innovation. From our pilots this seems to be irrespective of which actor takes the initiative.
- Pilots initiated by NGOs have been more successfully implemented than pilots initiated by public administrations. Actor-ship, and the relative independence of NGOs from public policy processes, may have something to do with this, but the smaller scale of the pilots may also be important.
- Rules and regulations seem to be a frustrating barrier for all actors. This is not to be equated with the public sector as an actor, however since it is not only the public sector that reproduces these rules and regulations. The reason for this is that rules and regulations are also a resource, and rules and regulations can be

point of access to these resources, and other actors ‘play the game’ to gain access to these resources. In many cases, however, rules and regulations are a barrier, e.g. obtaining re-building permits for the location of Amaro Records in Brno; refugees not being allowed to open a bank account which prevents them from taking part in activities of sports associations in Hamburg; tendering procedures delaying the implementation of a pilot; difficulties in obtaining permits to organize activities in a park where young people hang out anyway in Venice.

- Successful implementation often depends on key individuals willing to take chances and for whom the goal is more important than avoiding risks, who inspire, have authority, and make things happen. In several pilot reports there appear key individuals who make a difference, e.g. the involvement of a social worker/educator who had a good connection to many young people in Venice, and very experienced and highly rated trainers in Krakow.
- Successful implementation depends also on good, unselfish cooperation, involving and respecting everyone and every organization that can contribute something.
- Making use of experiences, good practices and inspiration from elsewhere seems to speed up the development of socially innovative practices (SIPs)
- A pedagogical approach of learning/teaching and a facilitating approach of building conditions through giving space, building trust, involving local authorities, employers and other organisations that young people are not familiar with, are important success factors, as are endurance and perseverance.
- “Bottom-up” and “top-down” approaches, supportive and compensatory approaches, can both be appropriate, depending on the context. The important success factor seems to be the ability of professionals to choose an adequate approach in every context, and flexibility with an eye to individual tailoring of activities.
- SIPs are effective when the ‘logic of their interventions’ matches the ambition and abilities of the young people they address, both in the positioning of a SIP in relation to its target group, as in what happens in the interaction between people (professionals and participants).

The wider meaning of these conclusions for social problems as experienced by young people is not yet clear. This is partly because WP6 looks mostly at the implementation and process, and not at outcomes and results. The case studies of WP7 may shed more light on this. Partly

it is also because young people are both viewed as ‘part of the problem’ (i.e. suffering social exclusion) and as ‘part of the solution’ (through own initiatives, resilience and entrepreneurial activities), and that, in fact, these different views may concern slightly different groups of young people rather than two sides of the same coin. In Section 2 several approaches to social innovation were distinguished: learning, creating conditions, preserving services, filling gaps, redistribution, which linked to social trends. These are not mutually exclusive, and in practice are often combined. All of these approaches have been part of the pilots, though some only marginally.

WP4 mentioned several problems experienced by young people, some of which are addressed by our pilots. On the micro-level of young people themselves, important problems that are distinguished are: fatalism about life prospects, opportunities in the labour market and the value of education. This fatalism can become a mechanism of (continued) self-exclusion. However, fatalism seems to be a somewhat one-dimensional description of reactions of young people to the experience of limited opportunities. Certainly not all young people participating in the pilots come across as fatalistic. For some young people -and this may be the most worrying group - resignation and passivity may be the dominant reaction. Others seem to be more inclined to try to take their fate into their own hands and develop entrepreneurial or criminal activities or become radicalized. Social innovation that builds on people’s own initiatives and resilience addresses the more entrepreneurial types – the lower right corner of the typology. It is not quite clear, however, how facilitating them can also help those for whom fatalism and self-exclusion has become part of the reproduction of their social exclusion, other than through a possible ‘trickle-down effect’. On the other hand, social innovation that aims to do something about the most marginalized, often relies on a pedagogical approach that contains explicit or implicit paternalist elements that may be counterproductive for stimulating entrepreneurial activities of less fatalistic young people. The pilot reports mention withdrawal, passivity or resistance in specific interaction-contexts.

Some pilots have a more pedagogical approach (Krakow, Sofia), others a more facilitating approach (Brno, Venice), or a combination of both (Athens). All approaches, in their context, are reported to generate some enthusiasm among participants, and seem to restore some hope and ambition in them, although reportedly, as of yet, only to a limited extent in the area of education and employment. The question is whether or not these pilots address similar participants in different ways, or whether the diversity in approaches reflects diversity among their participants. We are inclined to assume the latter is at least partly true.

The important lesson seems to be that, rather than looking at social innovation as an independent dynamic process over time, it is essential to link continuously to the existing ambitions and abilities of participants, and that this can imply, at different points in time, or with different people, quite divergent approaches. With regard to fatalism, this means that either activities have to start from ambitions that *are* present, which may be free time activities rather than employment and education related activities (Krakow, Venice), or it means that more intensive guidance and workshops have to be offered, and small steps taken (Sofia, Athens).

Professionalism implies that we do not look at different approaches to social innovation as competing, but rather as complementary, and understanding when (context, target group) to use which; when to facilitate and support, when to take the lead or put limits, when to stimulate own ambitions and when to criticise/ask to reflect/stop.

It seems important to point out that the pedagogical approaches indicated here work from a different conception of people than the stimulus-response approach and the assumed *homo economicus* in many Neo-Liberal inspired policy measures.

On a meso-level of social network and neighbourhood, problems of young people that are mentioned in WP4 are a loss of signposts, retreat into familiar territory and limited opportunities for engagement and collectivity. In short, these problems are occasioned partly by circumstances, partly by their own retreat and their lack of a supportive social network which could provide a bridge to opportunities in education, employment, housing and so on. WP3 identified three main approaches to addressing these issues: bridging, communing and developing trust. These approaches can all be found in the pilots. Bridging especially, the familiarization of young people with authorities (e.g. Athens), employers (e.g. Sofia), associations and local services (e.g. Hamburg, Venice), seems to be an important success factor. Communing and developing trust may be regarded as pre-conditions for going outside one's comfort zone. Restoring a basic trust in authorities and communities through facilitating the building of a new collective identity, in a way, is only useful if the new confidence it provides is used for going beyond one's 'zones of familiarity' e.g. by being better prepared and more actively competing for jobs or education, or by developing one's own entrepreneurial activities. Connecting people outside their familiar territory can also help them and challenge them to take these steps.

Some pilot reports (Sofia, Krakow, Athens) explicitly mention the experiences of participants going outside their comfort-zones and the positive effect it has on them, in the sense of opening new perspectives they did not know existed. It is not yet clear to what extent this is a general experience of participants in other pilots.

It is important to add here that developing trust and communing can also be stepping stones into criminal activities or radicalization, depending on how and with whom the new collective identity is developed. For this reason bridging – engaging 'outside' people and organizations that are relevant for participants – may make a difference between developing social innovation and 'not so social' innovation.

On a macro-level, according to WP4, young people encounter especially limited opportunities in the labour market, discrimination and retrenchment of welfare services (benefits, education and training, housing). None of the pilots had redistribution as an explicit aim, although the Local Bazaar in Birmingham and involving young people already in the planning phase of new policies in Malmö could partly be regarded as such. The Local Bazaar is, among others, aimed at facilitating redistribution of second hand goods and services. There has been too limited experience in this pilot to say something about the potential of social innovation at a macro-level of access to resources for breaking circles of social exclusion. The pilot in Malmö so far has mainly been described regarding the process, not yet the results. It would be

interesting to see some case studies in this area, to see to what extent structures of opportunities can be directly addressed in innovative practices, and what effect this can have for the social exclusion of young people.

On an institutional level, social innovation can encompass preserving services in times of austerity, or setting up new services to fill gaps. This has been indirectly addressed in the Rotterdam pilot that was aimed at establishing a public-private partnership, as a more efficient way to organize and coordinate services as well as to further develop policies by giving more space to ‘frontline’ input – experiences of organizations in working with young people and their problems. Again, the pilot has not yet made enough progress to say something about tangible results. Process indicators such as the evaluation of participating professionals, and the consensus that has been reached about actions for improvement of services, indicate a positive effect.

Lastly, some pilots (Venice, Hamburg) made extensive use of social media in their communication. Using the same tools of communication (social media) is reported to help create a group identity. An important aspect is that social media allow for two-way communication.

In Section 2 we defined the study of social innovation as an attempt to gain more rational control over social development. The typology outlined in Section 5 aims to support people and organizations involved in socially innovative practices to choose an appropriate approach in different contexts.

This report gathers together findings from nine pilots undertaken in nine out of the ten cities in the ten countries where CITISPYCE partners are based. They are mostly taken from the Menu of 45 Innovative Practices (WP5) which drew on the identification of potentially innovative practices of and for young people facing inequalities in the preceding fieldwork phase. Although it was not possible to control the selection of pilots from a research perspective, there nevertheless seems to have been a diversity of approaches and intervention mechanisms which we have been able to test out – albeit on a limited scale and within relatively short time-frames. We have been able both to explore the attitudinal and operational factors which may be critical to their successful implementation and gain insights into the key ingredients for a successful transfer of a socially innovative practice (SIP) from one context to another. In other words, we have fulfilled our aims which were to see what is going on in cities with regard to the development and implementation of innovative social practices of and for young people and what are the essential ingredients for the successful transfer of an initiative from one context to another. The Work Package 7 report will then go on to evaluate the SIPs we have identified in terms of their impact on the different types and levels of inequality still being experienced by many young people across Europe.

7. References

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